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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores how the novels of Virginia Woolf and Jean Rhys – To the 
Lighthouse (1927), Between the Acts (1941), After Leaving Mr Mackenzie (1930) 
and Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) – despite being set in times of wars and social change 
that influence personal lives, maintain an attachment to and love for life. This thesis 
proposes that Woolf and Rhys ‘locate’ this attachment to life in the moments and 
atmospheres of ‘strange intimacy’ – in sensual, affective, and oddly intimate 
moments and settings where characters realise their bodily connection to the world 
of others, things, and places.  
This work suggests that this love for life is cultivated when life is seen as ‘a 
life’ and selves as ‘haecceities’ in the Deleuzian sense, and when we consider 
modern life as enchanted, not disenchanted. To examine the love for life and strange 
intimacies further, this thesis rethinks the works of Hélène Cixous in the light of 
contemporary theories of affect and new materialism that are inspired by Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s philosophies. This theoretical framework allows the 
examination of the complex ways in which intimacy, selfhood, and desire are 
portrayed in Woolf’s and Rhys’s modernist fiction. This thesis also demonstrates 
how post-structural feminism’s focus on radical alterity and its emphasis on and 
(re)turn to materiality, the non-human, bodies, and affects, which are drawn together 
in the notion of écriture féminine, pre-figures the concerns of affect studies and new 
materialisms. 
The reading of Cixous’s, Deleuze and Guattari’s, and Bennett’s works 
performed in this thesis demonstrates how their theories of affect and the non-human 
help us to further our understanding of intimacy in the works of Woolf and Rhys and 
to reconsider the life-affirming, affective, and anti-Oedipal qualities of their 
modernism. Such an approach allows not only the discovery of a new understanding 
of Woolf’s and Rhys’s writings, but it contributes significantly to how we 
understand these theories and modernism in general.  
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Introduction 
Strange Intimacy in Virginia Woolf’s and Jean Rhys’s fiction 
 
October appeared in puffs of air, in fragments, in sorrows, and I think that’s the way 
one writes: discontinuously. Then, in a way, one cheats: one reassembles, pastes 
together, puts it all in order. That order doesn’t come solely from outside, of course. 
What is order? It’s a form hidden in disorder. 
Hélène Cixous, Stigmata 
Writing follows life like its shadow, extends it, hears it, engraves it. 
Hélène Cixous, ‘From the Scene of the Unconscious’ 
 
“Why waste sensation […] why waste a single drop that can be pressed out of this 
ripe, this melting, this adorable world?” wonders the narrator of Virginia Woolf’s 
final novel, Between the Acts (1941), looking at Mrs Manresa sipping coffee on a 
June afternoon in a scenic old country house on the eve of the Second World War. 
This moment, like many other moments in the four novels by Virginia Woolf and 
Jean Rhys explored in this thesis, are full of invisible, yet bodily, attachments to the 
material world and between characters in the midst of times of personal and political 
disorder and change. Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927) and Between the Acts (1941), 
and Rhys’s After Leaving Mr Mackenzie (1930) and Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) are 
full of intimate moments and strange encounters between unlikely characters and 
their environments, enhancing the characters’ sense of being attached to life during 
uncertain times. It is thus not only writing that is discontinuous, but also life. 
Because writing, as Hélène Cixous (1998) indicates in the above quotations, follows 
life like its shadow, hearing it, engraving it, extending it, eventually making order 
out of disorder (p. 39). The main aim of this thesis is to explore how the novels of 
Woolf and Rhys, despite being set in times of war and social change that influence 
personal lives, maintain an attachment to and love for life. They show us how in life, 
like in writing, a certain order nevertheless emerges and remains in the seeming 
chaos and discontinuity. I propose that Woolf and Rhys each ‘locate’ this attachment 
to life precisely in the moments similar to Mrs Manresa’s coffee-sipping – in 
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sensual, affective, and oddly intimate moments where characters realise their bodily 
connection to the world of others, things, and places. 
Jane Bennett’s tale of an enchanted modernity and her view on ethics as 
something affective and bodily in The Enchantment of Modern Life (2001) are 
central to exploring the attachments to life in Woolf’s and Rhys’s writings. 
Enchantment for Bennett (2001) “entails a state of wonder, and one of the 
distinctions of this state is the temporary suspension of chronological time and 
bodily movement. To be enchanted, then, is to participate in a momentarily 
immobilizing encounter; it is to be transfixed, spellbound” (p. 5). Inspired by 
Bennett’s sense of enchantment, I argue that Woolf’s and Rhys’s writings too try to 
enhance the feeling of being attached to life. For Bennett, the sense that it’s good to 
be alive and the atmosphere or mood of enchantment are formed in encounters 
amidst everyday, ordinary lives, not in the presence of something divine or in 
pristine nature (although they can happen there too). In the same way, Woolf and 
Rhys pay particular attention to ordinary, daily sites and encounters. Bryony Randall 
writes about the modern everyday in Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life 
(2007), arguing that 
while the term ‘everyday’ is most commonly seen as describing a particular 
range of practices – cooking, washing, gossip, walking, and so on – a more 
appropriate description of the everyday might be a particular perspective on, 
a particular kind of attention paid to, the various practices that make life up 
as a whole (p. 11).  
Two things from this quotation are important: first, that the everyday is a particular 
perspective, an attention paid to certain things and practices in life instead of certain 
daily activities. This description of the everyday depicts what critics working with 
affect such as Kathleen Stewart, Lauren Berlant, and Sara Ahmed do in their work. 
Stewart’s Ordinary Affects (2007), Berlant’s Cruel Optimism (2008), their co-
authored The Hundreds (2019), and Sara Ahmed’s The Promise of Happiness (2010) 
pay particular attention to things and practices that otherwise go unnoticed or get 
swept up in bigger events or narratives. The moments, glances, and gestures that they 
notice form an alternative story of what a good life means besides the 
heteronormative tales of happiness as marriage and family. These works, and the 
emphasis on the ordinary (where ordinary often actually gains the prefix extra), are 
influential to my thinking in this thesis. Although Cruel Optimism will be the only of 
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these works with which I engage in a comprehensive manner, this body of work is 
significant to my thesis not only because the authors write about affect, but because 
they write affectively and pay attention to the daily sites that enchant and affect us. In 
The Hundreds (2019) Berlant and Stewart explore “the partial yet precise points of 
contact in everyday life that register like a blip in the course of things” that make up 
a life (p. 100). They explore what happens with the knowledge that “here we are. 
This is it” (Berlant and Stewart, 2019, p. 101). I too examine how Woolf and Rhys 
‘deal’ with their here and now, which, for us, is ‘there and then’. I am interested in 
tracing the moments of what Berlant considers ‘minor intimacies’ in her ‘Intimacy: 
A Special Issue’ (1998). I am interested in the moments that have no life in 
heteronormative plots – glances, gestures, encounters, pauses – and which make up 
Woolf’s and Rhys’s characters’ everyday. It is precisely in these moments that 
characters experience an enhanced sense of being attached to life.   
Second, ‘life as a whole’ is at the centre of this thesis. In A Room of One’s 
Own (1929), Woolf suggests that a writer who has gained freedom and courage can 
finally write about “the common life which is the real life and not [about] the little 
separate lives which we live as individuals” (1992, p. 146). She urges us to “see 
human beings not always in relation to each other but in relation to reality; and the 
sky, too, and the trees of whatever it may be in themselves” (Woolf, 1992, p. 146). In 
a letter to Francis Wyndham on 14 September 1959 Rhys writes that “when I say I 
write for love I mean that there are two places for me. Paris (or what it is to me) and 
Dominica […] both these places or the thought of them make me want to write” 
(1984, p. 171). Following this, I propose that Woolf and Rhys depict life not as daily 
lives of men and women with particular activities, but life as a whole, including 
human and non-human, animate and inanimate matter. Although this point is more 
explicit in Woolf’s thinking in the above quotation, Rhys too seems to indicate that it 
is places, which always include life as a whole, that make her want to write, not 
individual people and their lives. Gilles Deleuze writes in ‘Immanence: A Life’ 
(1995/2002), that “a life is everywhere [...] an immanent life carrying with it the 
events and singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects” (2002, pp. 
27-29). ‘A life’ for Deleuze is not a subjective life lived by an individual, but 
something asubjective and impersonal, something that always happens in an 
encounter in relation to other people and, most importantly, in relation to and among 
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the world of non-human – it is not a particular individual human life, but life as such. 
Throughout this thesis, when I refer to life, I always refer to ‘a life’ in the Deleuzian 
sense.  
In ‘Modern Fiction’ (1921), Woolf tells us that the modernist writers aim to 
“get closer to life” (2008, p. 8). In this thesis, I too trace the desire to get intimate 
with life in both Woolf’s and Rhys’s writings. One of the central questions of this 
thesis is how Woolf and Rhys, and their characters, become (strangely) intimate with 
life. The thesis, then, has two major lines of inquiry. First, I engage with Woolf and 
Rhys’s fictions in the context of theories that mark the material, affective, and/or 
post-human turn that the humanities has witnessed in the past twenty or so years. 
This entails reading their fiction with Jane Bennett, Lauren Berlant, Claire 
Colebrook, and Elizabeth Grosz, all whose works are, to different extents, inspired 
by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s philosophy. I particularly engage with the 
concept of desire in their work to emphasise how Woolf’s and Rhys’s fictions too 
ask us to see desire as life-affirming, multiple, and anti-Oedipal. This desire comes 
often across as strange, but it is also that which creates intimacy between characters, 
and also that which creates strangely intimate atmospheres. 
Second, I bring Hélène Cixous’s writings in dialogue with the 
abovementioned theories because reading Cixous’s écriture féminine in the light of 
contemporary theories of affect and new materialism that are influenced by Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophies allows us not only to discover new things in Woolf and 
Rhys’s work, but contributes significantly to how we understand these theories and 
modernism in general. I propose that putting Cixous in dialogue with Deleuze allows 
us to demonstrate how post-structural feminism’s focus on radical alterity and its 
emphasis and (re)turn to materiality, bodies, and affects, which are drawn together in 
the notion of écriture féminine, pre-figures the concerns of affect studies and new 
materialisms and explains Rhys’s and Woolf’s engagement with place and the non-
human as the radical other in their writing. I propose that Cixous’s concept of 
écriture féminine in ‘Sorties’ and ‘The Laugh of Medusa’, both written in 1975, lays 
a foundation for a theory of affective writing that emphasises the importance of 
materiality and the non-human she continues to develop through Three Steps on the 
Ladder Writing (1990/1993), Rootprints (1994/1997), Stigmata (1998), and various 
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novels, such as Hyperdream (2006/2009) and So Close (2007/2009). 1 This writing 
creates a certain aesthetic which allows that which Berlant calls ‘minor intimacies’ to 
have a life.  
The first section of this introduction gives an overview of Woolf’s and 
Rhys’s own ideas about affect, embodiment, and materiality in their writing that 
have inspired me to read their works in the theoretical framework I develop in this 
thesis. In this section, with the help of Woolf and Rhys, Deleuze and Guattari, and 
Cixous, I also define what I mean by affect. The second section explores the 
relationship between modernity, modernism, and affect. In the third section, I focus 
on Cixous’s écriture féminine and propose that we should understand it as an 
affective writing of materiality, embodiment, and the non-human. In the fourth 
section, I explore notions of desire and what I refer to as ‘strange intimacy’, and how 
these can emerge from affective writing; and vice versa – how noticing various 
‘strange intimacies’ can create affective writing. I begin to examine the ethics of 
desire and intimacy in the fourth section, and in the fifth section, I explore the ethical 
implications of being attached to a life, and how this attachment is ethical precisely 
because it engages with joy, desire, and wonder. Finally, I give a brief outline of the 
four chapters.  
 
                                                             
1 Cixous and Deleuze were contemporaries and were certainly aware of one another. Cixous is 
familiar with Deleuze’s work, referring to ‘lines of flight’ in one interview in 2005, for example 
(2008, p. 181). Line of flight, a term developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand 
Plateaus (1980/1987),  might be relevant for Cixous because like the idea behind ‘lines of flight’, 
Cixous’s work in interested in escaping oppressive social systems and creating new possibilities. 
Deleuze has written about Cixous’s writing in Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974 (2004), 
praising it as follows: “In my view, Cixous has invented a new and original kind of writing, which 
gives her a particular place in modern literature: writing in strobe, where the story comes alive, 
different themes connect up, and words form various figures according to the precipitous speeds of 
reading and association” (p. 229). Although these are just a few examples that Deleuze and Cixous 
admired one another’s works, this admiration and influence is, as I will demonstrate, apparent in their 
thinking and writing more generally.  
           There is also some criticism available that puts their works into dialogue. Timothy Murray, for 
instance, in a roundtable discussion in 17 March 2014 on post-structuralism and/or new materialism 
has discussed écriture féminine and new materialism: 
https://openreflections.wordpress.com/2014/03/17/new-materialism-andor-post-structuralism/. 
Véronique Bergen’s ‘The powers of the outside in Deleuze and Cixous’ (2013) considers materiality 
and the ‘outside’ in Cixous and Deleuze. However, Bergen positions her work within structuralist and 
post-structuralist theories. Also, although Cixous after/ depuis 2000 (2017), the most recent collection 
of critical works on Cixous’s writings up to date, does not read her with new materialist or affect 
theories per se. There is, however, a chapter on archives, and the material work done in literary 
criticism. I have written an article ‘Philosophising in Plato’s Cave: Hélène Cixous’s Affective 
writing’ (2019) on Deleuze and Cixous that is available in CAPACIOUS online journal. 
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Affective Woolf, Affective Rhys 
There are plenty of theories we develop today about modernist affects as I will 
demonstrate shortly, but there are also theories developed during modernist times 
that allow us to understand the way in which modernist writers engaged with 
feelings, emotions, intimacy, and affect. Woolf has left us various essays, diaries, 
letters, and an autobiographical ‘A Sketch of the Past’ in Moments of Being (1976) 
where she describes her own thoughts about (modernist) writing. Although there is 
not as much life-writing or other personal sources left by Rhys, and the ones that we 
have are not so well studied as Woolf’s, her Smile Please (1979) is an insightful 
source for understanding what writing meant for Rhys, and what role feelings and 
embodiment play in her work.2 Woolf’s unfinished autobiographical Moments of 
Being and Rhys’s unfinished autobiographical Smile Please, therefore offer instances 
where the two authors discuss something that we might understand as writing 
affectively and writing about affect; looking at these works gives us ideas how 
Woolf and Rhys weave affects into writing.3 
In an autobiographical essay ‘A Sketch of the Past’, written in 1939 and 
published in 1976 in Moments of Being, Woolf contemplates on what makes up the 
person under scrutiny in (auto)biographies. She concludes that writing biographies is 
a very difficult task precisely because biographers often leave out the person to 
whom things happened (2002, p. 137). People, Woolf notes, are influenced by 
“many other than human forces” (2002, p. 137). She writes that  
among the innumerable things left out in my sketch I have left out the most 
important – those instincts, affections, passions, attachments – there is no 
single word for them, for they changed month by month – which bound me, I 
suppose, from the first moment of consciousness to other people […] yet it is 
by such invisible presences that the ‘subject of this memoir’ is tugged this 
way and that every day of his life; it is they that keep him in position (2002, 
pp. 91-92).  
 
                                                             
2 See Kristin Czarnecki’s ‘Heritage, Legacy, and the Life-Writing of Woolf and Rhys’ in Virginia 
Woolf and Heritage (2018) for a more detailed discussion of each writer’s life-writing and the way 
their personal lives are received, and what impact it has on their criticism and canonising their work. 
See also Stef Craps’ ‘Braving the Mirror: Jean Rhys, Virginia Woolf and the Question of 
Autobiography’.  
3 I have decided to focus on their autobiographical writings because I am interested in embodied 
affect, and how, although it is embodied in a self/ subject, it becomes something impersonal and 
asubjective through writing. What is more, there is something similar in the style, form, and structure 
of these autobiographies – both are a series of memories of places, people, sights, sounds, and other 
experiences, not a linear Bildungsroman style of narrative.  
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Here, Woolf seems to indicate that her-self is made up of “invisible presences”, of 
“instincts, affections, passions, attachments”, for which she says there is “no single 
word” (Woolf, 2002, p. 92). Perhaps what Woolf is trying to say is something akin to 
contemporary theories in affect and new materialism that follow the Deleuzian 
strand of affect studies – that human selves are constructed by and should be thought 
of in relation to the external world of various forces, percepts, and affects that 
influence human beings throughout their lives. 
Similarly, Smile Please includes a section called ‘The Trial of Jean Rhys’, 
taken from her Black Exercise Books. In this imaginary dialogue between Rhys and 
a certain prosecutor, the former struggles to express in words what she feels about 
herself and her relation to life. ‘The Trial of Jean Rhys’ passage presents the 
following conversation:  
Prosecutor: How can you believe in human love and not in humanity?  
Rhys: Because I believe that sometimes human beings can be more than 
themselves….         
Prosecutor: What you really mean is that human beings can be taken over, 
possessed by something outside, something greater, and that love is one of 
these manifestations. Then, my dear, you must believe in God, or the Gods, 
in the devil, in the whole bag of tricks…. 
Rhys: No, that is not what I mean […] I cannot say it. I have not the 
words.’[...] It is in myself [...]. All. Good, evil, love, hate, life, death, beauty, 
ugliness (Rhys, 1990, p. 145). 
 
Rhys’s denial of believing in God, or in humanity, and thinking that “human beings 
can be more than themselves” (Rhys, 1990, p. 145) refers to her moving away from 
humanistic ideas about selfhood towards something like more-than-human 
understanding of what is human. Her reference that there is something “outside, 
greater” and that it is at the same time “in [her]self”, indicates a certain relation to, 
and the openness to being affected by the external world (Rhys, 1990, p. 145). Woolf 
and Rhys, then, seem to ‘struggle’ to express something that contemporary theories 
in affect and new materialism aim to demonstrate: that human beings are part of and 
influenced by forces and things that are not human. Their writings also predict the 
ideas Hélène Cixous (1997) puts forward when talking about the ‘human’ – that 
human beings are affective, material parts of the rest of the universe of things and 
matter, as I will demonstrate in more detail later. 
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Rhys’s writing in the above quotation about “something outside, something 
greater” (Rhys, 1990, p. 145) also seems to tackle issues that are similar to what 
Woolf refers above as “invisible presences” that influence every human being who is 
alive (Woolf, 2002, p. 91). These passages bring to mind Woolf’s much-quoted idea 
that  
the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. Hamlet 
or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. 
But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and 
emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the 
thing itself (2002, p. 85).  
This is what Woolf calls “her philosophy” or “intuition” (2002, p. 85), which she 
experiences during her “moments of being” – moments, when the “cotton wool” of 
daily life is lifted, and she sees a certain pattern that encourages her to see humans as 
“the thing itself” (2002, pp. 83-85).4 Woolf’s moments of being can be described as 
specific moments of revelation about life that she experiences amidst the everyday. 
These are the moments when a certain truth, or indeed what she calls a pattern, 
strikes her. She stresses that seeing this pattern “proves that one’s life is not confined 
to one’s body and what one says or does; one is living all the time in relation to 
certain background rods or conceptions” (2002, p. 85). Moments of being then, and 
the intuition or philosophy of Woolf’s that she has developed from these moments, 
seems to emphasise, like affect theories, that life, and selves, are a compound of 
external non-human forces that influence humans.  
Both Woolf and Rhys indicate that it is in their writing they can make sense 
of their experiences and ‘reach’ the abovementioned ideas I examined. In other 
words, as Cixous writes, making order in life is related to making order in writing, 
because writing follows life, or, as Woolf herself puts it, “fiction is like a spider’s 
web, attached ever so lightly perhaps, but still attached to life at all four corners” 
(Woolf, 2002, p. 53). Possibly because of the connection between life and art, 
writing is an activity that for both Woolf and Rhys is deeply embodied. Although 
                                                             
4 See pages 83-85 in ‘A Sketch of the Past’ for the three specific ‘moments of being’ from her 
childhood Woolf describes – one positive when she realises that the flower she was looking at was 
connected to the rest of the earth, and other two negatives when she fights with her brother, realising 
there is no point in hurting other people, and one when she learns about death.  
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Woolf indicates that one’s life is not confined to one’s body, she realises this through 
embodied experience. In ‘A Sketch’, she writes that 
one day walking around Tavistock Square I made up, as I sometimes make 
up my books, To the Lighthouse; in a great, apparently involuntary, rush […] 
ideas and scenes which blew out of my mind, so that my lips seemed 
syllabling of their own accord as I walked (2002, pp. 92-93). 
Although it is ‘mind’ not ‘body’ she refers to, the emphasis on involuntary rush, her 
lips trembling, and her walking as the source of making up To the Lighthouse, is also 
depicting writing as something bodily, affective, and coming to her through physical, 
embodied activity. In other words, the connection to the outside, or to invisible 
forces, is still a bodily, embodied connection. Woolf also explains that her intuition 
to make sense of her experiences in writing is “so instinctive that it seems given to 
me, not made by me” (2002, p. 85), indicating that her ability to write is strongly 
connected to her body (and mind) being able to be affected by the external world.  
In Smile Please, Rhys describes the bodily sensations she experiences before 
writing: ‘“My fingers tingled, and the palms of my hands. I pulled a chair up to the 
table, opened an exercise book, and wrote “This is my Diary […] I wrote on until 
late into the night, till I was so tired that I couldn’t go on, and fell into bed and 
slept”’(1990, p. 113). Writing is a physical act, which is inextricably linked to other 
material objects – chair, table, pen. Rhys claims that once she started writing, she 
wrote until she was physically unable to continue. This claim is strikingly similar to 
Cixous who stated in one of her lectures that she writes days upon days, having very 
short breaks. Woolf claims in ‘A Sketch’ that by writing she is doing “by far the 
most important thing” (Woolf, 2002, p. 86) she could do, and Rhys, in an appendix 
to Smile Please, taken from her diaries, says that “I must write. If I stop writing my 
life will have been an abject failure. It is that already to other people. But it could be 
an abject failure to myself” (Rhys, 1990, p. 147). Writing, for both Woolf and Rhys, 
is an intimate act, a strange encounter where it seems to be almost given to them, or 
coming to them from an external world and its forces, impressions, and affects. It is 
interesting to note here that Cixous develops a similar idea of writing as something 
that is strongly influenced by the external world in Three Steps on the Ladder of 
Writing (1993): 
The imund book is the book without an author. It is the book written with us 
aboard, through not with us at the steering wheel […] that drops the self, the 
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speculating clever “I” […] The book that takes life and language by 
roots…how can it be written? With the hand running. Following the writing 
hand like the painter draws: in flashes. The hand leads to the flowers. From 
the heart where passions rise to the finger tips that hear the body thinking: 
this is where the Book (Alive)-to-Live (le livre Vivre) springs from (p. 156). 
It is not to say that the author does not exist; it is rather to say that the author is not a 
‘speculative I’ but someone who lets their body and their affects, which also embody 
past experiences, dictate their writing. Woolf and Rhys seem to write their books in a 
similar manner. 
To put it differently, both Woolf’s and Rhys’s writings draw, to different 
extents and through different techniques, on their own experiences, as I have shown 
above. The above examples are taken from Woolf’s and Rhys’s autobiographical 
writings. In these examples, the two authors explore their lived experience and 
bodily sensation in relation to their writing. For these reasons, Cixous’s work is 
insightful in explaining the embodied experience in relation to art without reducing 
the work’s aesthetic value, as is often done in women’s writing when 
autobiographical elements are explored.5 In White Ink (2008), an interview with 
Aliette Armel conducted in 2004, Cixous explains that  
even if everything I have written is thought through from experiences I have 
had, I find myself relatively absent from my texts considered to be 
autobiographical. The essential part of what I have been is completely secret. 
I write from this tension between what comes about, that is, the book (p. 
173).  
Likewise, Rhys’s protagonists are never straightforward portrayals of Rhys herself; 
they are not the generic Rhys-women but new characters in new situations.6 In 
Rootprints (1997), Cixous argues that “the books [she] love[s] are not masterful 
narratives but journals of experience,” or novels “that have kept the portion of a non-
novel” (p. 69). Mairéad Hanrahan proposes in ‘Of Altobiography’ (2000) that many 
of Cixous’s novels are not autobiographies but altobiographies – biographies of 
alterity(ies) of oneself.7 Bearing in mind Cixous’s altobiography, Woolf’s and 
                                                             
5 See Kristin Czarnecki’s ‘Heritage, Legacy, and the Life-Writing of Woolf and Rhys’ in Virginia 
Woolf and Heritage (2018). See also Who is Mary Sue? (2018) by Sophie Collins for a wider context 
of women’s autobiographical writing that have been belittled for centuries.  
6 Early criticism of Rhys used to treat her protagonists as Rhys-women. See, for example, Paula Le 
Gallez’s The Rhys Woman (1990) for discussions about the female characters in Rhys. 
7 I have written about altobiography in an article on Deleuze and Cixous, published in CAPACIOUS, 
and how an alternative version of a self can encourage writing where characters are Deleuzian 
‘haecceities’. I will return to the sense of self and haecceity in Woolf’s and Rhys’s writings at the end 
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Rhys’s personal perceptions and affections become percepts and affects in their 
writing. In What Is Philosophy? (1991/1994), Deleuze and Guattari write,  
Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those 
who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go 
beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and 
affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. 
They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is 
caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of 
percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: 
it exists in itself (1994, p. 164). 
In the same sense, Woolf’s personal experiences of ‘moments of being’ become 
impersonal in writing. Similarly, Rhys’s protagonists do not simply represent Rhys’s 
personal experience but are literary compounds of percepts and affects that perhaps 
were inspired by Rhys’s personal perceptions and affections. Their writings 
transform the affections and perceptions that the subjects of Woolf and Rhys 
experienced as persons into affects and percepts. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze 
and Guattari write: 
affect is not the passage from one lived state to another but man’s nonhuman 
becoming […]. It is a zone of indetermination, of indiscernibility, as if 
things, beasts, and persons. Life alone creates such zones where living beings 
whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate them in its enterprise of 
co-creation (1994, p. 173).  
In other words, art can capture a human’s non-humanity, and a subject’s (including 
an author’s) various parts in relation to place, seasons, and other non-human 
elements, representing them as something impersonal and asubjective. As I will soon 
demonstrate, asubjectivity and impersonality are central to my understanding of 
affect. Because of the focus on impersonality in affect, I am interested in looking at 
Woolf’s and Rhys’s personal experiences through a filter of writing and how they 
make their affections and perceptions something shared, something we, the readers, 
can experience too.  
 Woolf’s and Rhys’s musings about writing, together with Cixous’s writings, 
and affect theories inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, have helped me develop my 
own understanding of affect as I will define it in this thesis. Defining affect is, on the 
one hand, an impossible task because there are many possible definitions, as Gregory 
                                                             
of this introduction. For a more thorough engagement with Deleuzian philosophy and Cixous’s 
fiction, see my article ‘Philosophising in Plato’s Cave’ (2019) in CAPACIOUS.  
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Seigworth and Melissa Gregg point out in Affect Theory Reader (2010).8 On the 
other hand, this is precisely the reason why I want to clarify what it means in this 
thesis. Generally speaking, it is possible to distinguish between two main strands of 
affect theory: a philosophical strand influenced by Deleuze and Guattari’s readings 
of Baruch Spinoza and developed by Brian Massumi; and a 
psychological/psychoanalytical strand coming from Silvan S. Tomkins’ affect 
theories, which are taken up by Eve Kosofky Sedgwick. Although there are common 
traits and overlaps between these strands, I engage more particularly with the former 
in this thesis.In A Thousand Plateaus (1980/1987), Deleuze and Guattari write, 
following Spinoza, 
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, 
what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other 
affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be 
destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with 
it in composing a more powerful body (2004, p. 257). 
Many things are relevant from this quotation to my definition of affect. To begin 
with, what Deleuze and Guattari mean by a body’s ability to affect and be affected in 
defining a body is that bodies are not defined by their external characteristics. They 
give an example that “a racehorse is more different from a workhorse than a 
workhorse is from an ox” (2004, p. 257). By thinking of what a body can do, a 
workhorse’s ‘horseness’ diminishes and becomes more of an ‘oxness’. This is 
important precisely because, as I will demonstrate further on, it allows us to see 
selves not as defined by their external attributes such as sex, race, and class, but by 
what bodies do and into which relationships they enter. Because it is ‘a body’, not 
necessarily a human body, “in composition with other affects” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004, p. 257), we have to bear in mind also the non-human, or ‘more-than-
human’ part of affect.9 In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari write that 
                                                             
8 Many writers engage with the word ‘affect’ and write about its use and meaning. See for example 
Linda Zerilli’s ‘The Turn to Affect and the Problem of Judgement’ (2015), Patricia Clough’s The 
Affective Turn (2007), Ruth Ley’s ‘The Turn to Affect: A Critique’ (2011), Sara Ahmed’s afterword 
to the second edition of Cultural Politics of Emotion (2014), Brian Massumi’s The Politics of Affect 
(2015), Lisa Blackman’s Immaterial Bodies: Affect, Embodiment, Mediation (2012), Kathleen 
Stewart’s Ordinary Affects (2007), and Ben Highmore’s Ordinary Lives: Studies in the Everyday 
(2011), as well as various authors like Jane Bennett (2001, 2010), Lauren Berlant (1998, 2012), and 
Julie Taylor (2015) with whom I engage more thoroughly in this thesis. All these writings address the 
various problems around defining and ‘using’ affect.  
9 See Lisa Blackman’s Loving the Alien (2016) and Dorion Sagan’s ‘The Human is More than 
Human: Interspecies, Communities and the New “Facts of Life”. Theorizing the Contemporary’, 
(2011). Lisa Blackman (2016), following Sagan, uses the term ‘more-than-human’, indicating “a 
  
15 
 
“affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man” (1994, p. 169).10 The 
focus on bodies, whether human or not, is the first point of contact I draw out 
between Deleuze and Guattari, and Cixous in this work.11 In Three Steps on the 
Ladder of Writing (1993), in the final step, in the School of Roots, Cixous writes that 
If I have referred to these contiguities and over-flowings, it is to emphasise 
that none of this can be done without the body. Our body is the place of this 
questioning. And what about the flower part in our body? I’m planting this 
question here and I’ll let it grow (p. 132).  
Bodily, material, and not altogether human aspects are at the heart of Cixous’s 
writings. In Rootprints (1997), she claims that it is not reason and science that dictate 
her thinking, but affects: “what [are of] interest to all human beings” (p. 68). And 
affects, for her, begin in the body, “from the heart where passions rise to the finger 
tips that hear the body thinking” (Cixous, 1997, p. 156, emphasis mine). For Cixous, 
it is also bodies that think, not just minds. As we can see from the above quotations, 
bodies, both human and non-human, are important both for her and for Deleuze and 
Guattari. 
Affects are bodily also in Tomkins’ strand of affect theory, and in the works 
of Sedgwick. However, for these writers, affects are often bodily manifestations of 
emotions. In my understanding, affects are something different – this is why Deleuze 
and Guattari’s, and Cixous’s emphasis on the encounter is relevant. In other words, 
coming back to the quotation from A Thousand Plateaus, “how [affects] can or 
cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body”, 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 257) stresses the essentiality of an encounter with 
defining a body in that moment of an encounter. In Cixous’s work, this encounter is 
highlighted by focus on ‘in-betweenness’. In Rootprints, Cixous writes, speaking of 
affect, “the adventure […] is in the in-between for us, tormented humans […] we are 
                                                             
particular form of posthumanism or more-than-humanism, which draws on concepts such as 
entanglement, commingling, co-habitation, co-evolution and co-enactment in order to describe just 
what we are doing when we are being human” (p. 7). I use more-than-human to  keep the attention 
also on the human, which is central in Cixous’s work, as I will demonstrate later on.  
10 See A Thousand Plateaus for various ‘becomings’ and the last section in What is Philosophy? for 
the relevance of becoming in terms of art. It is important to note that all Deleuze’s and Guattaris’ 
concepts such as ‘becoming’, ‘multiplicity’, ‘haecceity’, ‘a life’, ‘rhizome’ and ‘Body Without 
Organs’ among others are all in complex relations to one another and it is not the aim of this thesis to 
explore all these concepts, but to focus on their general ideas about the positivity of desire and their 
aim to define subjectivity not in Freudian psychoanalytical terms but in relation to the world as such 
via various human and non-human encounters. 
11 See my article in CAPACIOUS on Cixous’s affective writing in her Hyperdream (2006/ 2009) and 
how this novel echoes a Deleuzian sense of ‘a life’ and a sense of self as an ‘haecceity’.  
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particles without depth in the scene of the present. The deep effects arise in the 
aftermath. The roots grow afterward, first the shock, then the nerves” (1997, p. 68). 
First, this quotation echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of affect as something that 
happens between bodies (1987, p. 257, pp. 287-290). Affect, as Lauren Berlant 
(2011) reminds us, also following Deleuze, “emerges not in the nervous system of 
persons but worlds” (p. 14). Cixous too indicates that affects are not contained 
within individuals, but shared between humans and the world. Second, the ideas of 
roots growing and deep effects arising in the aftermath refer to the fact that affect 
happens before it is named; before we can make sense of what emotions it forms 
itself into. Accordingly, following Deleuze and Guattari and Cixous, emotion is 
something rather different from affect – it is not contained within an individual and it 
is more complex than one single emotion. 
Affect, in short, is something experienced in bodies and shared among 
bodies, creating a certain atmosphere, or moments in which certain intimacies and 
desires that otherwise go unnoticed gain prominence. I am interested in how Woolf 
and Rhys ‘catch’ these atmospheres and moments of affect in writing. As 
demonstrated above, Woolf and Rhys both get hold of certain moments, sensations, 
emotions, and experiences in their writing, and as I have suggested, by putting these 
instances into writing, make what was personal rather impersonal and, accordingly, 
affective. In the chapters that follow I examine those moments and atmospheres, and 
how Woolf and Rhys use silence and heat, for instance, to slow down the narrative 
and absorb their characters as well as their readers to these affective moments and 
atmospheres. Looking at affects in writing is also the reason why Cixous’s work is 
insightful. She writes in Rootprints:  
If one could x-ray-photo-eco-graph a time, an encounter between two people 
of whatever sex they might be, by some extraordinary means; and if one 
could consume the radiation of this encounter in a transparent sphere, and 
then listen to what is produced in addition to the exchange identifiable in the 
dialogue – this is what writing tries to do: to keep the record of these 
invisible events […] all that will not have been pronounced but will have 
been expressed with means other than speech – that can be taken up in the 
web of writing (1997, p. 48).  
As Cixous indicates, because we do not have this magical x-ray-photo-eco-graph of 
an encounter, the closest we can get to examine this encounter is in writing. It is 
precisely this encounter between two or more people, or between a human and a 
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thing, that is taken up in the web of writing of Woolf and Rhys; a text that develops 
from personal experience but in the course of writing becomes impersonal and 
asubjective. It is a kind of writing that is, as I will soon demonstrate, affective, anti-
Oedipal, and inclusive of that which we consider feminine in Western cultures.  
 
Modernism and the Turn to Affect and Materiality 
Woolf’s and Rhys’s fiction explores the zones of life where experiences become 
impersonal, and where humans meet the non-human world. Reading their fiction 
with new materialist and affect theories, and particularly with authors like Jane 
Bennett, Hélène Cixous, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, allows me to 
maintain the focus on affect (as I defined it above), embodiment, materiality, and the 
non-human in their fiction. By reading Woolf and Rhys in this framework, I situate 
my thesis within a larger theoretical turn in the humanities and social sciences. 
Namely, since around the mid-1990s, the affective, materialist, and post-human turn 
has been manifest in many disciplines across the humanities, including literary 
studies.12 These turns are central to forming the argument in this thesis. I am 
                                                             
12 Gregory Seigworth and Melissa Gregg in The Affect Theory Reader (2010) offer an overview of the 
many strands in affect theory, In literary studies, critics such as Jonathan Flatley (2008), Kirsty Martin 
(2013), Pieter Vermeulen (2015), Sanja Bahun (2013), Julie Taylor (2015), Rachel G. Smith (2015), 
Derek Ryan (2013) and Abbie Garrington (2016), Jean-Michel Rabate (2016), Stephen Ahern (2019), 
Heather Love (2007), Mario DiGangi (2017), Erica L. Johnson and Patricia Moran (2017), Justus 
Nieland, (2008), and Marta Figlerowicz (2017), to name a few, offer affect-oriented readings of 
various literary texts. See Stephen Ahren’s (2019) edited collection to read about the tendency to 
explore affect especially in modernist and post-modern literature.  
The affective turn goes hand in hand with the materialist turn. A common interest is how 
affect resides in bodies and materiality, whether human or non-human. Dominic Pettman (2017) talks 
about the meaning of the post-human turn. Samantha Frost and Diane Coole (2010) outline the main 
objectives of new materialist criticism. Generally speaking, new materialism thinks “anew about the 
fundamental structure of matter” (Coole and Frost, 2010, p. 5), which accordingly allows a 
reconsideration of some of “modernity’s most cherished beliefs about the fundamental nature of 
existence and social justice” (Coole and Frost, 2010, p. 5). New materialism and post-humanism does 
not place human and animate life on a higher pedestal than inanimate life and matter – it develops an 
understanding of ethical coexistence, and even an underlying entanglement, of human life with the 
animate and inanimate non-human world. This thesis, although also working against hierarchies, 
maintains a radical difference between what is human and what is not human, as well as a difference 
between human individuals and things.  
Woolf’s and Rhys’s engagements with bodies, embodiment, materiality, the non-human, and 
affect has also (re)drawn wide attention to these aspects of Rhys’s and Woolf’s fiction. Villy 
Karagouni, Marly Lou Emery, Erica L. Johnson, Delia Caparoso Konzett, Elaine Savory, and John J. 
Su’s work is brought together in Twenty-First Century Approaches to Jean Rhys (2015) and they 
study Rhys’s work through the lens of affect studies, new materialism, and post-humanism, focusing 
on the role emotions, affects, and bodies play in her fiction. Laura Oulanne (2018) reads Rhys through 
new materialist studies, looking at things in her fiction. Scholars like Derek Ryan, Beatrice Monaco, 
Claire Colebrook, and Laci Mattison offer Deleuzian readings of Woolf in the 2013 special issue in 
Deleuze Studies as well as in their separate monographs and articles.  These critics place importance 
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particularly interested in the debates around the continuity between post-
structuralism and the contemporary affective, material, and post-humanist turns. For 
this reason, I also read this thesis with Cixous and Deleuze and Guattari, who, in one 
way or another, belong to the French post-structuralist tradition. Julie Taylor’s 
Modernism and Affect (2015), for example, addresses the problem of seeing the 
affective turn as a turn away from post-structuralism.13 As Taylor (2015) points out, 
authors such as Brian Massumi, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, “the 
authors of the two 1995 essays whose appearance is signalled as ‘the watershed 
moment’ by Seigworth and Gregg position their work in response to the apparent 
deficiencies of post-structuralism and deconstruction” (p. 6). It can be said, then, that 
there is an assumption that affect and new materialist theories turn away from post-
structuralism.  
Yet, there is also work that examines the continuity between these theories. 
As Taylor (2015) argues, “Rei Terada (2001) has complicated this opposition by 
arguing that deconstruction has much to tell us about emotion, revealing a surprising 
continuity in discourse (if not ideology) between classical theories of emotion and 
post-structuralist linguistic philosophy” (p. 7). In Feeling in Theory Terada (2001) 
explains why post-structuralism, besides being concerned with language, is an 
apparent ‘opposite’ to affect theories. Post-structuralism, Terada reminds us, heralds 
the death of the subject, and since emotions are associated with subjects, one might 
indeed conclude that once the subject is dead, the emotion too is dead. It is not my 
aim here to dwell on whether or not the subject really was dead for post-
structuralists. Rather, for this thesis the idea that emotions are associated with 
subjects is relevant. Terada (2001) argues against the death of emotion precisely 
because she says emotions are not necessarily tied to human subjects (pp. 2-5). She 
writes that “it is time to consider the possibility that post-structuralism is directly 
concerned with emotion. In order for this to be so, emotion would have to be non-
subjective” (Terada, 2001, pp. 2-3). Interestingly, she is against drawing a clear 
                                                             
on the development of the subject in relation to external world of various encounters instead of seeing 
the formation of a subject in Freudian psychoanalytical, or Lacanian psycholinguistic, Oedipal terms. 
I situate my work in dialogue with theirs. 
13 Taylor’s edited collection offers a comprehensive insight into the background of modernism’s 
relation to affect – both in terms of how modernist writers, thinkers, and philosophers have theorised 
affect in their contemporary settings, and how critics read modernist writings in the light of affect 
theories today 
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distinction between affect and emotion (Terada, 2001, pp. 2-5). Yet, the non-
subjectivity of emotion is exactly one way of explaining the difference between 
affect and emotion. As I have already demonstrated, in my reading, the distinction 
between affect and emotion does exist, and this distinction can be made precisely 
because affects are impersonal, whereas emotions are personal. To put it differently, 
post-structuralism, then, might be concerned with affect. Leaving aside the questions 
of naming and definition, what is important from Terada’s work is that she 
demonstrates the continuity between post-structuralism and affect theories – a 
continuity that I also aim to emphasise. 
My work contributes to this debate by bringing in Cixous’s work on intimacy 
and affect, and by putting her work in dialogue with Deleuze and Guattari (and 
theories inspired by their work) who, despite belonging to the French post-
structuralist tradition, are central to theories of affect, new materialism, and post-
humanism. To be precise, by putting Cixous’s work in dialogue with the turns to 
affect, materiality, and post-humanism, I demonstrate how these turns are not turns 
away from older theories more explicitly concerned with the psyche and linguistics, 
but rather a shift in focus. In particular, I propose that there is a link between 
feminist post-structuralism and theories in affect and new materialism. It is my aim 
precisely because, first, academic thinking should not be seen as a series of breaks, 
but a process, and second, because there is so much in the work of Cixous that 
contributes not only to affect and new materialist studies but also to the way we 
understand modernism’s relationship to theory. 
Claire Colebrook’s work (2012) is key to my understanding of ‘theory’, and 
especially to understanding the relationship between French thought and modernist 
literature.14 Colebrook argues that French post-structuralism, which primarily 
focuses on thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva, has created an 
Oedipal reading of modernist literature, because these thinkers have also drawn that 
theory from modernist literature, particularly that of James Joyce.15 By reading 
Woolf with Deleuze, Colebrook proposes an anti-Oedipal theory of modernist 
writing which Deleuze and Guattari develop in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
                                                             
14 The link between post-structuralism and modernist literature is well known as writers such as 
Kristeva, Derrida, and also Cixous and Deleuze examine modernist, sometimes Anglo-American, 
literature to develop their theories. 
15 See Colebrook’s ‘Woolf and Theory’ in Virginia Woolf in Context (2012). 
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Schizophrenia (1972/1977), and A Thousand Plateaus (1980/1987), the last of which 
I will engage with throughout this thesis.16 I aim to develop Colebrook’s ideas 
further by bringing in Cixous’s work. An anti-Oedipal reading of modernism and 
theory, I propose, is also a way to emphasise the continuity between post-structural 
French feminist thought, and contemporary theories in affect, new materialism, and 
post-humanism. Providing anti-Oedipal writings and readings is a common aim of 
certain strands of these theories, as I will demonstrate throughout this introduction. 
To clarify my understanding of anti-Oedipality, I distinguish between two ‘layers’ of 
anti-Oedipality. First is the linguistic or textual level, wherein characters’ selves 
‘reside’. About this, Colebrook (2012) writes that unlike in Oedipalised thinking, in 
anti-Oedipal thinking, 
language is not the way in which speakers are subjected to signifiers, beyond 
which they cannot think. Rather, in the beginning are perceptions from which 
subject positions are formed, but which are not yet privatized. There is a 
perception of ‘x’, and it is from that perception or affection that there 
emerges something like a subject who speaks (p. 73). 
Strictly speaking, this indicates that selves are not ‘made’ because they can be 
signified by categories such as ‘mother’, ‘father, and ‘child’, linguistically, but 
because they are in a perpetual relationship to the external world which affects them, 
and this should be captured in language. Secondly, there is a more explicit concern 
with sexuality and the Oedipal desire for the mother and the death of the father. 
Colebrook (2012) writes that  
there is a direct relation between desire and sexual difference but this is a 
difference that is neither human or gendered nor subjective. Genders and 
subjects are generated from desire and difference: in the beginning is a force 
that encounters another force (p. 73).  
                                                             
16 Interestingly, Colebrook associates Oedipal readings with post-structural French thought, especially 
with Kristeva and Derrida. Yet, her anti-Oedipal theory is developed by focusing on Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, who are also French and post-structuralists. It seems that Colebrook is not ‘writing 
against’ post-structuralism but rather offers a post-structuralism that is different from the widely 
known one. Also, it seems that it is the Freudian psychoanalytic element in post-structural theory that 
she takes most trouble with.  
To put it differently, Deleuze and Guattari’s work is post-structuralist, while also being highly 
influential for various people working with affect studies and new materialisms today, including Brian 
Massumi, Jane Bennett, Kathleen Stewart, Lauren Berlant, Claire Colebrook, and Elizabeth Grosz, to 
name a few. Derek Ryan in ‘The Reality of Becoming’ (2013) explains that Deleuze, while being a 
post-structuralist, has also been neglected in literary studies as a post-structuralist because “he does 
not fetishize language” (p. 14). I would like to emphasise then, that it is not post-structuralism as 
theory that Colebrook sees as Oedipal, but that part of post-structuralism that draws on Freud and 
Jacques Lacan’s readings of Freud.  
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The two layers are, of course, related. The first layer is about how to express certain 
desires, characters, sights, and sounds in text – this concern is relevant throughout 
this thesis and I will explore this further in the next section of this introduction. The 
second layer is, strictly speaking, more concerned with how selves are made in, or 
rather, outside familial relations – an issue that is primarily studied in Chapters One 
and Three.  
The view of modernism as Oedipal forms a certain position that encourages 
seeing modernism as concerned with loss or lack. Colebrook ties Oedipal readings of 
modernism to French post-structuralism in general, and particularly to Kristeva and 
Derrida. Colebrook (2012) suggests,  
we might say, then, that one of the dominant ways of thinking about ‘theory’ 
and modernism, or language and modernism, has been oedipal: the subject 
must submit to a system of signs which ‘he’ regards as lawful or punishing 
(and which prohibits his desire). From that submission he posits that there 
must have been some desired ‘beyond’ that he can now intimate only from 
within language. Modernism would then be a critical phenomenon: mourning 
an outside, plenitude, unity or a beyond that could be intimated (or gestured 
towards) only from within signs (p. 72). 
Oedipal readings that mourn a lost unity with mother (when we think of Kristeva’s 
writings, for instance) create a sense of modernism that is always concerned with a 
loss that cannot be regained. To put it differently, an Oedipal narrative of modernism 
sees modernism as a loss or lack of something. Jane Bennett (2001) focuses on a 
similar tale from a more historical and philosophical, not post-structural or 
psychoanalytical, view. She emphasises that the tale of modern life being 
disenchanted produces a certain narrative of loss. Bennett (2001) writes, 
this narrative is a tale of loss, though not always of woe: disenchantment is 
sometimes described as the destruction of a golden age when the world was a 
home, sometimes celebrated as the end of a dark age and the dawn of a world 
of human freedom and rational agency, and sometimes presented as a mixed 
blessing. But in each of these cases, it is agreed that disenchantment 
describes contemporary condition (p. 33).  
Bennett (2001) suggests that to reenchant the modern life, one needs to acknowledge 
that her tale is “not a tale of a man wronged, but of a civilisation somehow wronged 
because it has been ‘disenchanted’” (p. 7). Bennett (2001) explains that the 
disenchantment tale is particular to modernity, and “the disenchantment tale figures 
nonhuman nature as more or less inert ‘matter’; it constructs the modern West as a 
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radical break from other cultures; and it depicts the modern self as predisposed 
toward rationalism, scepticism, and the problem of meaningless” (p. 7). I will turn to 
the problem of matter as inert shortly. For now, it is important to emphasise that the 
Oedipal readings are related to what Bennett calls the tale of disenchantment of 
modernity. With the tale of disenchantment of modern life, and with more Oedipal 
interpretations of this disenchantment on an individual level, we also get theoretical 
readings of modernism that pick up traces from the text that confirm these 
interpretations.  
Even the affective readings of modernist literature, then, tend to focus on 
negative affects and loss. While we could say that post-structuralism was concerned 
with signs and language, then, affect theories aim, as Taylor (2015) puts it, “to put 
feeling at the heart of our thinking as we theorise modernism and modernity” (p. 2). 
It seems that engagement with affect, however, has primarily put negative feelings at 
the heart of modernism. The alienation in urban environments, technological 
improvements that were often used for disastrous ends, and international travel are, 
as Lorraine Sim and Ann Vickery (2014) point out, a trigger for the new feelings that 
modernist literature examines. These new feelings are indeed negative, as Sim and 
Vickery (2014, p. 6) point out, and as Taylor reminds us (2015, p. 11). Sim and 
Vickery (2014), referring to Heather Love’s (2007) study, name “nostalgia, regret, 
shame, despair, resentment, passivity, escapism, self-hatred, withdrawal, bitterness, 
defeatism, and loneliness” as the most common affects that various critics engage 
with (qtd. in Sim and Vickery, 2014, p. 6). It is not my aim here to argue that 
readings that explore negative feelings, emotions, or affects in modernism are false. 
Far from it, these readings are helpful and interesting. Rather, I want to point out that 
they too come from a theoretical standpoint, and in turn reproduce a worldview that 
encourages seeing modernity, and modernism, as concerned with loss and 
disenchantment. The focus on negative feelings seems to be more intrinsic to affect 
theories that are concerned with Oedipalised readings. When we look at some of the 
readings of Woolf and Rhys, we can also trace the tendency to focus on negative 
feelings and affects. In terms of Woolf, these readings are not concerned with affect 
or materiality per se, but examine negative feelings in a sense of trauma.17 Rhys’s 
                                                             
17 There is no systematic reading of negative affects in Woolf’s work as there is in Rhys’s. However, 
there is a monograph by Patricia Moran, Virginia Woolf, Jean Rhys, and the Aesthetics of Trauma 
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work, when considered through the affective lens, is often concerned with negative 
feelings and atmospheres. For instance, John S. Ju (2015), Delia Caparaso Konzett 
(2002) and Elaine Savoury (2009) all examine dislocation and disorientation in 
Rhys’s novels.18  
There are, however, also already readings that examine joy, desire, and 
otherwise pleasant feelings or atmospheres in modernist writings. For instance, Anna 
Abramson (2015) examines the advantages of being absorbed in atmosphere. There 
are various readings of Woolf with Deleuze that focus on joy and desire (2013) and 
Aberheen Hai (2015) looks at affective intimacies between Christophine and 
Antoinette in Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea. There is also new criticism on Joyce’s 
Dubliners (1914), a typical text of modernist paralysis, that is now being rethought 
in the light of liberation, hope and freedom.19 There is then an emerging body of 
work (some of which is strongly indebted to Deleuze and Guattari) that engages with 
what is enchanting and life-affirming in modernist works. This work, I propose, is 
precisely concerned with theory and modernism as anti-Oedipal. These readings, I 
suggest, are what allows us to enchant modern life. Bennett describes her 
enchantment as different from Kant’s and Paracelsus’s, which are either divine or 
natural. She sketches her own, a marvellous Deleuzian world,  
where wonders persist in a rhizomatic world without intrinsic purpose or 
divinity […] assuming telos or God […] for [Deleuze] enchantment resides 
in the spaces where nature and culture overlap: where becomings happen 
among humans, animals, and machines. Deleuze brings out the wondrous 
qualities of late modernity’s admixtures (Bennett, 2001, p. 34).  
                                                             
(2007), that explores their childhood abuse through a psychoanalytical lens, performing a thoroughly 
Oedipal reading of Woolf’s and Rhys’s works. 
18 For instance, John S. Ju (2015) examines the sense of feeling out of place and out of one’s body in 
Wide Sargasso Sea. According to Ju, disorientation is a major factor influencing and defining the 
‘fate’ of Rhys’s characters, including Antoinette and her husband in Wide Sargasso Sea. Delia 
Caparaso Konzett (2002) similarly suggests that “[the] sense of homelessness and dislocation, so 
pervasive in Rhys’s works, challenges not only colonial models of master nations and narrations, with 
their unquestioned ontologies of belonging but, more importantly, a concomitant mythology of the 
white race” (p. 128). Elaine Savoury (2009) too, focusing on post-colonial aspects of Rhys’s fiction, 
notes that “one vital aspect of postcolonial ecology is to reimagine the displacement between people 
and place through poetics” (p. 87), suggesting that Rhys’s fiction expresses this “pained connection 
often as displacement, between people and place with her characteristic originality and awareness” 
(2009, p. 87).  I agree that in most of Rhys’s interwar novels dislocation is indeed a prominent affect. 
However, as I will demonstrate, Antoinette knows exactly where she belongs. Therefore, in Wide 
Sargasso Sea, the shifting narrative voice and complex collision of different worldviews rather 
functions as disorientation for the reader, as Su has pointed out, but not, as I will propose, for the 
characters (2015, p. 184). 
19 See Rethinking Joyce’s Dubliners (2017), edited by Claire A. Culleton and Ellen Scheible.  
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Bennett’s focus on nature and culture overlapping, and on animals and machines in 
relation to humans places her work within the post-human, affective, and material 
turns, while her reference to Deleuze also confirms that these aspects were part of a 
certain strand in French post-structural thinking. With this focus in mind, modernism 
is not necessarily a tale of disenchantment and loss, a tale stuck in its own already 
known Oedipal desires and signifiers, but a tale of possibility. To put it differently, 
this thesis suggests that anti-Oedipal readings that see modernism as enchanted, and 
selves as complex compounds of various relations, also produce readings that allow 
us to see positive modernist affects.  
This thesis also extends this life-affirming, anti-Oedipal narrative beyond the 
high modernist period. Because Wide Sargasso Sea is, strictly speaking, not 
modernist in terms of when it was written (mid-twentieth century) and when it was 
set (early nineteenth century), it is also important to pause for a moment on why I 
read Wide Sargasso Sea with modernist novels and ‘modernist’ affects. While To the 
Lighthouse, Between the Acts, and After Leaving Mr Mackenzie are rather 
conveniently classifiable as high modernist, or perhaps late modernist in the case of 
Between the Acts, then Wide Sargasso Sea is usually considered post-colonial. Yet, 
with the emergence of the new modernist studies, critics take transnational and post-
colonial context into account when exploring modernist fiction.20 Rhys’s work is 
now understood as not simply modernist or post-colonial, as critics become more 
and more interested in how her modernist aesthetics are influenced by her own 
experience as a white Creole moving from the West Indies to European metropolitan 
centres in the early twentieth century, and inhabiting these centres at the height of 
the modernist movement.21 Both Woolf’s and Rhys’s oeuvres, as I will demonstrate 
                                                             
20 See Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz’s ‘The New Modernist Studies’ (2008) for a longer 
discussion about what the new modernist studies entail.  
21 Many critics take Rhys’s West Indian origins seriously now, complicating the earlier readings that 
focused more exclusively on capitalism and consumerism, and/or psychoanalysis. What is shared by 
most these readings is, again, the interest in dislocation in Rhys’s fiction and how this dislocation is 
triggered by complex issues regarding race, colonialism, imperialism, and patriarchy. What also 
interests me from these various strands and possibilities of ‘locating’ or ‘dislocating’ Rhys’s writing 
is what Delia Konzett (2002) and Erica L. Johnson (2015) have traced in their different ways – post-
humanism and affect. Johnson (2015) explains that Konzett has examined post-humanism from the 
post-colonial perspective focusing on race, and on how post-humanism was first and foremost a 
critique to liberal European humanism, drawing attention to the limited view of subject European 
liberalism offers. Johnson’s article points out various instances throughout Rhys’s oeuvre where the 
non-human becomes a source of identification. My reading, however, radically differs from Johnson’s 
because unlike her, I do not see Rhysian characters’ identification with the non-human as their escape 
to numbness and indifference (p. 213). 
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in Chapters Two and Four, offer examples of how various modernist themes, such as 
the problems relating to Empire, nationalism, gender roles, social hierarchies and 
convention of any kind, are already present in modernist fiction, which is also 
concerned with how to aesthetically present these topics. Urmila Seshagiri (2000) 
argues that already in Voyage in the Dark (1934) Rhys explored what we now 
consider as post-colonial issues, shifting the focus perhaps from more overtly 
modernist concerns with form and aesthetics to historical and social context. 
Seshagiri emphasises that there is no “stark polarity [that] divides modern and post-
colonial literature” (2000, p. 492), pointing out that who we consider modernist 
writers (for example, Woolf and Conrad) have devoted as much time to colonial 
issues as post-colonial writers have to artistic form.  
One way of focusing on the commonality between modernist and post-
colonial literature is in fact focusing on affective intimacies. Su (2015) points out 
that  
transformations in post-colonial studies over the past decade offer the 
opportunity to rethink Wide Sargasso Sea and its relationship to Rhys’s other 
work. The shift away from the centre-periphery model of post-colonial theory 
toward more multilateral, multinational analyses of globalisation among 
theories of post-colonialism open up possibilities for more nuanced readings 
of a writer who never fits terribly well within the categories of modernist, 
feminist, or post-colonial authorship (p. 171).  
The shift in post-colonial theory that Su mentions offers a possibility to trace the 
affective intimacies in post-colonial literature more generally, and importantly also 
in my reading of Rhys’s final novel. Critics like Phanuel Antwi, Sarah Brophy, 
Helene Strauss, and Y-Dang Troeung (2013) working with post-colonialism suggest 
that a change in focus in post-colonial studies is needed to turn its attention to tracing 
and taking affects and intimacies seriously (p. 2). These authors follow affect 
theorists such as Ann Cvetkovich and Kathleen Stewart and they shift the focus from 
what John Ashcroft (2012) calls ‘Grand Theory’ (institutionalised, political and 
wide-scale forms of oppression) to lived experiences of race, colonialism, and 
oppression.22 I too am interested in the lived experience of various political regimes. 
To put it differently, it is not my aim to periodise or categorise the novels I study in 
                                                             
22 See their article ‘Post-colonial Intimacies: Gatherings, Disruptions, Departures’ (2013)  to 
understand in more detail how they engage with the affective turn in post-colonial studies. I will 
return to pos-tcolonialism in the context of affect and new materialist studies in the fourth and final 
chapter on Wide Sargasso Sea.  
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this thesis, but to trace certain intimacies that these novels engage with and the 
atmospheres, feelings, and moods they trigger. I trace intimacies that Woolf and 
Rhys were interested in throughout their lives not because they were either 
modernists, late modernists, or post-colonial writers, but because they found these 
intimacies worth noticing.  
There is also a certain understanding of historical context that modernist 
studies can gain from looking at materiality, embodiment, and the non-human 
besides language, form and strictly human relations. Angeliki Spiripolou’s seminal 
monograph on history and modernity, and more specifically on Virginia Woolf and 
Walter Benjamin, Virginia Woolf, Modernity and History: Constellations with 
Walter Benjamin (2010) offers a novel understanding of the role of the past and the 
new in modernity and modernism. She talks of the shift in criticism towards 
exploring social and cultural implications of Woolf’s work besides aesthetic qualities 
that began in the 1970s with feminist and post-colonial criticism. As demonstrated, 
critics have now established that Woolf and Rhys engage with social, cultural and 
political issues through their aesthetics. The material, affective theories allow the 
examination of how they engage with these matters intimately. Lauren Berlant 
(2011), who also follows Deleuze in her work, suggests that central to an 
understanding of any era or time is the capture of “the affective sensorium […] of 
the historical present” (p. 53). Berlant (2011) contends that “affective responses may 
be said significantly to exemplify shared historical present” (pp. 14-15). Similarly, 
Taylor (2015), referring to affective criticism of literary modernism, suggests that 
“recent works within modernist studies have suggested foundational links between 
affect and the structure of the modern itself” (p. 2). She refers to Jonathan Flatley’s 
Affective Mapping (2008) and his claim that “the ‘nowness’ of modernity implies a 
sense of anteriority that links it fundamentality to loss” (qtd. in Taylor, 2015, p. 2) 
and also to Heather Love who similarly looks at the backward feeling of queer 
modernism. Taylor (2015) suggests that “in such understandings, then, the ‘modern’ 
emerges as an affective orientation towards history: affect is central to its 
constitution, its claims to newness and its ties to the past” (p. 2). In other words, 
affect offers us insights into certain historical moments, including those of the 
modernist period, which is itself an affective relation to that which came before and 
to that which might come after. 
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Anna Jones Abramson in ‘Beyond Modernist Shock: Virginia Woolf’s 
Absorbing Atmosphere’ (2015) makes a similar claim. Like Flatley, for instance, she 
places emphases on atmosphere. She offers a reading of Mrs Dalloway (1925) 
wherein, instead of looking at shock, which is common in “theorizing urban 
modernism”, she proposes that “Woolf moves beyond the matter of how the psyche 
absorbs shock and trauma to consider how the urban atmosphere itself functions as a 
shock absorber, a kind of affective repository for the past” (Abramson, 2015, p. 39). 
Like myself, Ambramson (2015) aligns her work with Berlant and Stewart who 
“have argued for the need to look at how history plays out at the level of everyday” 
(p. 44). On this everyday level, Abramson, like many affect theorists, is interested in 
the atmosphere, not in the individual psyche, because, as mentioned, affect is not so 
much concerned with the individual as it is with atmosphere. Accordingly, the 
disenchantment tale, as Bennett (2001) argues, really is a tale of civilisation, not of a 
man wronged, as the trauma is absorbed in the atmosphere (p. 7).23 There is, 
however, as I will demonstrate, much more than just trauma in the atmosphere. 
There is also joy, wonder, and attachments to life in specific historical moments, 
which might otherwise seem chaotic, disorderly, and even dangerous when we think 
of the sweeping social change and wars in the early twentieth century.  
The shift from the individual psyche to a shared atmosphere allows us to 
rethink not only the concept of history but of how we think of modernism and 
theory. I would like to return to the continuity between post-structuralism and the 
turns to affect, new materialism, and post-humanism here, and how Cixous’s work 
can illustrate this continuity. Cixous (1975), for instance, writes about how history is 
a narrative of great men’s lives, and how this is a direct outcome of the general 
tendency of Western cultures to produce phallocentric narratives (1976, p. 892). To 
move beyond the phallocentric writing that focuses on the ego, the self, and identity, 
which Cixous associates with Freudian psychoanalysis, she urges writers in ‘The 
Laugh of Medusa’ to “break out of the circles; don’t remain within the 
                                                             
23 The shift from psyche to atmosphere makes it possible to contemplate the idea that shared spaces 
offer collective experience to characters who have not individually experienced certain events, such as 
war. The characters in To the Lighthouse and After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, therefore, feel the impact 
of the First World War and the changes it brought without being at the battlefield, or without any of 
these changes being explicitly spelled out, and Between the Acts and Wide Sargasso Sea explore how 
affective resonances of history affect the characters’ sense of self and belonging. As Abramson (2015) 
writes, “the affectively charged residue of the past often materialises in the air, rather than as a 
dredged-up memory […] the atmosphere, too, is a kind of affective repository for history” (p. 49). 
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psychoanalytic closure. Take a look around, then cut through!” (1976, p. 892). As we 
see from the above quotation by Cixous, she already urges to turn away from 
Freudian psychoanalysis as early as 1975, because, as she writes, psychoanalytical 
theories often produce phallocentric and Oedipal narratives not just of history but of 
life. Colebrook’s anti-Oedipal readings, then, should not be considered as readings 
against the whole of French post-structuralist thinking, but against that part of 
French thought which is Oedipal, and which often produces readings that focus on 
negative affects. As we can see from Cixous’s quotation, Oedipal readings are 
closely associated with Freudian psychoanalysis, which we know was influential for 
Jacques Lacan in developing psycholinguistic theories, which the ‘French’ feminists, 
including Cixous, are also associated with, and which I will explain in more detail in 
the following section. Alternatively, drawing on Colebrook’s Deleuzian anti-Oedipal 
reading of modernism, I demonstrate how Cixous’s écriture féminine in fact 
encourages us to write a way out of Oedipal narratives by focusing on bodies, 
materiality, and the (non-human) other.  
 
Écriture Féminine as Affective Writing of Materiality 
Écriture féminine demonstrates the continuity between post-structural 
psycholinguistic feminism and new materialist and affect studies. Écriture féminine 
is a writing that is essentially anti-Oedipal, anti-patriarchal, and perhaps anti-
masculine. However, écriture féminine, as it is associated with ‘French’ 
psycholinguistic feminism, is often considered as incitement of biological 
essentialism, a kind of writing that pays particular attention to biologically female 
bodies.24 By emphasising the materiality and embodiment as such, and by putting 
Cixous in dialogue with Deleuze and Guattari, and prospectively with affect and new 
materialist theories that follow the latter’s work, I aim to show how écriture féminine 
is not biologically essentialist. The starting point of dialogue for Cixous and theories 
of affect and new materialism is, as I pointed out above, in defining something we 
may call affect, and how it resides in human and non-human bodies. I focus on 
écriture féminine, and then on Deleuze’s concept of ‘becoming-woman’ and 
                                                             
24 See the seminal work by Toril Moi Sexual/ Textual Politics (1985) for an overview of criticism 
against ‘French feminism’. See also Christine Delphy’s ‘The Invention of French Feminism: An 
Essential Move’ (2000). 
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‘majoritarian’ and ‘minoritarian’ identities, to demonstrate that Cixous, and Deleuze 
and Guattari associate a mode of writing as well as being in the world that is anti-
Oedipal with femininity and women. I focus on écriture féminine because there are 
already many readings of ‘becoming-woman’ and other Deleuzian thinking with 
contemporary, new materialist and affect-oriented feminist studies.25 More 
importantly, I focus on Cixous because, first, as demonstrated above, her writings 
resonate with Woolf’s and Rhys’s ideas on affective, embodied writing, and second, 
Cixous’s writing seems to be, as she herself claims in Hyperdream (2006/2009), on 
the side of life, affirming the attachment to it. Her work in dialogue with Deleuze’s, 
therefore, allows us to see the side of post-structuralism that is already also 
concerned with embodiment, materiality, and the (non-human) other – aspects that 
are related to creating anti-Oedipal, life-affirming narratives. Third, as I will 
demonstrate in more detail towards the end of this introduction, she keeps humans at 
the centre of her attention despite her focus on the non-human – an aspect that is also 
central in Woolf and Rhys. 
Cixous’s écriture féminine shares the same desire as many new materialist, 
post-humanist, and affect theorists such as Lauren Berlant (2011, 2019), Kathleen 
Stewart (2007, 2019), Jane Bennett (2001, 2010), and Rosi Braidotti (1993, 1994, 
2013), to name a few: a wish to develop a writing that is affective; includes everyday 
sensorial, embodied experience; the non-human and materiality, and does so by 
moving away from strictly rational or philosophical discourses. Cixous first 
introduces the concept écriture féminine in her 1975 essays ‘Sorties’ and ‘The Laugh 
of Medusa’. In both essays, she sees writing ‘the feminine’, writing the body, and 
writing the other as possible alternatives to the Western philosophical canon (Plato, 
Aristotle, Descartes, Hegel, to name a few) and the critical writing and thinking that 
stems from the aforementioned philosophers’ works and produces phallocentric, 
xenophobic, and misogynist narratives. Cixous’s writing is informed by that which is 
considered feminine in the Western philosophical thought. While Cixous questions 
binaries her idea of écriture féminine engages with the qualities that are on the right 
of the binary oppositions outlined in ‘Sorties’: Head/Heart, Intelligible/Palpable, 
                                                             
25 See Claire Colebrook’s ‘Modernism without Women’ (2013), and Elizabeth Grosz’s ‘A Thousand 
Tiny Sexes’ (1993), for example. There is a monograph Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Feminism 
by Cheri Carr and Janae Sholtz on the topic of Deleuze and feminism to be published later in 2019 
when this thesis is already finished. 
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Logos/Pathos, Mind/Body. Cixous explains what she means by feminine writing in 
an interview with Louis de Rambures in 1976, published in English in White Ink in 
2008. She says: “I am not trying to create a feminine writing but to let into writing 
what has always been forbidden up until now, knowing the effects of femininity. I 
am still at the research stage” (Cixous, 2008, p. 52). She stresses the same point 
again in another interview, saying, “I do not say feminine writing. I talk of 
femininity in writing, or I use heaps of quotation marks, I speak of ‘so-called 
feminine’ writing. In any case, femininity – to define it – also exists in men, it does 
not necessarily exist in women” (Cixous, 2008, p. 22). Instead of associating 
femininity with biologically female bodies, Cixous positions femininity as a certain 
quality to be found in many bodies.  
Femininity for her is “a certain type of generosity, a certain type of capacity 
to expend without fear of loss, without calling loss ‘loss’” (Cixous, 2008, p. 22). 
Rather, ‘loss’ in ‘femininity’ for Cixous stands for the loss of a certain set of values 
that are associated with patriarchy and masculinity, and this is not a negative loss. 
Cixous goes on to say that to lose  
could be a way of working with life, that defensive rigidity is not perhaps 
best defence […]there are a thousand ways of perceiving this style of 
behaviour which is in relation to a libidinal economy, that is to say with the 
conservation of the self, the expenditure of the self, the relation to the other 
(2008, p. 22).  
As seen in these quotations, femininity for Cixous marks a different notion of the 
self, and the self’s relation to the other, and also a different system of values. Her 
concept of femininity, and positioning loss not as loss but another way of relating to 
the world and to others bears comparison to Colebrook’s claim that anti-Oedipal 
theory and literature do not mourn for some sort of original loss that cannot be 
recovered. Colebrook (2012) writes, referring to Woolf, 
Like Deleuze and Guattari, Woolf’s project of writing is to descend from the 
composed generalities of the present world, to intuit the forces from which 
the world of ‘subject, object and the nature of reality’ is composed […] 
Deleuze and Guattari agree that at present we are ‘subjected’ to the signifier 
and are thoroughly oedipalised, but this is a consequence of a long political 
history. Further – and this is crucial for a reading of Woolf and its 
implications for what has come to be known as ‘theory’ – this universal 
history that ends with capitalism is sexualised and racial. The only way life 
manages to compose individuals from the ‘intense germinal influx’ is by 
generating relatively stable relations and terms from initially complex and 
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unbounded forces. Something like a figure of ‘man’ in general has been 
formed in order to present a humanity for whom there is a world; what needs 
to be considered is the historical and political emergence of the figure of man 
from forces that are initially far too sexually and racially multiple to 
compose anything like ‘man’ (p. 71; emphasis mine).  
This passage resonates throughout this thesis as it sums up the aim of anti-Oedipal 
writing: “to descend from the composed generalities of the present world” 
(Colebrook, 2012, p. 71). In this writing there is no ultimate signifier for a universal 
‘man’, or other categories that could accommodate ‘majoritarian’ identities defined 
by class, sex, gender, and race, which, strictly speaking, compose the generalities of 
the present world. To resist writing in the way that reinforces the already existing 
generalities that are presented via patriarchal historical and social narratives, 
Colebrook suggests that there is a mode of writing that is anti-Oedipal, and that in 
this writing, the various forces and desires that make up selves and their lives are 
taken into account. This writing is also associated, importantly, with concepts such 
as ‘woman’ and ‘femininity’.  
To understand why ‘woman’ and ‘femininity’ are important, it is necessary to 
pause over the concept of ‘majority’ from the above passage. Colebrook uses the 
word ‘majority’ from Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which, for the latter two, is 
represented by a figure of man who “is the average adult-white-heterosexual-
European-male-speaking a standard language” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 106). 
They explain that “it is obvious that ‘man’ holds the majority, even if he is less 
numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc. 
[…] Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not the other way around” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 106). Against this majoritarian white European male, 
Deleuze and Guattari develop a concept of minority mostly through ‘becoming-
woman’ to challenge this standard male Oedipalised speaking subject and see 
the majoritarian as a constant and homogeneous system; minorities as 
subsystems; and the minoritarian as a potential, creative and created, 
becoming […] Women, regardless of their numbers, are a minority, definable 
as a state or subset; but they create only by making possible a becoming over 
which they do not have ownership, into which they themselves must enter; 
this is a becoming-woman affecting all of humankind, men and women both 
(2004, p. 107).  
It is this minoritarian identity, a becoming-woman, that is of interest in this thesis 
and that is a constant point of focus in all four novels explored. As Colebrook (2013) 
  
32 
 
and Elizabeth Grosz (1993) remind us, Deleuze and Guattari use the word ‘woman’ 
to indicate that what is ‘man’ is already defined by Oedipal systems. ‘Woman’, on 
the other hand, is free to form various affective becomings where subjectivity is not 
understood in Oedipal terms but in relation to various human and non-human 
encounters. To come back to the quotation from Colebrook, what she indicates is 
that the majoritarian categories and the figure of man have been generated to create 
some sort of order in life where the figure of ‘man’ is the standard against which the 
orderliness of life is measured. ‘Man’ is the already defined historical signified. 
However, as mentioned before, in Woolf’s and Rhys’s writing, order is not imposed 
through these majoritarian categories but rather is found by noticing intimate, 
affective encounters. In other words, their fiction, and their characters, are a play of 
“initially complex and unbounded forces” that cannot be composed of the already 
existing “generalities of the world” (Colebrook, 2012, p. 71). 
Because these unbound forces are positioned as the opposite of ‘man’, 
Deleuze and Guattari, and Cixous associate them with femininity and women, where 
neither of these words marks biologically female bodies. One of the most difficult 
tasks of this thesis, and more generally of producing feminist discourses, is the 
balance in maintaining the focus on femininity and women, while, at the same time, 
demonstrating that femininity is not something specific to women and that women 
are not a concrete, unchanging category.26 I am less interested in defining ‘woman’ 
than I am interested in exploring what ‘femininity’ marks in the work of Woolf and 
Rhys, and I suggest this can be explored via understanding femininity in Cixous’s 
work. Following Cixous’s thoughts on femininity, I propose that in her work, 
femininity marks radical alterity, engagement with lived experience, materiality, and 
the non-human, and ‘functions’ as a possibility for noticing the sites in the world that 
make space for minorities. Both Woolf and Rhys, especially and explicitly the 
former, associate femininity with new ways of writing, new genres, and new 
language as well as new ways of being in the world. Although femininity is not 
something confined to women, in Woolf’s and Rhys’s fiction, because of their 
historical moment, it is female characters who suffer most from the suppression and 
marginalisation of femininity, and who are associated with feminine qualities. 
                                                             
26 See works on feminist theory such as Rosemary Putman Tong’s various editions of Feminist 
Thought (2009, 2013 etc.), Toril Moi’s Sexual/Textual Politics (1985), and Sneja Gunew’s Feminist 
Knowledge (1990).  
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‘Becoming-woman’ is often ‘placed’ in female figures in Woolf and Rhys, and 
female artists like Lily and Miss La Trobe might represent something like écriture 
féminine. For these reasons, it is important to look briefly at the history of femininity 
in writing, and how different theorists have engaged with femininity in Cixous’s 
works, and why I see new materialist and affect studies as an extension of this 
concern.  
Elizabeth Grosz discusses the history of femininity in philosophical discourse 
in a chapter in Sneja Gunew’s Feminist Knowledge: Critique and Construct 
(1990).27 Grosz (1990) looks at post-structural feminists, including Luce Irigaray and 
Michèle Le Dœuff, claiming they are concerned with altering the style and content of 
writing in order to change the status of femininity (pp. 162-166). Grosz’s 
engagement with their work, which she considers to be radical feminism, offers a 
ground for focusing on the stylistics as well as content of traditional philosophical 
and academic discourse. She explains that the modern style for philosophical 
discourse is based on its separation from poetry and myth. She notes that Homer’s 
The Iliad and The Odyssey embody philosophical, psychological, poetic, theological, 
and narrative features. In other words, she claims that it was not until the fifth and 
the third centuries BC that philosophical discourse gained specific standards and 
style, and lost the poetic, theological, and narrative features that were present in 
Homer’s texts (Grosz, 1990, p. 154). It was then when  
its propositions gain precise, unambiguous formulation and a truth-function; 
only, that is, when philosophy carefully controls language, clears up ‘poetic’ 
ambiguities, is cast into a propositional form, placed within the structure of 
the logical syllogism and assessed in terms of truth and validity will a 
statement become philosophical (Grosz, 1990, p. 153).  
The project of post-structural feminism, with its focus on poetics, rhythm, and 
sensory experience, has been to revolt against this traditional, masculine 
philosophical discursive style. It has been, in other words, a fight to restore the 
poetic in the philosophical. 
Traditional philosophical discourse is based on rationality, which is 
associated with masculinity. As Grosz (1990) points out, the Pythagoreans 
                                                             
27 I have also written about the same issue briefly in my article ‘Philosophizing in Plato’s Cave: 
Hélène Cixous’s Affective Writing’ (2019) in CAPACIOUS. See pages 147-149 in particular for the 
discussion of femininity in Cixous’s work.  
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introduced the following table of philosophical oppositions, a list of paired terms that 
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive: limit/unlimited, even/odd, one/many, 
right/left, male/female, rest/motion, straight/curved, light/dark, good/bad, 
square/oblong (p. 153). In these binary pairs, the first term represents a positive 
value, and the second a negative, or a lack of the first. Importantly, the first side of 
the binaries is associated with masculinity, the second with femininity. When the 
first signifies reason, harmony and order, then the second threatens it and should be 
avoided or supressed. As these binaries influenced Plato and Aristotle, whose 
thought is the cornerstone of Western philosophy and theory, including Freudian 
psychoanalysis, most philosophical and theoretical writing is, whether unconsciously 
or consciously, informed by the assumptions about masculinity and femininity that 
arise from the Pythagorean binaries. Modernist writing too can be explored in this 
masculine/ feminine, rational/affective binary. As Julie Taylor (2015) explains, 
modernism’s fascination with Thomas Mann’s idea that “art is a cold sphere” also 
has gendered implications (p. 2). Engaging with Susanne Clark’s work, Taylor 
writes that “we can put feelings back into modernism, Clark suggests, by including 
writers whom the anti-sentimental bias excludes” (p. 2). However, Taylor is careful 
to not associate feelings with women’s fiction only, emphasising the centrality of 
embodied affect to Adorno’s understanding of aesthetic experience (p. 2). In the 
same sense, I am not interested specifically in women’s writing, although I look at 
female writers. Rather, I am interested in the aspects of their writing that are 
associated with femininity: the inclusion of the radical other, of poetic style, of the 
non-human, and of embodiment and materiality.  
Thinking of some of the major concepts of twentieth-century French 
philosophy such as ‘becoming-woman’ and écriture féminine, we can see that there 
is a clear tendency to associate the experimental discourses that digress from the 
established norms in critical and philosophical writings with femininity, with that 
which is ‘other’. Various feminist discourses, including that of Cixous, challenge the 
notion of how it is proper to write philosophy and theory, and what forms the proper 
content for philosophising and theorising. Many critics working with theories in 
affect theory and new materialism seem to share the same aim. Dominic Pettman 
(2019), speaking of post-humanist theories in an online journal, suggests, naming 
writers like Kathleen Stewart and Lauren Berlant, that “there is an emerging wave of 
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writing from academics who feel enervated by the same intellectual – well – 
gestures; and who seek to import new voices, strategies, conceits, and genres into our 
discursive worlds” (Pettman, 2019). As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
Stewart and Berlant, Bennett, Cixous, and Deleuze and Guattari, write affectively. 
Their theories and philosophies draw from personal experience, engage with the non-
human, and are influenced by art and literature. What contemporary theories in affect 
and new materialism share with post-structural feminist theories, then, is the desire 
to conceptualise subjectivities in anti-Oedipal terms, and write in a way that includes 
the non-human, affect, embodiment, and materiality.  
Although the aim to include femininity in writing is supposed to make 
(literary, philosophical and theoretical) writing more varied and inclusive, the focus 
on femininity has nevertheless received criticism. First, Cixous’s work is often read 
as post-structural difference feminism, and what was termed ‘French’ 
psychoanalytical feminism, the latter term being largely constructed by Anglo-
American critics. Cixous’s work is placed alongside that of Luce Irigaray and Julia 
Kristeva, whose feminism is often criticised by being far removed from social and 
political issues, and of being inaccessible, too poetic, and biologically essentialist.28 
The criticism against biology is, to an extent, ironic because, as Sara Ahmed in 
‘Imaginary Prohibitions: Some Preliminary Remarks on the Founding Gestures of 
the “New Materialism”’ (2008) points out, there is a tendency among new materialist 
critics to present their work as something novel and ‘accuse’ older feminist theories 
from fearing biology and not engaging with it.29 I agree with Ahmed that there is a 
                                                             
28 See seminal works such as Toril Moi’s Sexual/Textual Politics (1985). See also Chris Weedon’s 
Feminist Practice and Post-structural Theory (1987) and Rosemarie Putman Tong’s Feminist 
Thought (2009, 2013 etc.) for more contemporary discussions. 
29 See Ahmed’s ‘Imaginary Prohibitions: Some Preliminary Remarks on the Founding Gestures of the 
‘New Materialism’ (2008). Ahmed (2008) is concerned about the way in which new materialist 
theories engage with previous feminist work. She takes issue with the fact that many new materialist 
thinkers position previous feminist work as a tradition that has neglected biology. She points out that 
this argument is made without close “attention and care” to previous feminist work, while many 
“male writers (who are usually dead and white) are engaged with closely” (Ahmed, 2008, p. 30). I 
agree with her that critique is “after all a labour of love” (Ahmed, 2008, p. 30), and hence engagement 
with other feminist work, in contrast to a sweeping generalised rejection, is of utmost importance for 
the future of feminist theory (p. 350).  Cixous’s work, although it is in fact accused of biological 
essentialism, makes an interesting contribution to this debate about continuity and presumed neglect 
of biology.  
Sara Irni addresses these problems in her article ‘The Politics of Materiality: Affective 
encounters in a transdisciplinary debate’ (2013), and points out how ‘new’ materialist feminism 
(sometimes new materialism for it is also conflated with feminism) should be seen as a continuation 
of work already done by post-colonial and post-structural feminists. She addresses the issue of 
‘politics of materiality’ suggesting that sometimes even feminists who work with science studies think 
  
36 
 
tendency to theorise new materialism, and affect studies that are concerned with 
materiality, as something novel and new that older feminist theories can benefit 
from.30 Putting Cixous’s work into dialogue with new materialism allows us to see 
the continuity between these new theories and older, post-structural feminist 
theories.  
I am by no means the first to further develop Cixous’s writings and her 
concept of écriture féminine. 31 However, what my work with écriture féminine 
contributes is precisely emphasising this continuity between post-structuralism and 
contemporary theories in affect and new materialism. Many critics have developed 
                                                             
that ‘materiality’ is only worth considering when it is understood in scientific terms. She is against 
such hierarchy of definitions in materialisms. 
Also, Clare Hemmings in ‘Telling Feminist Stories’ (2005) takes a somewhat similar issue to 
Ahmed about the feminist genealogy, saying that it is problematic to see the history of Western 
feminism as linear. She also takes issue with the dominant idea that post-structural feminism (she 
considers Butler, Haraway and Spivak as post-structuralist) as turning somehow radically away from 
older, more essentialist feminists (p. 125). See her article for references and debate. In short, there is 
no straightforward rule for saying who exactly is post-structural feminist.  
When Hemmings, Irni, and Ahmed emphasise the need to trace continuities between feminist 
thinking, then there are also responses to their writing, especially concerning new materialism, that 
‘defend’ new materialism. See various articles that criticise Sara Ahmed. For instance, see Iris van der 
Tuin’s ‘Deflationary Logic: Response to Sara Ahmed’s “Imaginary Prohibitions: Some Preliminary 
Remarks on the Founding Gestures of the New Materialism”’ (2008). Van der Tuin criticises 
Ahmed’s own approach as reductive in a way that she reduces feminist science studies to just feminist 
biology. Noela Davis in ‘New Materialism and Feminism’s Anti-Biologism: A Response to Sara 
Ahmed’ (2009) also criticises Ahmed’s own tendency to make caricatures of some of the feminist 
work she criticises. There is then a debate surrounding material feminism (race, class, sexuality, 
economics and the living conditions of women) and materialist feminism, science studies, and the 
mutual transdisciplinary engagements between those disciplines.  
30 For example, Elizabeth Grosz’s ‘A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics’ (1993) and 
Claire Colebrook in ‘Modernism without Women: The Refusal of Becoming-Woman (and Post-
Feminism)’ (2013) look at the relevance of new materialism, and more specifically of Deleuze, for 
feminist theories but do not explore what feminist studies have ‘given’ to new materialism.  
Braidotti’s work, however, very clearly traces the continuity between post-structural feminism (she 
cites Luce Irigaray the most) and post-structuralism in general (Deleuze and Guattari). My work too is 
indebted to the post-structuralist, French psycholinguistic feminism of Irigaray, Kristeva, and 
especially Cixous.  
31 Many theorists have taken up and developed Cixous’s concept of écriture féminine. Most directly 
inspired by Cixous’s écriture féminine is Joanna Zylinska, who introduced the concept décriture 
féminine in On Spiders, Cyborgs, and Being Scared: The Feminine and the Sublime (2001). In a 
chapter ‘Décriture feminine: The Discourse of the Feminine Sublime’, Zylinska discusses the ethical 
implications of écriture féminine, also emphasising the open relationship with otherness. There are 
also other projects concerned with demonstrating the radical possibilities embedded within the 
feminine. For instance, Barbara Claire Freeman’s Feminine Sublime (1995), does not so much see the 
feminine sublime as an aesthetic category but a “crisis in relation to language and representation that a 
certain subject undergoes” (p. 2). Following Kristeva and Cixous, her feminine sublime is also rather 
an inclusion of radical alterity and excess in the sublime rather than its appropriation. Griselda 
Pollock in Mother Trouble: The Maternal-Feminine in Phallic and Feminist Theory in Relation to 
Bracha Ettinger’s Elaboration of Matrixial Ethics/Aesthetics (2009) talks about the feminine and the 
maternal as allowing new discourses. What unites all those works is their desire to develop new ideas 
about subjectivity, the subject’s relation to the other to create better ways of being in the world.  
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écriture féminine in different ways, and I am interested in reading it in relation to 
Cixous’s other writings to emphasise that the different notions of a self, of self’s 
relation to other, and a different way of being in the world necessarily include an 
ethical and intimate engagement with materiality and the non-human in Cixous’s 
work. In an interview in 1976 with Christiane Makward, Cixous claims that an 
important aspect of femininity is bodies and materiality. In the School of Roots, 
which is the last step on the ladder of writing in Three Steps of the Ladder of Writing 
(1993), Cixous focuses on materiality and embodiment and develops and further 
explains her ideas about writing the body that she introduced in ‘The Laugh’ and 
‘Sorties’. Her ladder of writing does not reach for the sky but remains on the ground 
and goes deep into the earth, where humans meet animals, vegetables, and other non-
human animate and inanimate matter. Cixous (1993) writes,  
It is my way of indicating the reserved, secluded, or excluded path or place 
where you meet those beings I think are worth knowing while we are alive. 
Those who belong to the birds and their kind (these may include some men), 
to writings and their kind: they are all to be found – and a fair company it is – 
outside […] (p. 113).  
 
When Cixous refers to the beings who are worth knowing when we are alive, she 
brackets that these may include some men, also indicating that it is rather minorities 
(not majorities and the figure of ‘man’ in the Deleuzian sense) who can enable us to 
see which is feminine and anti-Oedipal.  
Referring specifically to Clarice Lispector’s work, Cixous explains that 
conventions ask people to repress materiality not only in life but also in writing. She 
writes,  
[Clarice Lispector] returns the ability not to forget matter, which we don’t 
notice: which we live, which we are. Clarice descends the ladder to the point 
of returning to think over matter. We are unable to think matter because we 
consider it to be invisible. We are made of assemblings that hide their truth, 
their atomic side, from us. We dislike matter, that is, ourselves, because we 
are destined to matter, because anonymous matter is called: death. Perhaps it 
isn’t matter we dislike, perhaps it is anonymity. The anonymity to which we 
are destined – the loss of name – is what we repress at any price (Cixous, 
1993, p. 113).  
The above quotation again demonstrates the importance of matter in Cixous’s work 
as it draws attention to the fact that we often forget matter because it is an 
encompassing part of our existence, that matter is us and our life. She says that 
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writing about matter requires the writer to go through their own bodily matter. In 
fact, she does not really want to call a body “a body” because she means various 
small complex parts of various matter (cells, nerves, tissue, bone, blood etc.) that 
make up the body (Cixous, 1993, p. 118). Cixous does not fear the anonymity of 
matter which she refers to in the quotation. On the contrary, she embraces it because 
for her our physical bodies remind us that humans are a part of the rest of the 
universe of things. She asks us to think of our lives, and write, in relation to the non-
human world of animate and inanimate things that we inhabit side by side with 
plants, animals, and even microbes. This predicts Samantha Frost and Diane Coole’s 
(2010), and Jane Bennett’s (2001, 2010) writings about new materialism, which 
emphasise that new materialism does not place human and animate life on a higher 
pedestal than inanimate life and matter – it develops an understanding of ethical 
coexistence. It is precisely part of Cixous’s work to undermine the hierarchies by 
emphasising the relevance of matter. Reading Cixous’s écriture féminine with her 
own more recent writings about affect and materiality allow us to really see the 
feminine in écriture féminine as an affective, anti-Oedipal writing of materiality that 
is life-affirming.  
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Desire, the ‘Other’, and Strange Intimacy  
From this affective, anti-Oedipal writing that challenges majoritarian categories, I 
develop a concept I call ‘strange intimacy’.32 ‘Strange intimacy’ (re)shapes 
characters, or at least has the potential to do so. It is a moment in which boundaries 
of the self and the other are lost or redefined, a moment when the concept of 
selfhood changes and becomes an encounter, forming and reforming itself depending 
on that encounter. 33 In strange intimacy, selves become affective and open: for 
example, when Julia in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie takes walks in Paris, when Mrs 
Ramsay in To the Lighthouse is alone with her knitting, and when Antoinette is 
absorbed in the West Indian nature in Wide Sargasso Sea. In other words, selves 
become ‘haecceities’. In A Thousand Plateaus (1980/1897) Deleuze and Guattari 
write that 
there is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, 
thing, or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a winter, 
a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even 
though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject. […] 
You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life (regardless of its 
duration) – a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its 
regularity) (2004, p. 289).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari give an example of Clarissa from Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway 
(1925) as an haecceity (2004, p. 262). I will demonstrate throughout this thesis how 
Rhys too writes her characters as haecceities – Julia and Antoinette are the 
impressions, forces, and affects of the external world. Because selves are open to be 
affected and affect in Woolf and Rhys, various strange intimacies can emerge in the 
stories we will read in the following chapters.  
                                                             
32 The word strange, according to Oxford Dictionary means “from elsewhere, foreign, unknown, 
unfamiliar, unusual, unfamiliar, curious; distant; inhospitable”. Importantly, its Latin root can also 
add “external” to its meaning. According to Oxford English Dictionary, in the seventeenth century, 
the word ‘intimacy’ was associated with ‘sexual intercourse’. The adjective, ‘intimate’, however, 
referred to ‘make known, announce, impress’, coming from Latin intimus ‘inmost, innermost, 
deepest’. It is this second sense that I follow – strange intimacy is bodily but not necessarily sexual, 
although it can also be that. It is something that externally impresses on the characters while having a 
deep effect on them. Strange intimacy is something stirred in senses and body but not exactly sexual. 
When thinking about the etymology of ‘strange’, which can signify something external, and the 
‘intimacy’ as something innermost and deep, then strange intimacy expresses exactly the tension 
between external and internal. Indeed, intimacy in strange intimacy is not something contained within 
an individual but something external in the environment, in the atmosphere, between different bodies.  
33 Beatrice Monaco (2013) and Derek Ryan (2013) see subjectivities in a similar way.   
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In an interview with Mireille Calle-Gruber, Cixous makes a similar 
observation about selfhood: “I am this compound of observations, admirations, 
uncertainties” (2008, p. 34) and in an interview with Susan Sellers, she says, “[a 
human being] is an emerald set in the silver seas of the scenes of the world. It’s a 
tiny precious stone, but it sends and receives – its extensions and depths are the 
whole world. The human being is a world” (2008, p. 152). When Cixous refers to 
admirations, observations and uncertainties, and when she says that human beings 
are sending and receiving – that is exchanging – information with the rest of the 
world, she also seems to say that our subjectivities and selves are constantly made 
and remade based on this exchange. We can assume from these quotations that 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, and Cixous, selves are not contained within 
persons but are a wire of connections to the outside world of non-human elements.  
Subjectivity in this model is not unchanging but always open and in relation 
to specific situations, environments, and others, enhancing ethical relations. Erinn 
Gilson (2011), Daniel W. Smith and Nathan Jun (2011), and Elizabeth Grosz (1993) 
argue that this kind of subjectivity is ethical. 34 Grosz (1993), for instance, suggests 
that 
Deleuzian ethics do not privilege the human, autonomous, sovereign subject, 
or the independent other, and the bonds of communication”, but is concerned 
with what psychoanalysis calls “partial objects, organs, processes, flows, 
which show no respect for the autonomy of the subjects (p. 172).  
Cixous’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s work indicates that ethical relations require 
subjectivity that is relational and open to the world shared with humans and non-
human alike: for instance, with the specific attributes of a day, the weather, or a 
season. This concept of selfhood is ethical precisely because it is aware of the other 
in the ‘construction’ of self.  
An important role in this conception of self is placed upon the ‘other’ whom 
the self meets in the encounter. It is vital here to pause on Emmanuel Levinas’s work 
briefly. One of the central tenets of this thesis is indebted to Levinas’s philosophy: 
we are defined by the radical other, and it is only when we are faced with this radical 
                                                             
34 Critics like Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith, and Erinn Gunniff Gilson, among others, also point 
out the connection between Deleuzian and feminist ethics, emphasising the attention to particular 
situations and the political nature of ethics in Deleuze and various feminist ethics. See more in their 
book Deleuze and Ethics (2011).  
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otherness that an ethical being in the world can emerge. In Totality and Infinity 
(1961), he writes, “a calling into question of the same—which cannot occur within 
the egoist spontaneity of the same—is brought about by the other. We name this 
calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics” (p. 43). 
The presence of the other, however, does not seem to be enough for ethical relations 
in Woolf’s and Rhys’s works – there also has to be a certain desire to know the 
other, and to get intimate with the other. Sara Crangle (2010) focuses on the 
importance of desire in Levinas’s work.35 It is interesting to point out, thinking back 
to the discussion of anti-Oedipality and the figure of a man, that, as Crangle (2010) 
writes, “Levinas believes it is precisely this masculine approach to the self that 
should be deferred in a privileging of otherness” (p. 15). Crangle (2010) explains 
that the idea of a more ethical relation to the other than the masculine one depends 
on seeing desire as different from how it is seen in the Western philosophical 
tradition from Plato to Lacan (pp. 14-17). The desire for the other is then more 
present in the feminine, or anti-Oedipal, approach to selfhood. She writes,  
Because [desire] is inevitably directed beyond the self, desire is not 
solipsism. Nor is it love, a word to which Levinas has an aversion as it 
promotes an overly romanticized view of the self as a fusion or confusion 
with the other. Levinas insists on the separateness of self and other crucial to 
the maintenance of desire and its attendant responsibility (Crangle, 2010, p. 
15). 
This indicates that the desire for the other is not a desire to consume the other as the 
same. This desire for the other is precisely maintaining the otherness of the other, 
and a curiosity and desire to know the other.  
In interview with Mireille Calle-Gruber, Cixous says that “life is to desire the 
other” (2008, p. 34). For Cixous, curiosity and wonder toward life begins from not 
knowing, from wanting to learn, to discover. This curiosity and wonder towards life 
can be seen as strange intimacy; a relation to something already seemingly familiar, 
where nevertheless an affective space opens up where the potential for more ethical 
relations with others and one’s surroundings resides. As will be demonstrated in the 
following chapters, Woolf’s and Rhys’s writings almost always border on the line 
between the self and the other (whether human or non-human) – it risks the 
                                                             
35 See Sara Crangle’s introduction to Prosaic Desires (2010) for a discussion of Levinas’s ideas on 
desire, otherness, and ethics.  
  
42 
 
disappearance of the self, and it gives way to the unknown, to the stranger, whether 
human or not. In this sense, Woolf and Rhys locate intimacy in the realm of the 
unfamiliar and unknown; in their works, what matters and what triggers intimacy is 
the unknown, and the desire to know that springs from this: not to know the other, 
but to acknowledge the existence of the other, and their otherness. In other words, it 
is desire to know the other in their work that keeps the characters and narrative 
moving forwards.  
Desire, when seen not as a lack, and not as entirely human, paves the way to 
intimacy. If Levinas focuses on the human other, then this thesis also focuses on the 
non-human other. For this reason, I come back to Deleuze and Guattari. Derek Ryan 
(2014) writes that the very first of Spinoza’s affects is desire which is also “a central 
tenet of Deleuze’s onto-ethics […] ‘desire is man’s very essence’ as it leads him ‘to 
do something’ – it is ‘any of man’s strivings, impulses, appetites, and volitions, 
which vary as the man’s constitution varies’” (p. 165). In other words, Deleuze and 
Guattari allow desire to be anything and become anything. They write about the 
multiplicity of desire:  
desire is present wherever something flows and runs, carrying along with it 
interested subjects […] Our question was: what is the nature of relations 
between elements in order for there to be desire, for these elements to 
become desirable? I mean, I don’t desire a woman – […] I also desire a 
landscape that is enveloped in this woman, a landscape that, if needs be – I 
don’t know – but that I can feel (2004, p. 49). 
We can gather from this quotation that for Deleuze and Guattari, desire is a 
compound of various elements and flows that enter into relations with one another. 
Elizabeth Grosz (1993) and Claire Colebrook (2012), following Deleuze, see desire 
not as a lack, but as productive. 36 Colebrook writes that “desire is not some human 
set of embodied interests that must be repressed or articulated through language; 
desire is the multiplicity of forces of life as such, which is diminished and 
                                                             
36 Elizabeth Grosz in ‘A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics’ (1993) makes a similar 
point to Crangle (2010) who points out that desire in the Western tradition has been seen as a lack. 
Grosz writes: “It has been plausibly argued that in the tradition reaching from Plato to Lacan and 
beyond, desire has been understood largely as negative, abyssal, a lack at the level of ontology itself 
[…] .a lack in being which strives to be filled through the (impossible) attainment of an object […] 
For Hegel, ‘for woman to have desire is to posit her on the same ontological level as man’ – a 
theoretical impossibility in phallocentric texts, hence the enigmatic and perpetual question of 
woman’s desire: what does woman want?” (p. 171). Colebrook (2012, 2013) puts forward similar 
ideas. 
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impoverished when represented as human” (p. 67). Rosi Braidotti (1993), a leading 
scholar working at the interstices between feminist and post-humanist theory makes 
a similar claim about desire. She writes that desire is “not just libidinal desire, but 
rather ontological desire, the desire to be, the tendency of the subject to be […]” (p. 
6). This desire to be, is, essentially, a desire to live, a desire to be alive and to enjoy 
life, and to be able to be curious about life. In the same sense, in Woolf and Rhys, we 
see how (female) protagonists struggle with desiring heteronormative ways of being 
a wife and a mother. Rather, their desire is a desire for life and the ability to follow 
their various small, multiple desires in life that may or may not be heteronormative 
and conventional.  
Lauren Berlant’s work on intimacy, love, and desire is helpful regarding the 
above thoughts. Her work allows us to understand how desire can create intimacy 
and how it is not a desire for Oedipal love plots of happiness. According to her, 
(conventional) intimacy is an “aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a 
story about both oneself and others that will turn out in a particular way” (Berlant, 
1998, p. 281). Berlant in Desire/ Love (2012), however, suggests that love is just one 
aspect of desire that can take various forms. Love, for Berlant (2012), is often 
imprisoned in what she calls major narratives of intimacy – it is “bound up in 
institutions like marriage and family, property relations, stock phrases” (p. 7), and 
patriotism (Berlant, 1998, p. 285). Instead, Berlant is interested in the minor 
intimacies, in desire that may form into love, but not into major love plots. In the 
same sense, strange intimacy registers that which conventional intimacy leaves 
unregistered. In this respect, it shares something with what Berlant calls ‘minor’ 
intimacies, which she distinguishes from the conventional intimacies that often exist 
between romantic partners, parents and children, and siblings. She calls for the need 
to look at the minor intimacies, at those desires for intimacy that bypass the couple 
or the life narrative, because these 
intimacies have no alternative plots, let alone few laws and stable spaces of 
culture in which to clarify and to cultivate them. What happens to the energy 
of attachment when it has no designated place? To the glances, gestures, 
encounters, collaborations, or fantasies that have no canon? As with minor 
literatures, minor intimacies have been forced to develop aesthetics of the 
extreme to push these spaces into being […] in order to have a life (Berlant, 
1998, p. 285). 
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Glances, gestures, and encounters that have no canon or that do not form any major 
life narratives are also what are prevalent in the four novels studied in this thesis. 
These novels are full of desire of all sorts. In these novels, like for Deleuze and 
Guattari, desire is not lacking but life affirming, life producing (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004, p. 60). It is capable, as Deleuze and Guattari write, “of calling into 
question the established order of a society […] it is revolutionary in its essence” 
(2004, p. 51). To put it differently, Berlant and Deleuze and Guattari seem to 
indicate that unnoticed or unconventional desires have the capacity to challenge 
heteronormative or otherwise conventional stories of intimacy. I propose that 
Woolf’s and Rhys’s novels do the same.  
Woolf made it clear in her various essays, including A Room of One’s Own 
(1929) and Three Guineas (1938) that her art is her means of resistance to fight 
against imperial and patriarchal order. Although Rhys’s political views, or indeed 
any personal views, are not very clearly expressed anywhere, and her feminism is 
ambivalent, her fiction clearly stresses the limiting and constraining effect of a 
patriarchal, imperial system on individuals of both genders. Minor, anti-Oedipal 
(both between family members and strangers), strange intimacies (that have a life 
because of the recognition of a multiplicity of desires) in Woolf’s and Rhys’s fiction 
can therefore represent a resistance to patriarchal power and order by creating an 
affective atmosphere that enhances the sense of being attached to life that is 
experienced in various moments of strange intimacy. 
The intimacies in the four novels studied in this thesis resist time, space, race, 
class, and gender. For instance, the intimacy between Antoinette and her almost life-
long nurse Christophine is written into Wide Sargasso Sea implicitly: it is in the 
stories that Antoinette remembers from Christophine, in Christophine’s singing, and 
in the way Christophine dresses, smells, speaks, and cooks. In the same way, Lily 
remembers Mrs Ramsay through her phrases and through glimpses of her in her 
daily tasks in To the Lighthouse. In Between the Acts, it is a poetic desire between 
William and Isa, and the more carnal desire of Giles and Mrs Swithin. It is also a 
desire to paint in Lily, and a desire to create stories, lift people out of their 
subjectivity in Miss La Trobe. None of these intimacies have any ‘outcome’ in terms 
of marriage or an otherwise conventional happy ending. Yet, these strange intimacies 
expressed in glances and gestures have a life because Woolf and Rhys depict them in 
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their writing. And often these intimacies are exactly what maintain the attachment to 
life where major narratives (of love plot, of national belonging, of career) are too 
dismal to keep that attachment intact. 
Strange intimacy is not, however, impossible within Oedipal relationships 
between husbands and wives, parents and children in Woolf and Rhys. Rather, 
strange intimacy is also the attention paid to anti-Oedipal desires that exist within 
Oedipal relations. Ryan (2013), quoting Deleuze, points out that “non-oedipal love is 
pretty hard work. And you should know that it’s not enough just to be unmarried, not 
to have kids, to be gay, or belong to this or that group, in order to get around the 
Oedipus complex” (qtd. in Ryan 2013, p. 115). Non-Oedipal love is this attention 
paid to glances and gestures that also exist within familial relationships and within 
patriotic narratives. This assumes maintaining the radical otherness of the family 
member in the relationship, rather than considering them as ‘my’ mother, daughter, 
or father. We can notice the moments, for instance, between Lucy and Bart in 
Between the Acts, between Mr and Mrs Ramsay in To the Lighthouse, and between 
Julia and her sister Norah in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. Jessica Stiff Berman 
(2004) points out that,  
there is a growing body of work that seeks to reconcile Levinasian ethics 
with the question of intimacy. This problem has been of particular concern to 
feminist ethicists seeking to move beyond the essentializing aspects of a 
feminine ‘ethos of care’ without discounting the insight that women’s private 
ethical experience has rarely figured into the ethical scenarios of philosophers 
(Levinas included) (p. 152).  
Noticing strange intimate moments between familial characters can help to extend 
the aims of these feminist ethicists: for example, Luce Irigaray and Tina Chanter 
(Berman, 2004, p. 152).37 My work too aims to confirm that ethical intimacy is 
indeed possible within Oedipal relations. However, I also maintain that for the 
relation to remain ethical, the familial other needs to be considered as a radical other, 
not as a ‘my’ someone.  
Woolf’s and Rhys’s characters’ capacity for ethical behaviour resides 
precisely in strange intimacy, which is the awareness of being connected to all 
(living) bodies; to the body of the other, of the stranger, and to the material world, 
                                                             
37 See Berman’s ‘Ethical Folds: Ethics, Aesthetics, Woolf’ (2004).  
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not just to familiar bodies (and acknowledging the strangeness of familiar bodies). 
The moments I am interested in in the coming chapters – instances between Lily and 
Mr Ramsay in To the Lighthouse, Julia and her sister and their mother in After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie, the community of characters in Between the Acts, and 
Antoinette and Jamaica in Wide Sargasso Sea – all explore the encounters between 
self and other. Within these moments, time slows down, human speech becomes 
minimal or poetic, and the world of non-human gains prevalence. It is importantly 
the uncanniness of those moments, or strangeness, and yet at the same time their 
familiarity and everydayness, where something is revealed that the characters have 
not noticed before. It is intimacy that emerges from a different attention paid to the 
world, people, and things that surround us. Strange intimacy emerges in an 
atmosphere, or in a state of mind where one feels absorbed in one’s environment, as 
Abramson (2015) writes – it is losing oneself in a moment, becoming part of the 
environment which one inhabits (p. 45). In a sense, strange intimacy itself is a 
(positive) affect; a general atmosphere or mood of enchantment, wonder, and 
affirmation of the fact that life, under however disorderly conditions, is worth living.  
 
The Ethics of Being Attached to a Life 
To draw this introduction to a close, I want to return to the concept of life. 
Specifically, to the idea of ‘a life’, which I will also explore in close detail in 
Chapters Two and Three. Deleuze in ‘Immanence: A Life’ (1995) writes,  
A life is everywhere […]: an immanent life carrying with it the events and 
singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects […] The life of 
the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life […] The life 
of such individuality fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a 
man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other 
(2002, pp. 27-28).  
A life is not an individual’s life but a network of things, places, sights, sounds, and 
impressions, which nevertheless ‘belong’, or make up that individual who 
experiences those impressions. Woolf and Rhys’s characters are attached to life 
exactly in this sense – not necessarily to their individual private lives, but to a life as 
such. Bennett (2001) writes that “if popular psychological wisdom has it that you 
have to love yourself before you can love another, my story suggests that you have to 
love life before you can care about anything” (p. 4). And from this primary love for 
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life, ethical behaviour towards any other, human or non-human, emerges in Woolf’s 
and Rhys’s fiction. And if this love is not there, neither is there intimacy between 
characters because strange intimacy between characters cannot emerge before 
characters are in love with life. Speaking of enchantment, Bennett (2001) writes that 
one of the ways to cultivate the sense of enchantment that affirms the love for life is 
to resist the story of modernity as disenchanted (p. 4). The disenchantment tale, as I 
have suggested above, is one of the main reasons why modernist literary studies are 
so prone to focus on the negative affects – because the modern world is supposed to 
be disenchanted, a story which has continued also into our contemporary lives. The 
attachment to life, which is cultivated by strange intimacy and which in turn 
encourages strange intimacy, is therefore important not only for the modernist period 
and the novels I explore, but also because our contemporary moment witnesses 
climate crisis, the rise of authoritarian regimes in Europe, and far-right, nationalist, 
conservative politics. These are all aspects that diminish many people’s attachment 
to life and create the need to pay attention to things that could restore that 
attachment.  
But how, then, is the seemingly apolitical, asubjective mood or atmosphere 
of strange intimacy ethical? The works of Deleuze and Guattari, Cixous, and Bennett 
are central to my understanding of the ethical potential within strange intimacy. 
What Cixous, Deleuze and Guattari, and Bennett’s ethics share is their engagement 
with the other, be it human or non-human, the life-affirming quality of desire, the 
sense of joy and wonder, and the singularity of situation. For instance, Cixous speaks 
of being unclean with joy, and central to Deleuze and Guattari is the affirmative, 
world-making qualities of desire and imagination. Bennett sees sensations and 
embodiment as central for the love for life that propels ethical behaviour. In her 
bodily, affective model of ethics, she follows Schiller, Foucault and Nietzsche. She 
writes,  
Schiller's notion of the aesthetic makes important contributions to the model 
of ethics with affect that I endorse. First, he makes a persuasive case for the 
ethical insufficiency of intellect. Recent history, in particular the French 
Revolution, had forced him to ponder the disturbing coexistence of rational 
enlightenment and ethical barbarism (Bennett, 2001, p. 139).  
In other words, an abstract ethical code to follow does not necessarily end up in 
ethical behaviour in Bennett’s model. Instead, Bennett proposes that for ethical 
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behaviour, joyful attachment to and “affective fascination” with the world are 
necessary (Bennett, 2001, p. 139). Joyful attachment and affective fascination both 
depend on the ability to see the modern Western world as enchanted, as sites that are 
worth wondering about, being curious about and being intimately attached to. 
Bennett (2001) suggests that this attachment to life cannot be abstract but has to 
come from an embodied sense of belonging to the world of other material things (pp. 
131-156). Following these ideas, it can be argued that strange intimacy with the 
world and life itself is ethical in a sense that it enhances the feeling of belonging to 
the world and being part of it – a feeling that should also propel the desire to engage 
ethically with this world and the beings in it. There are many moments in the novels 
I explore that can be read with this model of ethics, the most obvious of which is 
Wide Sargasso Sea and Antoinette’s embodied sense of belonging to the West Indies 
and her deep love for that place. 
This model of ethics, as Bennett is aware, also invites criticism of elitism, as 
joy and wonder are often considered as things accessible only for the privileged. 
Bennett (2001) resists this idea and writes that if it were true that enchantment is 
accessible only for the privileged, it gives “all the more reason for privileged 
intellectuals to develop that capacity. For, if enchantment can foster an ethically 
laudable generosity of spirit, then the cultivation of an eye for the wonderful 
becomes something like an academic duty” (p. 10). However, her story of 
enchantment is not restricted to sites accessible only to the elite. Instead, her model 
of enchantment, as already stated, is daily. It is worth mentioning Berlant’s Cruel 
Optimism (2011) here as she too claims there that “even those whom you would 
think of as defeated are living beings figuring out how to stay attached to life from 
within it, and to protect what optimism they have for that, at least” (p. 10). To put it 
differently, it can also be said that the criticism of elitism itself actually fuels 
patronising attitudes towards lives that are not ‘elite’ when in reality these lives can 
contain just as many sites and moments that enhance wonder and attachment to life. 
Also, being an academic or an intellectual does not necessarily mean having a 
privileged and secure life as much academic labour in these days is indeed 
precarious and more than anything, a labour of love, not a labour that earns proper 
‘living’. In other words, Bennett and Berlant, and, also Sara Ahmed in The Promise 
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of Happiness (2010) reconsider the generic, ‘American dream’-like ideas that are 
widely considered as a ‘good life’, who has it and how it is lived.  
All protagonists in Rhys’s interwar novels fall under the category of not elite. 
In Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, Mrs McNab is the embodiment of the ‘not elite’ who 
nevertheless maintains the attachment to life through daily sites of enchantment. I 
will focus on Mrs McNab in closer detail in Chapter One. For now, it is worth 
mentioning that in her old age, having spent most of her life working for others in 
physically tiring conditions, with her toothless mouth and her shabby clothes, she 
sings, laughs, and smiles at herself in the mirror while breathing life into an old 
house. With her work and care, Mrs McNab undoes the damage inflicted by the First 
World War, and more generally, by the passing of time on the Ramsay house and 
family – she not only makes her own life worth living but also the lives of the 
Ramsays, who, in the context of To the Lighthouse, could be considered the elite. In 
a similar manner, although the landlady in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie thinks of 
Julia’s life as “the life of a dog” (Rhys, 1997, p. 11), Julia keeps on living, finding 
attachments to life in sharing specific intimate moments with her sister, and in being 
immersed in the atmosphere of the city. In short, despite life being seemingly far 
from marvellous from a normative point of view, these characters cultivate intimacy 
with life and the world around them through maintaining joy in daily tasks and sites. 
To illustrate Bennett’s point then, the sites of wonder and enchantment are by no 
means restricted to the ‘elite’, at least not in Woolf’s and Rhys’s fiction. 
A criticism to be taken more seriously is, however, that of “naïve optimism”, 
as Bennett notes (2001, p. 10). This criticism points out the danger of losing sight of 
‘real’ oppression and violence when focusing on aesthetic and affective properties of 
life. Here, it is helpful to consider how Anna Abramson (2015) responds to the 
potential dangers of becoming absorbed in atmosphere. Abramson is aware of how 
the sense of being absorbed can be confused with being inattentive to the 
surrounding world and its issues. Yet, she suggests that the result of this absorption 
is not going inward but going outward – of realising one’s own dependence on 
others and also one’s role in affecting others and one’s environment, and accordingly 
becoming more critical towards one’s own actions (Abramson, 2015, pp. 45-46). 
Similarly, although characters are present in the atmosphere of strange intimacy, 
they are nevertheless aware of themselves, their actions, and their relations to others. 
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This attention makes it possible to contemplate their choices and actions, thereby 
propelling their ethics. Even if this contemplation leads to no major social change, it 
is still that which makes space for the minor intimacies to exist, which, accordingly, 
maintain the attachment to life.  
I would also like to point out here that new materialist critics, Bennett among 
them, receive similar criticism about whiteness, Eurocentrism, and privilege from 
Indigenous studies scholars as they do from feminist scholars. Critics like Peta 
Hinton, Tara Mhrabi, and Josef Barla (2014), Nicki Sullivan (2012) Juanita 
Sundberg (2014), and Alison Ravenscroft (2018) criticise new materialism’s 
ignorance of the work that has already been done in the field of Indigenous studies.  38  
In this sense, this criticism is similar to that made by feminist critics who take issue 
with new materialist work, which positions itself as a break from earlier feminist 
work, as I have already outlined when introducing Cixous into the new materialist 
tradition. For example, Ravenscroft (2018) explains that  
Sara Ahmed among others has argued [that] new materialism’s founding 
gestures are possible only by excluding earlier feminist materialisms. But at 
least as urgent is the exclusion of Indigenous materialism and through this 
the recentring of the Western-centred discourses that these theories aim to 
depose (p. 354).  
What these criticisms take issue with is not what new materialists do but how they do 
it – mostly white scholars focusing on Western, often Eurocentric thought. 
Regarding this, and focusing specifically on the work of Bennett, who is the central 
new materialist thinker of this thesis, I suggest that Bennett’s aim is precisely to 
demonstrate that Western thought can be challenged from within. In other words, 
Bennett’s engagement with white Western philosophers such as Kant, Paracelsus, 
Lucretius, Foucault, and Deleuze is there to demonstrate that Western thought itself 
is not that different from, say, Australian Indigenous thought, but that the idea of 
matter as lively, non-human as part of and entangled with the human, is also there 
already in the Western tradition. In short, the aim of new materialism seems to be to 
challenge the Western thought from within.  
                                                             
38 See Peta Hinton, Tara Mhrabi, and Josef Barla in ‘New Materialisms/ New Colonialisms’ (2013), 
Juanita Sundberg in ‘Decolonizing Post-humanist Geographies’ (2014), and Alison Ravenscroft in 
‘Strange Weather’ (2018). 
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Some of the criticism against new materialism addresses issues around how 
to define ‘human’, and around entangling the human with the non-human. For 
instance, Carine M. Mardorossian (2015) warns against flattening out the differences 
between human and the non-human:  
no matter how much philosophers, cultural theorists and political scientists 
strive to emphasise interconnectedness in the name of saving the 
environment, insofar as they highlight this ‘mesh’ by relying on their 
consciousness of humanity’s dependence on and imbrication with the 
environmental Other, they cannot challenge what ultimately drives 
anthropocentrism, namely the certitude that our depth and self-reflexivity, 
ability to critique and debate is what places us above the ‘shallowness’ of the 
surfaces we discuss as the environment, the Other, and the non-human (p. 
111). 
She is, in short, against what Simon Choat (2018) calls ‘flat ontology’ that eradicates 
the differences between humans and the non-human. Although Mardorossian 
somewhat flattens out the differences between new materialist thinkers, I do take 
seriously her idea that the non-human should remain a radical other. In other words, 
with Levinasian ethics in mind, the non-human, as any other to the self, does remain 
a radical other in this thesis.  
Ravenscroft (2018), however, criticises the use of the word ‘human’ in new 
materialism and post-humanism regarding sexual, racial, and class differences. She 
writes that “post-humanism and new materialism (and some feminist critiques of 
both) risk leaving the Western liberal human intact, making the ‘human’ in ‘post-
human’ stand in for all of ‘us’” (p. 354). Yet, as I have already emphasised, it is 
precisely the aim of new materialism to demonstrate that human beings should not 
be narrowly defined and categorised by their external attributes but rather by 
focusing on the place and affects they share. In Rootprints, Cixous addresses the 
question, ‘what is human’? 
the word human is very important. When I say “more human”, I mean: 
progressing. I ought to say: better human. This means, while being human, 
not depriving oneself of the rest of the universe […] After all, what do we 
do? We live, but why do we live? I think: to become more human: more 
capable of reading the world, more capable of playing it in all ways. This 
does not mean nicer or more humanistic. I would say: more faithful to what 
we are made from and to what we can create (1997, p. 30).  
But what are we made from and what can we create? She has a potential answer for 
the former question, suggesting that humans are made of “the rest of the universe” 
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(Cixous, 1997, p. 30), which perhaps indicates that humans are not separated from 
the rest of the world of animate and inanimate matter. This realisation is precisely 
what propels humans to become ‘more’ human. In other words, it helps to enhance 
ethical relations to that which is not-human. Birgit Mara Kaiser (2013) explores 
affective corporeality in Cixous’s work, and suggests that human for Cixous is not 
associated with rational subjectivity and universal humanism. Instead, materiality for 
Cixous, or “the rest of the universe” (1997, p. 30), as we see in the above quotation, 
is there to remind us that human subjects are not abstract but embodied, carnal 
beings in the world among other beings and things. This model of ethics that focuses 
on the non-human other and its entanglement with the human is also, as argued by 
Ryan (2015), particular to modernism. He suggests that if there is a common ethics 
to modernism, it is post-human ethics. Ryan (2015) proposes that “reorienting 
modernist ethics alongside post-humanism [opens] possibilities for a modernist 
ethics founded on what is often in the background, on what turns its back to us, in 
modernist texts” (p. 290).39 What seemingly turns back to us is matter and the non-
human, and in Cixous, these aspects are taken into account. 
Keiser (2013) argues that humanity then has a double-meaning for Cixous – 
on the one hand, it is material, embodied and related to the world of the non-human; 
on the other hand, this same realisation also allows transformation and creations of 
other, more ethical ways of being in the world. Keiser (2013), following Irving Goh 
(2010), suggests that Cixous’s engagement with the animal is a “manoeuvre to move 
away from a vision that orders and classifies, names and hierarchizes” (p. 492). As 
Keiser (2013) writes,  
Human is precisely the term that permits Cixous both the refusal of being 
enclosed into segregated communities, clearly separated species, or sexes or 
cultures and the demand of a work of learning, of reading what we witness 
and undergo, whom we encounter and affect, and what touches us, in order to 
inhabit the world in ways that are less harmful to ourselves and others and 
more adequate to the diffracted and corporeal beings that we are (p. 499). 
                                                             
39 Ryan (2015) addresses the criticism of the impossibility to write from any other than a human 
perspective. Although all attempts to look at non-human life through human words are 
anthropomorphised, as Ryan notes, he also acknowledges that “Woolf and Lawrence demonstrate a 
nonanthropocentric anthropomorphism. It is an anthropomorphism that comes after the non-human, 
an anthropomorphism that seeks to follow the snake and the moth in order to find a conception of life 
that is not centred on human subjects” (p. 294). 
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In other words, the word ‘human’ for Cixous is a possibility to be more-than-human, 
and to see the human not in terms of race, sex, gender, ethnicity or other 
‘majoritarian’ identity, as Deleuze and Guattari would put it, but to see humans as 
affective beings in relation to other humans and non-humans. Thinking of Kafka’s 
deathbed notes on flowers, Cixous (1993) writes, 
It’s the extraordinary courtesy of a man who has nothing left to live. The 
other exists! In these moments of extremity, perhaps we do admit to having a 
relationship with the vegetal, which is as intense, as embodied, as fleshy […] 
Perhaps it is because we discover at this point that flowers lead – […] - by 
their way of getting through the earth, with their roots, to the core of the 
matter […] They lead us back to the origins, where we become obviously one 
family (pp. 152-154).  
For Cixous, human is extended to the world of non-human, and the non-human to 
the human world. Accordingly, if modernist ethics are indeed post-humanist, as 
Ryan suggests, Cixous’s work, with its emphasis on materiality and embodiment and 
the non-human, can open up very interesting avenues for exploring this ethics, while 
also maintaining the critical, and still necessary, focus on the gendered implications 
on embodiment and materiality. 
What makes strange intimacy strange, then, is never purely human, or what 
we understand as human. In White Ink (2008), in an interview with Rene de 
Ceccatty, Cixous writes that there is  
nothing more intimate, they say, than love, than where one makes love. But 
what does one make love of, as human and animal being? [...] it’s the one 
[question] that subverts, that haunts all the scenes in which we move, which 
all seem professional, external, ‘extimate’, political, etc. For me, it is always 
about a questioning of love (p. 26).  
Cixous puts the question of love to the forefront, suggesting that every other issue is 
related to that of love. It is important to note here that she does not tell us what love 
is, or what one, as an animal or as a human, or rather as a human-animal, “makes 
love of’” (Cixous, 2008, p. 26). Rather, I would like to suggest that she opens up the 
concept of love to a wider definition than romantic, purely human love, like she 
opens up the concept of human, as demonstrated above. 
Dominick Pettman in Creaturely Love (2017) contemplates love along 
similar lines to Cixous, although he is more interested in romantic love, suggesting 
that “love makes us both more and less than human. Whether it is the texture of the 
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beloved’s skin or hair, their singular scent, the way they drool in their sleep […] we 
love the creaturely in the other, as much as their humanity” (p. xi). If (strange) 
intimacy is affect, then, following Deleuze and Guattari’s idea that affects are the 
non-human becomings of man, and bearing in mind Cixous’s quotation about what 
does one make love of, as a human or an animal, we also see that what creates 
intimacy, what makes us lovable and what makes us love other(s) is the non-human 
in us and them. Pettmann continues, echoing Deleuzian ideas on singularity, that it is 
not a question of reducing humans to animals or animals to humans or flattening the 
differences between different human and animal individuals (or perhaps singularities 
is a more fitting word), but “it is to rejoice in the miraculous singularity of the being 
that one is with, while also understanding the profound universality represented by 
his or her presence: the fact that the embraced body is but a temporary refuge for a 
universe of generic, genetic materials” (Pettman, 2017, p. 8). Strange intimacy, is, in 
part, dependent on the realisation that we are, in our singularity, only parts of 
universality, which is not entirely human. Pettmann (2017) continues that “we all 
suspect, at various levels of consciousness, that we are not really human. Or not only 
human. And it is that twilight between love and lust known as desire that we unmask 
the pretension of species-being […]” (p. xi). Intimacy, he suggests, is not pure love, 
which he associates with humans, or more animal-like lust – it is an odd combination 
of both. It is not just being in love with, or desiring the human other, but desiring and 
being in love with a whole network of non-human things associated with the person. 
In other words, it is not simply a desire for another human being, but a desire for and 
an attachment to a life as such.  
 
Chapter Outlines 
I have established, following Bennett, Cixous, and Deleuze and Guattari, that the 
following chapters will argue that in Woolf’s and Rhys’s fiction, there exists in 
characters a primary love for life as such, a strange intimacy towards their 
environment, and this is what enhances intimacy between the characters in the novel, 
or at least has the potential to do so. Intimacy between characters can, however, in 
turn also enhance the general mood or atmosphere of attachment to life, which is 
ethical. This love for life, I argue, is cultivated when life is seen as ‘a life’ in a 
Deleuzian sense, when modernity, and accordingly modern life, is seen as enchanted, 
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and when there is room in this life for narratives of intimacies and desires that exist 
outside the conventional plots of the couple and marriage. The works of Cixous and 
Deleuze and Guattari, and Colebrook’s readings of the latter’s works, have inspired 
me to see this affective engagement with the world as an anti-Oedipal reading that 
depends precisely on seeing life as ‘a life’, selves as ‘haecceities’ in relation to this 
common life, and on noticing joy, desire, and various intimacies. Woolf’s and 
Rhys’s writings, I argue, capture these strange intimacies between characters, and 
also the general atmosphere of strange intimacy. My argument about a love for life 
through strange, embodied intimacy with the material world of the non-human will 
proceed as follows in the coming chapters: I suggest that Woolf’s To the Lighthouse 
and Rhys’s After Leaving Mr Mackenzie focus more on individual selves and their 
relations. These novels, and accordingly Chapters One and Three that explore them, 
address issues related to how individual selves are made inside and outside familial 
relations, by exploring the anti-Oedipal desire in female characters especially. While 
individual selves are prominent in To the Lighthouse and After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie, then Between the Acts and Wide Sargasso Sea are more concerned with 
exploring communal elements of identity such as ethnicity and the sense of national 
belonging, and how it is formed in relation not only to other humans but in relation 
to the world of the non-human. These issues will be explored in Chapters Two and 
Four. The thesis is organised by authors in order to maintain the uniqueness of each 
author and emphasise how their oeuvres have developed over years. Yet, Chapter 
One on To the Lighthouse and Chapter Three on After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, and 
Chapter Two on Between the Acts and Chapter Four on Wide Sargasso Sea can be 
read as pairs.  
Chapter One, “The Sense of Wonder in To the Lighthouse”, focuses on the 
nature of intimacy itself, and on the complex interplay between distance and 
proximity in the formation of intimacy in this novel, which is most explicitly 
concerned with intimacy, and how it emerges between people. The novel looks at 
intimacy as knowledge that emerges from the sense of wonder, and the ability to 
keep wondering about the other – a notion where the verb and noun forms of wonder 
melt into one another and create intimacy, both in atmosphere and within and 
between people. When Lily wonders about knowledge, it is not just any knowledge 
but embodied knowledge, which is clearly associated with femininity in To the 
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Lighthouse. In other words, I propose that it is a specific kind of knowledge that 
intimacy holds – that of embodiment and senses. Intimacy, I demonstrate, is also 
dependent on being able to keep wondering about the other. I propose that 
cultivating the kind of thinking-wondering which is rooted in embodied experiences 
is encouraged in To the Lighthouse through art, not through the discipline of 
philosophy. Lily’s painting and Woolf’s writing is affective, but in order for it to 
become affective, that which is feminine has to be embraced, celebrated, and 
included. Only then can the atmosphere of wonder and strange intimacy emerge. I 
propose that their art is an entanglement of the nearness/distance, 
femininity/masculinity, immanence/transcendence, and non-human/human binaries, 
where the left sides represents that which is feminine. In this chapter, I focus mostly 
on Deleuzian concept of ‘haecceity’ and Bennett’s concept of wonder.  
In Chapter Two, “A ‘Whizzing, Whirring, Buzzing’ History in Between the 
Acts”, I explore what I consider to be the most mischievous, playful, and self-
indulgent novel of this thesis. I examine how Woolf, by focusing on sensual, bodily 
intimacies on the one hand, and poetic, ephemeral ones on the other, creates a 
collective atmosphere of the present moment that can be seen as ‘defining’ the 
historical period of late modernism. Woolf, through the woman artist and an 
affective sense of Englishness offers an alternative to patriarchal and patriotic 
narratives of English history and identity. I demonstrate how Woolf’s ‘we’ is similar 
to Deleuze’s ‘a life’ and propose that history in Between the Acts becomes ‘a 
history’. I turn to Berlant’s Cruel Optimism to explore the affective present moment 
and how this affective present also creates a different sense of history than, say, 
narratives that focus on politics and eminent historical figures. I propose that history 
in Between the Acts is something that Hélène Cixous calls ‘time’s horizon line’ 
where everyday lives of ordinary people are depicted and felt. What is important is 
not the linear historical narrative of England but how the stories that make up history 
influence what is perceived as Englishness, or the affect they produce and which 
becomes associated with Englishness. Then again, I show how events, and indeed 
stories, produce affects, so stories do matter, including the story of the past, which 
essentially is history – a story about a past. But stories can be told very differently 
using different language, and this is Woolf’s aim in Between the Acts: to tell 
different stories, or to tell the same stories from new perspectives by using language 
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in a different way, in a way that depicts multiple desires and intimacies, blending 
together colloquial gossip and poetic soliloquies, fact and fiction, to beget different 
affects and most importantly, to construct a different kind of history, based on a 
different kind of ‘we’, which includes village idiots, people with ‘suspicious’ ethnic 
backgrounds, animals, and nature. 
Chapter Three, “Anti-oedipal Desire in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie”, 
explores desire and intimacy, or rather, the lack of desire and intimacy in female 
characters. I propose that this lack draws critical attention to the fact that the non-
existence of intimacy between women is a direct result of how the majoritarian 
concept of ‘woman’ is created in Freudian, Oedipal psychoanalytical narratives. 
After Leaving Mr MacKenzie, albeit in a different manner, puts forward an idea that 
is also central in To the Lighthouse: that women should not be defined by their 
‘motherness’, ‘daughterness’, or ‘wifeness’, all majoritarian, conventional identity 
categories. On the other hand, Rhys suggests a woman, or any self for that matter, is 
impossible to define as a constant but is in perpetual becoming in relation to the 
world of the non-human. I suggest that we cannot understand Rhys’s protagonists if 
we try to understand their desires, and desire in general, in solely psychoanalytical 
frames, whether Oedipal or pre-Oedipal, as scholars like Ann B. Simpson, Sylvie 
Maurel, and Patricia Moran have done. Besides working with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
texts, I use Claire Colebrook’s understanding of Deleuzian anti-Oedipality as a 
reference for explaining Rhys’s modernism in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie to 
demonstrate that Rhys’s writing, like Woolf’s, is anti-Oedipal. To do so, I explore the 
importance of animal imagery, places, and to a lesser extent, the importance of 
childhood in this novel along Deleuzian concepts of ‘becoming-animal’, and 
‘becoming-woman’. 
In Chapter Four, “The Embodied Aesthetics of Place in Wide Sargasso Sea”, 
I propose that Antoinette’s embodied relation to place that is and is not her native 
land complicates any straightforward notions of national belonging and ethnic 
identity. Wide Sargasso Sea tackles the problems of embodiment, and the complex 
relations and entanglements between the human and non-human worlds. In Wide 
Sargasso Sea, the detailed focus on flowers, forests, waterfalls, animals, furniture, 
and various other aspects of non-human world presents life from the point of view of 
new materialisms and affect studies. At the centre of the novel is a love story 
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between Antoinette and Jamaica. I suggest that Rhys presents us with embodied 
aesthetics of place that results in ethical awareness of the animate and inanimate 
non-human world precisely because Antoinette is aware of the vitality of her 
surrounding non-human world because she is embodied in it. Positing embodiment 
as the primary source of knowledge is also a critique of Cartesian disembodied 
epistemology, and can be read as a part of Rhys’s feminist, anti-Oedipal, affective 
writing and ethics that function as anti-imperial critiques. I explore the importance of 
childhood in this novel, along with Deleuze’s concept of ‘becoming-child’ or 
childlike thinking in general. I address the criticisms of new materialism in terms of 
race and from Indigenous studies scholars by aiming to demonstrate that Wide 
Sargasso Sea maintains the focus on majoritarian identity categories marked by race, 
class, and sex, while also indicating that these categories create patriarchal, patriotic 
and imperial sentiments and prohibit the happiness and freedom of the characters. 
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Chapter One  
The sense of wonder in To the Lighthouse  
 
What art was there, known to love or cunning, by which one pressed through into 
those secret chambers? What device for becoming, like waters poured into one jar, 
inextricably the same, one with the object one adored? Could body achieve it, or the 
mind, subtly mingling in the intricate passages of the brain? or the heart…? for it 
was not knowledge but unity that she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing 
that could be written in any language known to men, but intimacy itself, which is 
knowledge[…]. 
Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse 
 
Of the four novels studied in this thesis, To the Lighthouse (1927) is the most 
thoroughly concerned with questions about knowing oneself, knowing the other, and 
cultivating and understanding intimacy between humans as well as between the 
human and non-human worlds. The novel provides a compelling opening chapter as 
we can start to explore the nature of intimacy itself, examining both its conventional 
forms and its stranger expressions. Characters, notably Lily when thinking about Mrs 
Ramsay, wonder about intimacy throughout the novel: “How then did it work out, all 
this? How did one judge people, think of them?”; “It was painful to be reminded of 
the inadequacy of human relationships, that the most perfect was flawed”; “How 
then, [Lily] asked herself, did one know one thing or another about people, sealed as 
they were”; “Who knows even at moments of intimacy, This is knowledge?” (Woolf, 
2016, p. 28, p. 45, p. 58, p. 193). Lily’s agony about intimacy, however, becomes 
most apparent in the opening quotation, when she desires to know Mrs Ramsay but 
is failing to do so: “Could body achieve it, or the mind, subtly mingling in the 
intricate passages of the brain? or the heart […]? for it was not knowledge but unity 
that she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be written in any 
language known to men, but intimacy itself, which is knowledge” (Woolf, 2016, p. 
57). As these wonderings demonstrate, there is a constant questioning about what 
intimacy is and how to achieve it. There are also contradictory ideas of intimacy as 
knowledge and intimacy as something opposed to knowledge, when, in the novel, 
there is both knowledge in intimacy, and intimacy in knowledge – a specific 
  
60 
 
affective, embodied knowledge of bodies and senses, that, I propose, is associated 
with femininity in To the Lighthouse.  
This intimate, embodied knowledge about the world and the other is induced 
by wonder, which is central to the novel, both as a verb and as a noun – wonder as an 
activity of thinking, and wonder as an experience. To be struck by wonder, and to 
wonder about something in To the Lighthouse means being affected and being able 
to experience (strange) intimacy. There is a distinction then between the verb, ‘I 
wonder’ as something we primarily understand in cognitive terms, and the noun, 
‘wonder’, as an affective experience. This distinction, however, is not as clear-cut in 
To the Lighthouse because thinking is not a rational, calculating activity only, but 
also wondering, wherein wonder maintains its more affective state. As we can see 
from the above quotations, wonder is often centred around the figure of Mrs 
Ramsay. By locating the wonder-inducing figure of Mrs Ramsay at the centre of the 
novel, To the Lighthouse, like Jean Rhys’s After Leaving Mr Mackenzie (1930), is, 
among other things, concerned with providing a broader definition of intimacy than 
those offered by Freudian psychoanalysis, which focuses on vertical relationships 
within families. If the mother is central to After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, implicitly, as 
I will demonstrate in Chapter Three, then To the Lighthouse explicitly looks at Mrs 
Ramsay, the mother, or the mother-figure. Lily wants to see Mrs Ramsay with 50 
pairs of eyes, knowing that even this “[was not] enough to get round that one woman 
with” (Woolf, 2016, p. 222). The central place that Mrs Ramsay takes in the novel, 
however, does not reinforce the idea that mothers are crucial as mothers per se. 
Rather, the novel explores the role of a mother when she is seen as a complex self in 
an assemblage of various relations, both familiar and non-familiar, human and non-
human. In other words, it is not her ‘motherness’ that is relevant but her ‘Mrs 
Ramsay-ness’, of which motherness is only a part.  
Woolf explores the communal or family feeling that Mrs Ramsay as an 
(almost) conventional Victorian mother creates, and tries to highlight that it is 
always something extra in the conventional stories associated with Victorian 
motherhood and femininity that create the atmosphere of belonging and family 
feeling. Mrs Ramsay muses, 
Not as oneself did one find rest ever, in her experience […], but as a wedge 
of darkness. Losing personality, one lost the fret, the hurry, the stir; and there 
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rose to her lips always some exclamation of triumph over life when things 
came together in this peace, this rest, this eternity (Woolf, 2016, p. 71). 
Here, Mrs Ramsay sinks away from her identity as a mother, a wife, and a host; in 
relation to the external world, she makes peace with the fleetingness of life, finding 
peace, rest, and eternity. I propose that it is through the predominantly feminine, 
domestic figure of Mrs Ramsay that Woolf draws our attention to the importance of 
conventional intimacy. It is through the same figure, however, that she also 
demonstrates that intimacy, when it is truly intimate, almost always derives from its 
conventional forms. Although characters wonder about Mrs Ramsay as a host, a 
mother, and a wife, she herself thinks that she never finds peace and rest when she is 
seen as fitting into one of those categories. In other words, not knowing Mrs Ramsay 
enhances an atmosphere of wonder that is present throughout To the Lighthouse. 
In what follows, I begin by examining the nature of intimacy, and the role 
distance, proximity, and the non-human play in establishing (strange) intimacy. I 
draw on Sara Crangle and Emmanuel Levinas to establish that To the Lighthouse 
celebrates distance within intimacy while also putting forward the idea that distance 
only feels like distance when there is closeness. I then move to examine wonder, 
which is the central concept of this chapter. I examine wonder both as a verb and as a 
noun to propose that wonder has ethical implications that are triggered by ‘short-
sighted’, acute attention to the other and one’s surroundings in ‘The Window’. I look 
at how wondering and the sense of wonder create the feeling of things persisting and 
remaining in the otherwise chaotic modern world and human relations, focusing 
specifically on ‘Time Passes’ and the figure of Mrs McNab. I then examine the verb 
form of wonder, and how wondering complicates various binaries, including that of 
masculine/ feminine. I propose that To the Lighthouse induces the sense of wonder 
by a specific kind of wondering that is affective, embodied, sensory, and associated 
with femininity. Finally, I look at how Woolf in her writing, and Lily in her painting, 
make order out of disorder without losing the sense of chaos in their embodied, 
sensory art. I suggest that in turn, this sort of art can enhance the sense of wonder 
and strange intimacy.  
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Self and Other, Proximity and Distance, Human and Non-Human 
The general affect, or mood, or atmosphere of the novel seems to be that of (strange) 
intimacy and wonder that is achieved through the focus on loss, beauty, and the 
fragility of human relationships. Yet, there is also the resilience and ability of the 
human relationships to adapt to change, no matter how sweeping the change may be 
that adds to the wondrous atmosphere. This resilience in the face of loss, change and 
chaos becomes apparent through a nuanced play between proximity and distance, 
which is present in the form of the H shape or the butterfly wings of the novel.40 
‘The Window’ partly focuses on domesticity and proximity, seemingly zooming into 
the house that is located on a remote place in Scotland. The ‘Time Passes’ section, 
although still focused on the house, is no longer concerned with the human 
relationships but with life as such, caught in the view of deep time. The final part, 
‘The Lighthouse’, zooms in on human relationships again, but also keeps the 
necessary distance for intimacy always in view. However, neither distance nor 
proximity is privileged in the novel – their intricate entanglement is what makes 
intimacy possible, and the overall sense of the novel reflects that. Although the novel 
has three different parts, it is a whole, like Lily’s painting, which has “a line there, in 
the centre” (Woolf, 2016, p. 235). I will come back to the seemingly chaotic 
aesthetic entanglement of opposites and their feminist implications at the end of this 
chapter. For now, I want to keep the focus on the interplay between proximity and 
distance to explore the nature of intimacy in To the Lighthouse. 
In this novel, intimacy is not something straightforward and easy. We can see 
this in Lily’s fruitless attempts to establish intimacy with Mrs Ramsay, and in Mrs 
Ramsay and Mr Ramsay only being capable of exchanging somewhat awkward 
affectionate glances and bodily gestures instead of using conventional phrases and 
deeds, such as ‘I love you’ or bringing flowers, that express love. We can see strange 
manifestations of intimacy also in Lily and Mr William Bankes and various other 
characters often sharing intimate moments in silence, being absorbed by the views 
and sensations the external world offers. Regarding Mr and Mrs Ramsay, James 
Krasner (2004) goes as far to argue that it is not until Mrs Ramsay’s death that Mr 
Ramsay expresses his love, reaching his arms out, which remain empty, longing for 
                                                             
40 See Jane Goldman’s Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf for a detailed study of To the Lighthouse 
and its formal qualities in relation to feminist aims. 
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the missing body of Mrs Ramsay. Their love, however, and intimacies between other 
characters in To the Lighthouse are found in moments that are often conventional 
(dinner table, walks) but that always also contain something that is strange. This 
strangeness is often reflected in the narrator’s descriptions of or characters’ thoughts 
about the external non-human world. I follow Kristina K. Groover (2014) in seeing 
intimacy in To the Lighthouse as something daily and embodied while at the same 
time being transcendent, much like Kathleen Stewart (2007) indicates that ordinary 
affects are extraordinary, and like Lauren Berlant (1998, 2008) locates intimacy not 
in conventional love plots but in minor exchanges and glances.  
The affections of the characters in To the Lighthouse, and the intimacy the 
reader can cultivate with the text depends on a carefully considered balance between 
distance and proximity in what happens on the story level, and how the novel is 
structured. While ‘The Lighthouse’ is explicitly concerned with physical distance, 
‘The Window’ is concerned with physical proximity. In strange intimacy, however, 
physical distance and proximity do not simply equate to emotional distance and 
proximity. Critics such as Patricia Ondek Laurence (1991), Randi Koppen (2001), 
Beatrice Monaco (2013) and Derek Ryan (2013) note the relevance of distance in 
‘The Lighthouse’ as more important and more ethical than proximity. The limiting 
effect of closeness is emphasised in the much-quoted passage that I emphasised at 
the beginning of this chapter where Lily desires to know Mrs Ramsay, and through 
that, the nature of knowledge and intimacy itself:  
What art was there, known to love or cunning, by which one pressed through 
into those secret chambers? What device for becoming, like waters poured 
into one jar, inextricably the same, one with the object one adored? Could 
body achieve it, or the mind, subtly mingling in the intricate passages of the 
brain? or the heart […]? for it was not knowledge but unity that she desired, 
not inscriptions on tablets, nothing that could be written in any language 
known to men, but intimacy itself, which is knowledge. […] Nothing 
happened. Nothing! as she leant her head against Mrs Ramsay’s knee. And 
yet, she knew knowledge and wisdom were stored in Mrs Ramsay’s heart 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 57).  
There is much to say about this passage in terms of different ways of knowing – with 
heart and head, and body and mind; ways which have traditionally been seen as 
binaries associated with femininity and women on the one hand, and masculinity and 
men on the other. I will return to the issue of gendered knowledge, and how this 
knowledge can be expressed in art towards the end of this chapter, but for now it is 
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important to focus on how, when Lily is physically as close as possible to Mrs 
Ramsay – she presses her head (container of rational knowledge?) against Mrs 
Ramsay’s body (container of emotional knowledge?) – nothing happens. If the 
reader does not learn anything else about intimacy from this passage, she does learn 
that intimacy is not achieved merely through physical proximity between two human 
beings.  
In a way, intimacy is the desire to bridge that distance between the self and 
the other. Sarah Crangle in Prosaic Desires (2010) argues that in many modernist 
writers, including Woolf, “longing becomes a conduit to considerations of 
individuals defined by an endlessly unknowable and desirable other” (p. 6). I am 
interested in how desire too creates intimacy, precisely because it is the desire to 
know while acknowledging that it is impossible to know any other. As I outlined in 
the introduction, Emmanuel Levinas’s ideas about radical alterity are resonant 
throughout this thesis. Especially his idea that “the Other remains infinitely 
transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face, in which his epiphany is produced and 
which appeals to me, breaks with the world that can be common to us, whose 
virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our existence” (qtd. in 
Crangle, 2010, p. 195). While Levinas values face-to-face encounters, To the 
Lighthouse demonstrates that physical proximity, as demonstrated in the case of Lily 
and Mrs Ramsay, does not lead to intimate knowledge of another person. Or, to put 
it differently, Lily assumes that her closeness to Mrs Ramsay will result in a 
complete knowledge of the latter, and, accordingly, is intimacy. Yet, as “nothing 
happened” (Woolf, 2016, p. 57), we can assume that Woolf puts forward an idea that 
echoes that part of Levinas’s argument that emphasises the necessity of radical 
otherness in ethical relations. In Woolf, for an ethical relation to emerge, however, 
distance is needed, and when this distance is embraced and the other is a radical 
other, certain strange intimacy can emerge. To put it differently, the desire to know 
is itself intimate, and not knowing creates that intimate desire to know. There are 
moments in the first section of the novel that already bring distance into view, and 
portray a certain desire to maintain as well as bridge the distance. Mrs and Mr 
Ramsay go for walks in the garden looking over the sea; there are eloquent silences 
between Mrs Ramsay and Mr Ramsay as they sit across the table from one another, 
or in different ends of the room and when Cam dashes off into the openness of the 
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countryside; and by the third part, Lily thinks that “so much depends then […] upon 
distance” (Woolf, 2016, p. 216).41  
The importance and ethics of distance, however, only make sense when also 
explored side by side with the short-sighted vision of Mrs Ramsay that zooms in on 
family life, personal relationships, and also on the non-human world – flowers, 
stockings, and fruit (Woolf, 2016, p. 232). Hélène Cixous describes in Stigmata 
(1999) how her extreme short-sightedness in her childhood ‘forced’ her to see the 
world differently – if she really wanted to see and understand what something was, 
she had to go very close to it. That, she writes, encouraged her to examine the world 
with extreme detail in her later life and express this in her writing. This attention to 
detail is stylistically present in her writing, which is often very slow and repetitive, 
taking rounds and turns to examine the same thing or phenomenon from various 
angles, much like the narrator examines the Ramsays and their house. The narrative 
voice in ‘The Window’ draws the readers’ attention to ordinary, daily objects and 
sights with Mrs Ramsay’s short-sighted vision in mind. For example, we see 
stockings, magazine cuttings, and fruit. One the one hand, as critics have noted, this 
can be associated with Mrs Ramsay’s conventionality and narrow-mindedness.42 On 
the other hand, it is also a sign of care as it looks at the characters, situations, and the 
non-human world with extreme scrutiny. Hence, I first demonstrate how these 
readings are accurate but then complicate them by focusing on the ethical potential 
of short-sighted attention to things. 
Although To the Lighthouse, and this chapter accordingly, predominantly 
focuses on human relationships to explore how selfhood is constructed via new 
avenues, the non-human is already an important part in the entanglement of humans, 
their intimacy and in the sense of distance. To the Lighthouse demonstrates that if 
                                                             
41 I have chosen to focus on the ‘The Window’ and ‘The Lighthouse’ parts when exploring the 
interplay of distance and proximity in intimacy because in these parts we encounter the same 
characters in relation to one another and their surroundings. These sections are also explicitly 
concerned with the human rather than the non-human, whereas ‘Time Passes’ introduces two new 
characters vaguely and centres on the non-human. I will focus on ‘Time Passes’ section later in 
relation to the question that remains. 
42 Critics such as Beatrice Monaco and Derek Ryan suggest that ‘The Window’ captures Mrs 
Ramsay’s consciousness the most, suggesting that ’The Window’ is somewhat like a dated, less 
desirable, and oppressing way of life. The Lighthouse part, in contrast, is represented through Lily’s 
consciousness and offers a less conventional view of the world. To a large extent, this interpretation is 
true and ‘The Window’ indeed displays a pre-war society with much stricter gender roles. However, 
to dismiss the value of the domestic happiness and (feminine) attention to quotidian life also 
dismisses Woolf’s point about the relevance of both distance and proximity.  
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human relationships are to be intimate, this intimacy needs more than only human 
presence. Fily and William are in the open nature, by the sea, and they look at and 
discuss Lily’s painting; Mrs Ramsay reads to James – there is a story they share and 
book they hold; and Mr and Mrs Ramsay also feel comfortable in their silence when 
they are either both absorbed in the texts they read, or when they look at the view 
together. Intimacy in To the Lighthouse is then often more than just an encounter 
between two people; intimacy is the whole environment of things and other people 
and stories where the encounter happens. Mrs Ramsay, for example, is “made aware 
[…] of human relations, how flawed they are, how despicable, how self-seeking, at 
their best” (Woolf, 2016, p. 47). Human relations in To the Lighthouse, whether 
distant or proximate, become almost always more meaningful when they are 
examined in relation to the world of the non-human.  
Gillian Beer (1996), Louise Westling (1999), Gabriella Moise (2015), Cara 
Lewis (2014), Derek Ryan (2015), Laci Mattison (2011), and Carrie Rohman (2011), 
to name a few, have focused on the emphasis on the non-human world in Woolf’s 
fiction. Lewis (2014) argues that still life (the house, the painting, furniture, 
arrangement of the dinner table) is not a pure aesthetic emotion, but a fully human 
emotion that animates the narrative, that the still life encourages the shifts in human 
affect (p. 445). The aforementioned critics have explored the importance of still life 
and objects in To the Lighthouse via various different theoretical and philosophical 
strands such as psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and affect. I read the novel with 
Jane Bennett’s The Enchantment of Modern Life (2001), as the latter book is 
specifically interested in the complex human and non-human entanglements and how 
the non-human has a power to enchant and strengthen human attachment to life. In 
To the Lighthouse, materiality, still life, and nature work as sites of enchantment, 
that is, as sites of affective attachment to the world, to borrow Bennett’s phrase. 
Bennett suggests that despite the predominant narrative of modernity as 
disenchanted, the modern world does offer attachments that enhance the love for life. 
In the moments of intimacy that occur in To the Lighthouse, the same sort of 
attachment to life and people is apparent via things.43 It is the enchanted mood that is 
                                                             
43 See the introduction for a more thorough discussion of modernism, modernity and enchantment, or 
see Jane Bennett’s introduction to The Enchantment of Modern Life (2001).  
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triggered and an atmosphere created by objects, nature, and humans together that 
enhances the feeling of strange intimacy between characters.  
In one of Mrs Ramsay’s musings when she drifts off to distance herself from 
her role as a mother, a wife, and a host, she muses,  
It was odd, she thought, how if one was alone, one leant to things, inanimate 
things; trees, streams, flowers; felt they expressed one; felt they became one; 
felt they knew one, in a sense were one; felt an irrational tenderness thus (she 
looked at that long steady light) as for oneself” (Woolf, 2016, p. 72).  
Here, Mrs Ramsay finds an attachment to the world when she has oddly dropped 
‘her self’ and sunk into an intimate relationship with trees, streams, and flowers, and 
associates herself with the final stroke of the lighthouse light, which some critics 
read as her having a final say through her silence.44 Here, Mrs Ramsay becomes 
something like what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call ‘haecceities’. They write 
that,  
There is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, 
thing, or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a winter, 
a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even 
though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject. They 
are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement 
and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected 
(2004, p. 261). 
Mrs Ramsay in a sense also becomes an haecceity – her sense of self depends on the 
environment she is in: what she sees, feels, and experiences. Here, she drops her 
individuation in the psychoanalytical or conventional sense where she is recognised 
as a mother, a wife, and a hostess. When the reader too recognises Mrs Ramsay 
beyond these individuations, we can begin to understand the strange elements that 
surround her and enhance the sense of wonder about her.  
                                                             
44 See Ann Banfield’s ‘Time Passes: Virginia Woolf, Post-Impressionism, and Cambridge Time’ 
(2003). See also Mary Jacobus’s ‘The Third Stroke’: Reading Woolf with Freud’ in Virginia Woolf 
(1992) and Patricia Ondek Laurence’s The Reading of Silence: Virginia Woolf in the English 
Tradition (1991). Ondek discusses three types of silences in Woolf’s work. Much has been written by 
other critics, such as Monaco, on silence in Woolf, and particularly Mrs Ramsay’s silence as her way 
of passive resistance to Mr. Ramsay. In a sense, silence is also what creates a certain distance, as it 
does not ‘intrude’ upon the other’s boundaries.  
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Similarly, although in one another’s presence, Lily and William too become 
something different when absorbed in the external world. When they stand together, 
the narrator expresses a strong need in them to be near the sea:  
They came there regularly every evening drawn by some need. It was as if 
the water floated off and set sailing thoughts which had grown stagnant on 
dry land, and gave their bodies even some sort of physical relief. [Lily and 
William Bankes] smiled standing there. They both felt a common hilarity, 
excited by the moving waves; then by swift cutting race of a sailing boat […] 
looked at the dunes far away […] felt come over them some sadness – 
because the thing was completed partly, and partly because distant views 
seem to outlast by a million years the gazer and to be communing already 
with a sky which beholds an earth entirely at rest (Woolf, 2016, pp. 23-24). 
The view the sea offers to Lily and William standing together in silence triggers the 
sense of distance and the triviality of human lives, which is reflected in the vast skies 
that witness deep time. If this is so for Lily, then interestingly, in William, the view 
triggers thoughts not about the faraway in time and space, but about the near – his 
(somewhat failed) friendship with Mr Ramsay. Both Lily and William, however, are 
embedded in a common feeling of some kind of sadness and hilarity that is triggered 
in them by the boat, the dunes, the waves, and the sky (Woolf, 2016, p. 24). It is the 
external world of things that they see from a distance and that draws them together, 
makes them wonder about who they are and what their relations to others are, and 
allows them to find certain peace and a common emotion, which essentially is affect.  
The most famous example of the external world of objects drawing humans 
together and creating a strangely intimate, somewhat enchanted atmosphere is the 
otherwise conventional dinner scene in ‘The Window’. It is the change of light and 
the arrangement of fruit that draws the characters together beyond physical 
proximity, a sense of feeling that is again mediated, like most of the feelings in ‘The 
Window’, via Mrs Ramsay’s (short-sighted) consciousness: 
and to her pleasure (for it brought them into sympathy momentarily) she saw 
that Augustus too feasted his eyes on the same plate of fruit, plunged in, 
broke off a bloom there, a tassel here, and returned, after feasting, to his hive. 
That was his way of looking, different from hers. But looking together united 
them […] Now all the candles were lit, and the faces on both sides of the 
table were brought nearer by the candlelight, and composed, as they had not 
been in the twilight, into a party round a table, for the night was now shut off 
by panes of glass, which, far from giving any accurate view of the outside 
world, rippled it so strangely that here, inside the room, seemed to be order 
and dry land; there, outside, a reflection in which things wavered and 
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vanished, waterily […] Some change at once went through them all, as if this 
had really happened, and they were all conscious of making a party together 
in a hollow, on an island; had their common cause against that fluidity out 
there (Woolf, 2016, pp. 108-109; emphasis mine).  
Interestingly, there is a contradiction between the above quotation and the one where 
Lily and William enjoy the view: when Lily and William are outdoors (also looking 
together but seeing differently – Lily the cosmic, William the quotidian), the 
narrative voice muses on how the fluidity of the waves offered something that dry 
land could not. Now, the sea, the distant outside world, is presented as a chaotic 
fluidity out there, which is separated by panes of glass that can never give any 
accurate view of the outside world. But indoors by candlelight, the party is safe 
together on orderly dry land and proximity, in an atmosphere created by non-human 
objects that render meaningful human relations that ‘surround’ the dinner table. In 
this sense, the house in a remote place, in which there is a dinner party, is contrasted 
to the fluidity of modern life and the coming war. In other words, Mrs Ramsay, 
through a specific set of non-human objects, finds and shares a communal feeling of 
belonging. Through her consciousness, the reader gets an impression that human 
proximity in a conventional setting can resist the chaos and change of the distant 
outside world.  
In ‘Time Passes’, the sense of deep time triggered by natural forces such as 
air, wind, rain and the sounds of the sea, and the fragility and fleetingness of human 
lives and human-made things, such as furniture, is emphasised. Charles M Tung 
(2016) suggests that the  
zooming out at the beginning of the twentieth century […] not only served to 
critique the myopia of the short term, the close-up immersion in the 
momentary that we often take as aesthetic modernism’s primary focus; the 
big-historical lens also generated a new and bewildering sense of 
heterochrony, a clash of multiple timescales (p. 518). 
Tung gives, albeit very superficially, Woolf’s interest in the distant view in To the 
Lighthouse as an example, claiming that the “desire to scope out from the illusions of 
the now was informed by the rise of the large telescope”, that “allowed for the 
perception of faraway things, while the latter provided the experience of seeing 
everyday things from far away” (Tung, 2016, p. 526). Tung follows Holly Henry 
(2003) to show how big telescopes contributed to Woolf’s long-range aesthetics, her 
“modernist human decentring and re-scaling” (Tung, 2016, p. 526). Although the 
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sense of deep time that natural forces engender in ‘Time Passes’ is important, Tung 
makes it sound as if the everyday moment was somehow of lesser value in the face 
of the grand scale of time and space in To the Lighthouse. Yet, it is precisely the idea 
that the distant and the large only have meaning when juxtaposed or examined in 
relation to everyday life and the human scale of things. In other words, Mrs 
Ramsay’s ‘family feeling’, the atmosphere of domestic bliss she triggers is valuable 
precisely because it gives meaning to human life in deep time.  
In the third part, ‘The Lighthouse’, physical distance replaces proximity, and 
the material world of what is inside the window is replaced with the material world 
outside the window. In the ‘The Lighthouse’ section, the space outdoors – the non-
human world of natural forces and nature – becomes a positive site for change, 
whereas in ‘The Window’, it was indoors – the furniture, jewellery, and cutlery, 
where Mrs Ramsay found comfort. Nina MacLaughlin’s thoughts in her 
Novembrance column in The Paris Review offer an interesting illustration to what To 
the Lighthouse might indicate:  
once death has been inserted into the mind, the magnificence of the mountain 
range registers in a different way, and what’s sensed instead is its gaping 
indifference, the nothingness of one’s flicker of existence in comparison. 
Managed nature gives not only the illusion of control, the comfort of our 
efforts to contain and command the life and growth of things, but also […] 
reveals the evidence of another human hand. In the tulip rows, the pathway 
fenced and mowed, we see the evidence of tools and work. Not only is there 
control to be had, but also, the managed landscape says, you are not alone 
(MacLaughlin, 2018).45  
In a similar manner, the sense of human-made objects as sites of comfort is very 
clear in ‘The Window’ as it was in furniture, created by human hand, in which Mrs 
Ramsay found comfort. Moreover, seeing wilderness as a reminder of indifference 
and decay also speaks to the elegiac nature of To the Lighthouse – ‘The Window’ 
was haunted by the coming war and the deaths of the Ramsay family members, and 
‘Time Passes’ is a section where death is ‘inserted’. This part is empty of human life 
and there is a strong sense of the non-human being out of human control, reminding 
the reader of the inevitability of the end of the human life by bracketing it and 
placing it against the background of vast landscapes of natural forces and scenes.  
                                                             
45 See MacLaughlin’s article in The Paris Review. Retrieved from 
https://www.theparisreview.org/blog/2017/11/15/the-alchemy-of-november/ 
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In ‘The Lighthouse’, however, when time has passed, it is the flowing, the 
fleeting, and the spectral from outside the window that provide continuity and a 
sense of the future going on. In short, wild nature does not enhance anxiety in this 
section. At first, when Lily has arrived back in the house, we can see her still 
dwelling on the loss of Mrs Ramsay and the attachment to life the latter managed to 
create in conventional domestic settings:  
[…] sitting alone among the clean cups at the long table she felt cut off from 
other people, and able only to go on watching, asking, wondering. The house, 
the place, the morning, all seemed strangers to her. She had no attachment 
here, she felt, no relations with it, anything might happen, and whatever did 
happen, a step outside, a voice calling, was a question, as if the link that 
usually bound things together had been cut […] how aimless it was, how 
chaotic, how unreal it was, she thought, looking at her empty coffee cup 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 166). 
Although the usual link binding things together, Mrs Ramsay, has disappeared, Lily 
soon finds new links, wondering about the questions she already wondered about in 
‘The Window’, but she is now able to dwell on her own answers, standing in the 
open air in front of her painting, undisturbed by the male gaze: in ‘The Lighthouse’ 
human relationships have moved from indoors to outdoors, embedded in distance. 
Looking at the Ramsays sailing towards the lighthouse, Lily muses that “distance 
had extraordinary power; they had been swallowed up in it, she felt, they were gone 
for ever, they had become part of the nature of things” (Woolf, 2016, p. 212). Part of 
the nature of things and distance here are signified by the external non-human world 
of sea, sky and lawn. In other words, the external world of nature not that of 
comfortable, human-made objects, triggers the sense of distance, and importantly, 
enhances Lily’s sense of intimacy towards the Ramsays, William, and Mr 
Carmichael.  
A similar embracing of distance in intimate relationships can be said to 
develop in the boat between Mr Ramsay and his children. There are parts of Mr 
Ramsay that are unknown to his children. They know practical facts about him “but 
what might be written in the book which had rounded its edges off in his pocket, 
[Cam] did not know. What he thought none of them knew” (Woolf, 2016, p. 215). 
Unlike Lily in the first part considering Mrs Ramsay, the children here accept that it 
is impossible to ever know the other person fully, no matter how close they are. Yet 
at the same time the children are feeling “they alone knew each other” (Woolf, 2016, 
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p. 218). This intimacy comes from being able to acknowledge the Levinasian idea 
that we cannot fully know the other. Only when the children acknowledge the 
radically unknown part of Mr Ramsay can they begin to develop some sort of 
intimacy with him.   
This acknowledgement too is enhanced by the presence of the non-human 
world. Being in the middle of the sea, away from land, allows the children to 
understand that distance is required within proximity if intimacy is to develop. Cam 
is thinking,  
Already the little distance they had sailed had put them far from [the shore] 
and given it the changed look, the composed look, of something receding in 
which one has no longer any part. Which was their house? She could not see 
it […] She was thinking how all those paths and the lawn, thick and knotted 
with the lives they had lived there, were gone: were rubbed out; were past; 
were unreal, and now this was real; the boat and the sail with its patch; 
Macalister with his earrings; the noise of the waves – all this was real 
(Woolf, 2016, pp. 187-188).  
The reality of the dinner-table in ‘The Window’ has gone and is replaced here by 
that which is outside the window – the fleeting, the flowing, the spectral – which 
here takes the form of potentiality and freedom, not chaos. Distance rubs away 
certain feelings, as Cam thinks people do not feel a thing on the shore. Pain is 
imagined to be with us, and somehow places far from us seem free of pain. This 
seems to complicate the view that physical proximity is not needed for intimacy, 
because Cam cannot imagine the pain of others who are far from her. Yet, when we 
think of Lily, who also sees the sea as a space of non-pain for her as she is situated 
on a shore, it seems that distance between places and people the characters associate 
with pain, are seen not as painful when they are seen from distance (Woolf, 2016, p. 
206). To put it differently, seeing the boat and Mr Ramsay from a distance creates 
intimacy in Lily whereas physical proximity caused discomfort in her. Distance, in 
other words, also helps to see people in relation to the wider ‘picture’: the boat, the 
sea, the wind. In other words, characters are not seen solely in their roles as fathers, 
children, and old family friends but perhaps more like ‘haecceities’ in the Deleuzian 
sense; they are seen from a distance in relation to the outside world, changing in 
relation to the external world.  
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It is the movement of the sea and the wind outdoors that alleviates the 
tensions between characters. When the wind stands still, Cam feels,  
Everything became very close to one […] there they came to a stop, flapping 
about waiting for a breeze, in the hot sun, miles from shore […] everything in 
the whole world seemed to stand still […] the sun grew hotter and everybody 
seemed to come very close together and to feel each other’s presence, which 
they had almost forgotten (Woolf, 2016, p. 206).  
This passage echoes the motor car incident in Mrs Dalloway (1925), and how it 
draws people together and makes them pause. If in Mrs Dalloway, this absorption in 
the moment has a potential ethical implication, then here the drawing together in the 
sun is rather dangerous for the ethics of intimacy – people become dangerously close 
and stagnant in this proximity that Woolf gives us by increasing heat and 
emphasising silence. And then she brings movement to rescue them from the 
stillness as,  
at that moment the sail swung slowly round, filled slowly out, the boat 
seemed to shake herself, and then to move off half conscious in her sleep, and 
then she woke and shot through the waves. The relief was extraordinary. 
They all seemed to fall away from each other again and to be at their ease 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 211).  
Again, the wind that seemed threatening in ‘Time Passes’, and the sea that was a 
source of anxiety for Mrs Ramsay as she was worried about the children getting 
back, here provide relief.   
The final part of the novel further explores proximity and distance, and 
conventional forms of intimacy and its stranger representations. In ‘The Window’, 
Lily wonders at the dinner table when a feeling of togetherness reigns:  
Such was the complexity of things. For what happened to her, especially 
staying with the Ramsays, was to be made to feel violently two opposite 
things at the same time; that’s what you feel, was one; that’s what I feel was 
the other, and then they fought together in her mind, as now. It is so 
beautiful, so exciting, this love, that I tremble on the verge of it, and offer, 
quite out of my own habit, to look for a brooch on a beach; also it is the 
stupidest, the most barbaric of human passions, and turns a nice young man 
with a profile like a gem into a bully with a crowbar in the Mile End Road 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 114). 
Here Lily thinks of Paul and Minta’s engagement, of them being in love. Lily knows 
that while it is beautiful and exciting, it is also a beginning of a conventional family 
life. Yet, she sees the beauty and excitement also of romantic love. In ‘The 
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Window’, the conventional values were in binary opposition with the freedom to not 
marry, not to have children. In ‘The Lighthouse’, the opposites coexist peacefully, 
making new patterns – Lily is unmarried and follows her passion to paint, and Paul 
and Minta remain married on their own terms. Julia Briggs (2005) indicates that 
although Woolf was indeed aware and critical of the roles Victorian conventions 
imposed on women, she nevertheless valued the sense of community Mrs Ramsay 
created. To put it differently, although To the Lighthouse explores conventional 
scenes of intimacy between family and friends, it always locates intimacy in a 
complex interplay between the near and the far, familiar and the strange, human and 
non-human, and this is what creates the sense of wonder. 
 
The Affective Ethics of Wonder 
Mrs Ramsay’s short-sightedness also has another value – it encourages one of the 
central concepts of the novel – wonder. Her near-sightedness encourages her to keep 
wondering about the other that is distant and unknown. When Lily thinks back to a 
picnic she had with Mrs Ramsay, the children and Charles Tansley, she remembers 
Mrs Ramsay’s short-sightedness and her inability to make out what it was in the 
distance on the sea, which made Mrs Ramsay wonder about the object she could not 
see. As emphasised, Mrs Ramsay’s short-sightedness is often read as her 
traditionally feminine concern with the domestic sphere and conventional values. I 
would briefly like to turn to Cixous’s references in Stigmata (1999) to her own short-
sightedness in her childhood that made her examine the world with extreme care and 
pay close attention to human and non-human life that surrounded her. In the same 
sense, Mrs Ramsay’s short-sightedness creates a sense of wonder, which can be 
ethical as wonder induces curiosity about the other one is engaged with, whether 
near or far; short-sightedness can create a positive affective atmosphere of wonder 
that propels ethical engagement with the other as it maintains the other as radically 
other. To put it differently, Mrs Ramsay’s short-sightedness also serves as a 
reminder to be curious about what distance holds: to keep wondering about the other 
that is distant or in the distance, and to keep that wonder even in proximity. 
Wonder, as thinkers as diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Alfred North 
Whitehead have acknowledged, is the starting point for philosophers and poets alike. 
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Predrag Cicovacki in The Analysis of Wonder: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Nicolai Hartmann (2014) argues that for Aristotle, “the actual impulse to 
philosophize lies in the desire ‘to escape ignorance’” (p. 9). Cicovacki (2016) also 
continues that Aquinas, “seems to agree, adding that, ‘because philosophy arises 
from awe, a philosopher is bound in his way to be a lover of myths and poetic fables. 
Poets and philosophers are alike in being with wonder’” (qtd. in Cicovacki, 2016 p. 
9). Alfred North Whitehead (1938) has argued that “philosophy begins in wonder”, 
adding that, “at the end, when philosophic thought has done its best, the wonder 
remains” (p. 232). The sense of wonder in To the Lighthouse seems to be similar – 
Mr Ramsay and Charles Tansley, the philosophers, can be done with their work, and 
even if they seemingly settle the discussion about going to the lighthouse and 
‘killing’ wonder, the novel keeps the wonder that surrounds the trip to the lighthouse 
present all the way through the story. The atmospheric wonder is present in the novel 
already on the first page – we learn that the possibility that the weather will be fine 
produces “extraordinary joy” in James, and it was “the wonder to which he had 
looked forward” (Woolf, 2016, p. 5). Wonder in To the Lighthouse then, seems to be 
central both as a verb and as a noun. Wondering in To the Lighthouse is like 
wandering around – not physically, but mentally, in one’s mind. In other words, the 
‘action’ of wondering triggers the sense of wonder. As it is something all the 
characters do, it also complicates the gendered binaries of active and passive, male 
and female, public and domestic – a point to which I will return shortly when I 
examine the verb form of wonder and its relation to the activity of thinking. For now, 
I want to focus on the noun; on the atmosphere of wonder To the Ligthouse has in 
general, and how many things also seem to begin from wondering and wonder in this 
novel.  
From all these musings on wonder, I am most interested in Bennett’s writing 
on wonder when exploring To the Lighthouse.46 For Bennett (2001),  
enchantment entails a state of wonder, and of the distinctions of this state is 
the temporary suspension of chronological time and bodily movement […] it 
is to participate in a momentarily immobilizing encounter […] enchantment 
                                                             
46 There are many writings about things that induce wonder in Woolf’s fiction. For example, Louis 
Westling’s ‘The Flesh of the World’ (1999) seems to wonder about the non-human. Also, Bill Brown 
in ‘The Secret Life of Things’ (1999) starts by ‘wondering’ about object-world. However, there is no 
research on the word ‘wonder’ as such in Woolf’s oeuvre. And yet, the general atmosphere of To the 
Lighthouse seems to be that of wonder, albeit sometimes anxious. 
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is not only a property of the natural world – it is also the joyful human mood 
that results from a special way of engaging with that world. Enchantment as a 
mood requires a cultivated form of perception, a discerning and meticulous 
attentiveness to the singular specificity of things (p. 5; emphasis mine).  
Aren’t the affective atmosphere over the dinner table, the moments shared between 
Lily and Mr Bankes, between Mrs Ramsay and Mr Ramsay also moments when 
these characters are enchanted precisely because they pay meticulous attention to 
their non-human environment and to one another within it? Don’t they engage with 
the world in a special way? One could say that in these moments, the characters put 
on Mrs Ramsay’s short-sighted vision to pay attention to the world and to one 
another, and then recognise the necessity of keeping the distance between the self 
and the other for ethical interactions. In these moments, To the Lighthouse gives us 
literary examples of that which Bennett calls enchanted mood.  
Like for Bennett’s enchanted mood, the appreciation of beauty and aesthetics 
seems to be important in enhancing wonder in To the Lighthouse. For example, the 
arrangement of fruit on the dinner table, the view Lily and Mr Bankes enjoy, and Mr 
Ramsay’s desire to pay “homage to the beauty of the world” (Woolf, 2016, p. 41). 
However, as with intimacy, there is also always something that ‘disrupts’ the 
conventional scenes of beauty. Like for Bennett, beauty in To the Lighthouse never 
simply appears in traditional forms – it is not written about as Romantics would 
write about it, or depicted as Greek sculptures would depict it. For Bennett, 
strangeness is part of beauty. In a similar way, Mr Bankes, for instance, thinks of 
Mrs Ramsay’s beauty:  
She clapped a deer-stalker’s hat on her head; she ran across the lawn in 
galoshes to snatch a child from mischief. So that if it was her beauty merely 
that one thought of, one must remember the quivering thing, the living thing 
(they were carrying bricks up a little plank as he watched them), and work it 
into the picture; or if one thought of her simply as a woman, one must endow 
her with some freak idiosyncrasy; or suppose some latent desire to doff her 
royalty of form as if her beauty bored her and all that men say of beauty, and 
she wanted only to be like other people, insignificant (Woolf, 2016, p. 34). 
Mrs Ramsay’s beauty is not the transcendental beauty of Greek sculptures or 
Romantic poets, but a strange, “quivering, living thing […] freak idiosyncrasy” 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 34). Her beauty, because it is lively, vibrant, and unconventional, 
an assemblage of her and the thing she does and wears in specific environments, 
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creates a sense of wonder and curiosity about her.47 In other words, her beauty is as 
much dependent of Mrs Ramsay as it is dependent on her entanglement with the 
world and things around her. One can also say, following Deleuze and Guattari and 
their concept of ‘haecceity’, that Mrs Ramsay (and her beauty) is what she does, and 
her relation to the world around her. This passage illustrates the general atmosphere 
of the novel that enhances strange intimacy and wonder – a conventional scene of 
beauty and/or intimacy is always quivering with things unconventional – galoshes 
and deerstalker hats, the outside world haunting the peace of the dinner, Lily’s 
painting, her independence, and her ‘Chinese’ eyes.  
But there is more than beauty that induces wonder in the novel. As 
demonstrated, the novel already begins with an atmosphere of wonder that surrounds 
the trip to the lighthouse. Throughout the novel, wondering that references specific 
atmospheres of wonder in the three sections of the novel continues – Mrs Ramsay 
wonders about what Cam is feeling when she wants to dash off all the time; Nancy 
wonders why Minta cries and why all of them feel like crying when Minta loses her 
grandmother’s brooch; Cam and James wonder about their father; Mr Ramsay 
wonders about reaching the letter Q; Mrs Ramsay wonders about the core of 
darkness in oneself and about her children’s futures; Lily wonders about intimacy; 
and Mrs McNab wonders about how life, despite all suffering, will always endure 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 61, p. 87, p. 215, p. 45). From these wonderings different affective 
atmospheres of wonder are conjured. The wonder in each of the three parts of the 
novel has a different sense. In ‘The Window’, wonder is often an  anxious wonder 
about the future and about people and interpersonal relationships; in ‘Time Passes’, 
it is a metaphysical wonder about what life is, articulated in a daily manner via Mrs 
McNab; and in ‘The Lighthouse’, the wonder has become a force that is positive and 
affirming, carrying life onwards.  
                                                             
47 There is also a sense of wonder about Mrs Ramsay as a mother. Prue looks at her mother in awe 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 103), and Mrs Ramsay herself thinks of her role: “What was the reason, Mrs Ramsay 
wondered, standing still to let her clasp the necklace she had chosen, divining, through her own past, 
some deep, some buried, some quite speechless feeling one had for one’s mother at Rose’s age. Like 
all feeling that one had for oneself, Mrs Ramsay thought, it made one sad. It was so inadequate, what 
one could give in return; and what Rose felt was quite out of proportion to anything she actually was” 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 92). The question of motherhood is not, however, reduced to the Oedipal role of the 
mother but weaved into larger questions about the constitution of a subject. 
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In ‘The Window’, the sense of wonder is related to time, especially to the 
future. Many critics have examined time in To the Lighthouse, including Ann 
Banfield (2000, 2003), Jane Goldman (1998), and Gillian Beer (1988). I disagree 
with Banfield’s (2003) suggestion that in To the Lighthouse, “the characters remain 
ignorant of time’s passing – that is the point. They are within the moment, where all 
is still; time’s movement is imperceptible” (p. 503). Quite the contrary, Mrs Ramsay 
is always aware of time passing, of her children growing, and a sense of things 
coming to an end for human individuals. This is what causes the desire in her to 
make something permanent, to be in the moment and to hold life still in that 
moment. In ‘The Window’, the sense of wonder is related to the uncertainty about 
the future, and the reader gets the sense of death being already very present in life in 
the first section, both in the sense of individual deaths, but also because of the sense 
of the war coming. There is a classic image of death, the skull wrapped in a beautiful 
green scarf which unfolds in ‘Time Passes’, perhaps referring to the fact that in this 
second section the moments of intimacy and domestic warmth that were created to 
postpone death in ‘The Window’ now unfold and death has its way. As Gabriella 
Moise (2015) has suggested, the skull wrapped in a shawl is a physical manifestation 
of Mrs Ramsay’s pessimism that life is nothing but death wrapped up in the beauty 
and warmth that humans try to create while they are alive. This ominous atmosphere 
reigns in the first part of the novel, so the sense of wonder in the first part is always 
somehow anxious.  
The sense of wanting to make time stand still comes from this anxiety of 
knowing that time is passing, and the appreciation of beauty and domestic warmth is 
strong precisely because there is this sense that all this will come to an end. 
Accordingly, Mrs Ramsay “never wanted James to grow a day older or Cam either. 
These two she would have liked to keep for ever just as they were, demons of 
wickedness, angels of delight, never to see them grow up into long-legged monsters. 
Nothing made up for the loss” (Woolf, 2016, p. 56). We can see here that Mrs 
Ramsay is acutely aware of time passing and her children growing up – an 
awareness, which makes her fear the passing of time. Importantly, this knowledge is 
what also creates intimacy and attachment to life in the present moment. Precisely 
because of this awareness, Mrs Ramsay places great value in moments experienced 
over dinners, as it draws characters together, and seems to pause time for a moment, 
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as I will soon demonstrate. The sense of time passing and taking characters towards 
their own end is therefore strongly present in ‘The Window’, albeit covered up with 
life, like the skull within the folds of a scarf.  
The anxiety or uncertainty about the future, when not soothed away by art, 
attention to the external world, or by some repetitive, daily task at hand, is explicit in 
the following passage from ‘The Window’:  
[t]he monotonous fall of the waves on the beach, which for the most part beat 
a measured and soothing tattoo to her thoughts and seemed consoling to 
repeat over and over again as she sat with the children the words of some old 
cradle song, murmured by nature, ‘I am guarding you – I am your support’, 
but at other times suddenly and unexpectedly, especially when her mind 
raised itself slightly from the task actually at hand, had no such kindly 
meaning, but like a ghostly roll of drums remorselessly beat the measure of 
life, made one think of the destruction of the island and its engulfment in the 
sea, and warned her whose day had slipped past in one quick doing after 
another that it was all ephemeral as a rainbow – this sound which had been 
obscured and concealed under the other sounds suddenly thundered hollow in 
her ears and made her look up with an impulse of terror (Woolf, 2016, p. 19).   
The sound of the sea is soothing when Mrs Ramsay is immersed in a daily task 
(reading to children or knitting), but when this daily task is dropped, she is reminded 
of her own triviality and fleetingness, causing her terror and anxiety, and adding to 
the ominous atmosphere that is prevalent in the first part of the novel. It is this very 
same atmosphere, however, that also creates the desire to ‘capture’ time, and hold on 
to certain moments.  
In the ‘Time Passes’ section, Mrs Ramsay’s sense of life being ephemeral 
finds affirmation. In the middle section, life has become almost empty of human 
touch and warmth, and the bracketed parts demonstrate that elsewhere, outside the 
house, war is happening and the Ramsays are dying. The middle section of To the 
Lighthouse illustrates Peter Slotderjik’s (2002) point that “the unprecedented nature 
of twentieth-century war and technology stemmed from its assault on atmosphere 
rather than an individual target” (qtd in Abramson, 2015, p. 48). In the same way, it 
is not a single individual that suffers in the ‘Time Passes’ section – it is the general 
atmosphere of the house that has changed and suffered because of the war that we 
know is happening while the house is decaying. Yet, at the end of the second section, 
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there is also a positive affirmation (via a figure of an old woman, as I will 
demonstrate shortly in the next section) that things will endure. 
In the third section, the sense of wonder has become something affirmative. 
For instance, Cam wonders in ‘The Lighthouse’,  
it was the sense of adventure and escape that she wanted, for she was 
thinking, as the boat sailed on, how her father’s anger about the points of 
compass, James’s obstinacy about the compact, and her own anguish, all had 
slipped, all had passed, all had streamed away. What then came next? Where 
were they going? […] an unthinking fountain of joy fell here and there on the 
dark […] (Woolf, 2016, pp. 213-214). 
The unknowability of the future here has become exciting, as it is full of new 
possibilities. In this section, the joy and wonder of the unknown are most explicit. 
Lily too, “[sitting] alone among the clean cups at the long table felt cut off from 
other people, and able only to go on watching, asking, wondering” (Woolf, 2016, p. 
166).  
The curiosity and desire for the new is what has inspired Deleuzian readings 
of Woolf by Laci Mattison (2013), Beatrice Monaco (2008), and Derek Ryan (2013). 
Ryan (2013) reads grass and lawn in the third part as a specific place for the 
formation of these new possibilities and intimacies. He follows Deleuze and Guattari 
to suggest that the figure of the tree in To the Lighthouse is associated with Victorian 
conventions and Oedipal relations, whereas grass, which is dominant in the last 
section, is a rhizomatic assemblage of new possibilities. Ryan (2013) writes, 
following Deleuze, “the tree grows with arborescent rigidity, is rooted in 
phallogocentrism and promotes the binary machine, grass is aligned with the 
horizontal, multiple growths of the subterranean ‘rhizome’” (pp. 84-85). He 
associates grass, a non-human ‘thing’, with inclusion, saying that “ultimately, her 
grass becomes an inclusive space in which no one is locked out or locked in” (Ryan, 
2013, p. 85).48 The emphasis on the inclusiveness of grass is what is relevant for my 
thinking here: grass, an outdoor space, can be seen as creating the ethical potential of 
                                                             
48 A rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari explain in A Thousand Plateaus, “has no beginning or end; it is 
always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is 
alliance, uniquely alliance…the fabric of rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and…and…and…’ … 
American literature, and already English literature, manifest this rhizomatic direction to an even 
greater extent; they know how to move between things, establish a logic of the AND, overthrow 
ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings” (2004, pp. 27-28). Rhizome, 
generally speaking, marks a relation that is unpredictable, changing, and open for freedom and 
possibilities. 
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wondering and wonder, which is clear in the third part where Lily stands on the 
grass, wonders about her friendship with William Bankes, her intimacy with the 
Ramsays and Mr Carmichael himself. The final ‘The Lighthouse’ part embraces this 
rhizomatic being most clearly, and moves away from Oedipal narratives (marriage, 
children, families, pairs) towards all kinds of affections. In addition, the children, as 
demonstrated already in the previous section, accept the fact that they can never fully 
know other people, including their father. This realisation does not, however, happen 
on the grass, but on the sea, where water itself might function as a symbol for 
movement and change. In other words, the ‘The Lighthouse’ part embraces the 
distance that is always present in intimacy, and finds joy and wonder precisely in not 
knowing, in continuing to wonder. Woolf makes that inclusion of distance apparent 
by focusing on spaces and ‘things’ outdoors: grass and the sea. 
Wonder, then, functions as a positive affect in To the Lighthouse despite the 
fact that loss, and coming to terms with it, is a central topic explored in the novel. 
Jane Goldman (2015) examines various monographs that focus on loss in Woolf’s 
fiction.49 It is not my aim to undermine the relevance of these readings. However, I 
do want to stress that in one of her most elegiac novels, the sense of wonder is also 
prevalent, and, to an extent, loss creates the sense of wonder because characters are 
forced to wonder how to move on and be in the world after the loss. This new way of 
being, as we can see when comparing ‘The Window’ and ‘The Lighthouse’, often 
brings characters freedom, and with it, joy. In a sense, loss (perhaps also loss of good 
eyesight) triggers a scrutinising attention to the world; an attention, which can propel 
a new, more ethical way of being in the world. As Cristina Bacchilega (2014) puts it,  
it is our responsibility and privilege to attend to this insistent and emerging 
poetics and politics of wonder, one that questions established lines between 
history, fiction, and science, between the natural and the supernatural; one 
that embodies counterhegemonic perspectives; and does so to help us 
imagine and act together to bring about better futures (p. 14). 
 
                                                             
49 Goldman examines Hellenism and Loss in the Work of Virginia Woolf (2011) by Theodore 
Koulouris, Virginia Woolf and the Migrations of Language (2011) by Emily Dalgarno, Visuality and 
Spatiality in Virginia Woolf’s Fiction (2012) by Savina Stevanato, and Lecia Rosenthal’s Mourning 
Modernism: Literature, Catastrophe, and the Politics of Consolation (2011). 
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A Desire to Create Something Permanent  
There is a specific wonder in the novel through all the sections – a question about 
what will endure. This is not, however, a desire to have children and continue the 
familial bloodline but a more general desire for making sure that life itself endures. 
Lily wonders whether her painting will be hung in the attics, Mrs Ramsay wonders 
about human relationships and happiness, Mr Ramsay of his work, and interestingly, 
Mrs McNab in ‘Time Passes’ is the most metaphysical wonderer of them all. The 
general contemplation of what will last, however, is present also in ‘The Window’, 
and even here it is not an Oedipal desire to continue familial lines. Rather, it is a 
more general wonder about how life as such will last. For example, over dinner, 
someone pulls Mrs Ramsay back into conversation with the phrase “ah, but how 
long do you think it’ll last?’ […]” (Woolf, 2016, p. 118). Who asked this? How long 
will what last?  
For Mrs Ramsay, it is a certain communal feeling that seems to last. It is after 
the dinner, after the candles have been lit and fruit arranged, that Mrs Ramsay is 
satisfied, when she looks at her children and thinks: “life stands still here” (2016, p. 
31). Mrs Ramsay, like Lily at the end of the novel with her painting, has her vision at 
the end of the dinner, when people are brought together and embedded in common 
emotion. The dinner table again is the ultimate symbol of continuity for Mrs 
Ramsay:  
There it was, all round them […]; there is coherence in things, a stability; 
something, she meant, is immune from change, and shines out (she glanced at 
the window with its ripple of reflected lights) in the face of the flowing, the 
fleeting, the spectral, like a ruby; so that again tonight she had the feeling she 
had had once today already, of peace, of rest. Of such moments, she thought, 
the thing is made that remains for ever after. This would remain (Woolf, 
2016, p. 116). 
Here, for Mrs Ramsay, what matters and holds power against the flowing, the 
fleeting, the spectral is what Groover (2014) calls a ‘family feeling’ – the sense of 
community and warmth and belonging. Mrs Ramsay is assured that “they would, she 
thought, going on again, however long they lived, come back to this night; this 
moon; this wind; this house: and to her too” (Woolf, 2016, p. 125) – as indeed they 
do in the final section. Mrs Ramsay, going up the stairs, thinks,  
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All that would be revived again in the lives of Paul and Minta […] that 
community of feeling with other people which emotion gives as if the walls 
of partition had become so thin that practically (the feeling was one of relief 
and happiness) it was all one stream, and chairs, tables, maps, were hers, 
were theirs, it did not matter whose, and Paul and Minta would carry it on 
when she was dead (Woolf, 2016, p. 126). 
The community of emotion Mrs Ramsay thinks of is perhaps more a human and non-
human assemblage than it is a certain family line that Mrs Ramsay desires to 
continue. Chairs, tables, maps, china, fruits, food – all everyday things, homely 
things at that, which will continue to exist and continue to bring communal feeling 
among people when families sit together with friends. Already, here, Mrs Ramsay 
herself does not list her self as the first thing that the characters at the dinner will 
come back to, but the non-human things that created the atmosphere – the moon, 
wind, the house, chairs, and maps. It is not her family or Minta and Paul’s future 
family that Mrs Ramsay is necessarily concerned about continuing – it is life itself, 
which, of course is not entirely separate from human life.   
Critics such as Ryan (2013), Mattison (2013) and Groover (2014) have noted 
that there is a certain dialogue between the human and the non-human scales of time 
and space. I would like to take this idea further by saying that the non-human and 
human entanglement is what triggers wonder and strange intimacy, and accordingly 
creates a sense of something permanent in the midst of the fleetingness of life. While 
‘The Window’ and ‘The Lighthouse’ are centred around humans and their relations, 
‘Time Passes’ gives voice to the large scales of non-human time and space, and asks 
what will endure:  
Only through the rusty hinges and swollen sea-moistened woodwork certain 
airs, detached from the body of the wind (the house was ramshackle after all), 
crept round corners and ventured indoors […] questioning and wondering, 
toying with the flap of hanging wall-paper, asking, would it hang much 
longer, when would it fall? [...] and questioning (gently, for there was time at 
their disposal) the torn letters in the wastepaper basket, the flowers, the 
books, all of which were now open to them and asking, Were they allies? 
Were they enemies? How long would they endure? (Woolf, 2016, pp. 140-
141; emphasis mine). 
The bracketed part about the house being ramshackle is a reminder of Mrs Ramsay’s 
premonition in the first part. Through the narrative voice that represents the voice of 
the natural forces, which are also “wondering, questioning, toying” (Woolf, 2016, p. 
140), the natural world and indoor furniture are brought together and the question is 
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asked whether they are allies. The narrative voice, through the outside world, seems 
to ask whether humans and all they have made will remain, or whether they have the 
resilience to remain against the forces of the ‘natural’ non-human world that is 
indifferent to human will. 
Bearing in mind the analysis at the beginning of this chapter, wild nature and 
human-made furniture are rather like enemies in the first section of the novel, which 
is mostly mediated through Mrs Ramsay’s consciousness. For instance, the world 
outside the window during the dinner is hostile, unknown, and dangerous. By the 
third section, however, they become more like allies. Cara Lewis (2014) argues that 
the sea wind asking the empty house in ‘Time Passes’ whether the objects will perish 
and fade introduces the inevitable decay of both the human and object worlds. Yet, 
this is not exactly the case when we follow the dialogue of the wild and human-made 
object-world, as, a little further on, the question whether still life will remain is 
answered:  
Loveliness and stillness clasped hands in the bedroom, and among the 
shrouded jugs and sheeted chairs even the prying of the wind, and the soft 
nose of the clammy sea airs, rubbing, snuffling, iterating, and reiterating their 
questions – ‘Will you fade? Will you perish?’ – scarcely disturbed the peace, 
the indifference, the air of pure integrity, as if the question they asked 
scarcely needed that they should answer: we remain (Woolf, 2016, p. 145). 
Although it is slightly uncertain of whom and by whom the question is asked ‘will 
you remain?’, it seems as though it is indeed directed by the forces of nature to 
human-made still life. The latter confirms, and Woolf indicates that it is obvious, that 
it will remain, just like Mrs Ramsay thought it would.  
The forces of nature and the sense of deep time are certainly dominant 
features of ‘Time Passes’ that have inspired many critical readings: for example, by 
Tung (2016) and Banfield (2003). Interestingly, there is still human consciousness 
present in ‘Time Passes’, without which, I suggest, the uttering of “we remain” 
(Woolf, 2016, p. 141) by the still life against the forces of nature would be 
impossible. The only humans mentioned outside the square brackets in ‘Time 
Passes’ are Mrs McNab and Mrs Bast, two elderly women, probably close to not 
‘enduring’ much longer themselves. There is not much criticism focusing closely on 
these two figures, who are nevertheless very important to the narrative and the 
overall meaning of the novel. Julia Briggs (2005) stops at them briefly, seeing them 
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indeed as forces who breathe life back into the house. Briggs is interested in them 
from a class perspective, suggesting that they are working-class characters whom 
Woolf fails to depict realistically and instead creates stereotypes. Instead of focusing 
on their class only, I want to do something like Bennett does in The Enchantment of 
Modern Life: to pay attention to those characters who are seemingly not central to 
the story. I am interested in their relation to one another, and their relation to and 
entanglement with their surroundings: that is, with the decaying house of the Ramsay 
family.50 I am, in other words, also interested in Mrs Bast and Mrs McNab as 
‘haecceities’, in the entanglement of Mrs Bast and Mrs McNab and the house and 
everything that is in the house, and what can become of this entanglement.  
Of the two, Mrs McNab is portrayed more intimately and accordingly 
provides a better ground for exploring her crucial impact on the house and the story 
To the Lighthouse tells us. Like the forces of nature, she wonders about the same 
question – what will endure?  
[this question] coming from a toothless, bonneted, care-taking woman, was 
robbed of meaning, was like the voice of witlessness, humour, persistency 
itself, trodden down but springing up again, so that as she lurched, dusting, 
wiping, she seemed to say how it was one long sorrow and trouble, how it 
was getting up and going to bed again, and bringing things out and putting 
them away again. It was not easy or snug this world she had known for close 
on seventy years. Bowed down she was with weariness. How long, she 
asked, creaking and groaning on her knees under the bed, dusting the boards, 
how long shall it endure? (Woolf, 2016, p. 146; emphasis mine). 
A toothless, bonneted woman is herself a sign of a time that has passed – her bonnet, 
and also the fact that she, a woman, is taking care of and cleaning (someone else’s) 
house, belong to a pre-war society. Having probably cleaned someone else’s houses 
for her whole life, she still endures, and keeps enduring, creaking and groaning, 
                                                             
50 Without reducing or belittling the class elements in this passage, I would like to consider this 
passage beyond that. Woolf as a white upper-middle-class woman who herself had servants writing 
about the enchantment and wonder surrounding her servants is of course problematic. Yet, Aberheen 
Hai (2015) has looked into intimacy between women and their servants in modernist fiction, and also 
points out female rather than male novelists focused on these domestic intimacies across hierarchies 
(servants and the family members). It is possible to see Woolf’s writing about her servants as her 
choice to acknowledge the hard work they do for her. She gives immense importance to those two 
figures in To the Lighthouse, breathing life back into the Ramsay house which is undoubtfully the 
centre of the story, without which the story would not exist. Also, as Berlant and Stewart point out, 
we do not know what happiness means to other people. Thinking about working-class life and work 
as miserable is also patronising. Therefore, the portrayal of these two figures here is much more 
complex than Woolf being patronising as it demonstrates a certain respect and even intimacy she 
might have had towards people who worked (for her).  
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bowed down with weariness of day to day life. The ‘it’ that will endure in the 
quotation is possibly life and the world, and also perhaps the question about how 
long will female workforce cleaning someone else’s house ‘endure’. Perhaps the 
answer to the first part of the question is that life in some form or another will endure 
despite life itself; despite war, death, and the frustration of daily, repetitive activities, 
life itself endures in different shapes and forms over time, and the figure of a 
bonneted, elderly woman belonging to a time that has come to an end is an odd sign 
of the continuity of life. Mrs McNab is indeed a figure of persistency itself, 
springing up again from having been bowed down with weariness, attaching herself 
and the Ramsays, by enlivening their house, to life.  
Life shall thus endure and remain, and Mrs McNab and Mrs Bast dust off the 
emptiness and bring human life back to the house, singing and working at the same 
time. It is Mrs McNab and Mrs Bast, themselves almost perished, who save the 
house from perishing. To come back to Bryony Randall’s (2007) idea of the 
everyday as not a specific set of activities, but as a certain attention paid to life, Mrs 
McNab and Mrs Bast are important precisely not because of what they do, but 
because of the attention paid to what and how they do. The fact that Woolf chooses 
to focus on these figures and makes them the ones who breathe life back into the 
house is itself an ethical act of paying intimate attention to that which otherwise goes 
unnoticed – the daily labour of women. Even in the ‘Time Passes’ section then, the 
distant view of deep time and the space that is only full of indifferent forces of 
nature, is accompanied by that which is daily and near. Woolf in To the Lighthouse 
seems to suggest that life, when stretched out over time is either ungraspable for the 
human mind or is weariness and dull repetition, but certain intimate moments give 
meaning to existence. In the middle of the toils of their work, Mrs McNab and Mrs 
Bast drink tea, pick flowers, and chat. Although being bowed down with weariness, 
Mrs McNab  
stood and gaped in the glass, aimlessly smiling, and began again the old 
amble and hobble, taking up mats, putting up china, looking sideways in the 
glass as if, after all, she had her consolations, as if indeed there twined about 
her dirge some incorrigible hope. Visions of joy there must have been at the 
wash-tub, say with her children, at the public-house, drinking; turning over 
scraps in her drawers (Woolf, 2016, p. 147).  
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With Mrs McNab and Mrs Bast Woolf gives authority and influence to elderly 
women and to the activity of feminine caregiving and the power of the repetitive acts 
of daily lives. Woolf acknowledges the hardness of Mrs Bast and Mrs McNab’s 
work and life, but she also tries to endow them with power in giving them joy and 
persistence. In fact, Woolf renders their work and being so powerfully that against 
chaos and war, it is the feminine labour of care and repetitive daily tasks that save 
the house, and what the house represents, from perishing. Accordingly, Woolf gives 
power and voice to that which we consider feminine and affective, that which is 
perhaps immanent to daily life.  
 
Feminine, Affective Thinking-Wondering 
Most of the positive things, including the sense of wonder in To the Lighthouse, are 
associated with women and femininity: for example, with Mrs Bast and Mrs McNab, 
who breathe life back in to the house; with Lily who follows her desire to paint; and 
with Mrs Ramsay, who manages to create moments that draw people together in 
intimacy, and who keeps the possibility of going to the lighthouse intact. Yet, not all 
men are evil and women good in To the Lighthouse (or elsewhere). Rather, Woolf 
offers us an examination of the complex ways in which masculinity and femininity 
manifest themselves in different characters and phenomena. For instance, Mrs 
Ramsay’s views are also stagnantly patriarchal, imposing conventional gender roles 
on people around her, and men such as William Bankes, Mr Carmichael the poet, 
and young James exhibit qualities associated with femininity – consideration of 
others’ feelings, passivity, and vulnerability. With the issues of gender in mind, the 
verb form of wonder becomes relevant for examining the feminine/masculine and 
other binaries related to it. As already mentioned above, wondering in To the 
Lighthouse is like wandering around, not physically, but mentally, in one’s mind. As 
all the characters in their different ways do it, it complicates the binaries associated 
with masculinity and femininity. More precisely, it complicates the idea that women 
are inherently passive and feminine, and men inherently active and masculine. 
Wondering also complicates what activity and passivity entail. In her diary entry 
from 1939, Woolf notes “[t]his idea struck me: the army is the body; I am the brain. 
Thinking is my fighting” (1972, p. 285). And it is a specific, marvellous and 
enchanting kind of thinking, perhaps thinking-wondering, that is associated with 
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femininity, affect, and intimacy, and that is emphasised in To the Lighthouse and 
allows us to focus on the human and non-human entanglements, and various kinds of 
intimacies. In other words, the ‘action’ of wondering triggers the sense of wonder, 
which, accordingly, can have ethical implication because the sense of wonder 
enhances care towards the other and the surrounding environment. 
Bennett (2001) suggests that thinking can lead to being enchanted. She 
challenges Kant’s notion that thinking is a thoroughly rational enterprise, writing 
that “Kant was inattentive to this site of enchantment, for he pictured thinking as 
having a natural talent for order and a natural affinity for what is true” (p. 52). 
Instead, Bennett (2001) follows Deleuze because for him, thinking is enchanting, 
Deleuze figures thinking as a novelty machine, an arcanely complex, 
idiosyncratic machine out of which sometimes emerges a surprising idea, a 
weird alternative, an unsettling association. Thinking as a kind of bubbling 
limbus soup internal to human bodies. Out of thinking, enchanting novelties 
and strange becomings are always being born (p. 52).  
For Bennett and Deleuze, it is our “senses that force us think” (Bennett, 2001, p. 53), 
and sense perception is enhanced by the material world and the attention humans pay 
to it. Thinking, then, is not a rationalising, calculating activity of the mind only, but 
also something that is enhanced and inspired by the senses and the body via contact 
with the external world. Enchanted thinking is Mrs Ramsay’s musings about the core 
of the self, Mrs McNab’s dusting and singing, and Lily’s moments with her painting. 
It is not, however, Mr Ramsay and Charles Tansley’s mode of thinking, which kills 
all joy and wonder. 
Mrs Ramsay in particular, is attentive to daily life and domestic detail. To all 
this, to the daily activities, to flowers, to the material world, Mr Ramsay, and the 
masculine knowledge he represents, is ignorant. Mrs Ramsay wonders,  
All sorts of horrors, seemed not to depress him, but to cheer him […] indeed 
he seemed to her sometimes made differently from other people, born blind, 
deaf, and dumb, to the ordinary things, but to the extraordinary things, with 
an eye like an eagle’s […] did he notice the flowers? No. Did he notice the 
view? No. (Woolf, 2016, p. 78).  
Mrs Ramsay goes on to contemplate that if only Mr Ramsay was little more like 
other people (Woolf, 2016, p. 53), if he too could notice the ordinary things, both of 
them would perhaps be happier. As the narration progresses, the emphasis falls on 
the idea that because philosophy is so removed from daily life, as is the figure of Mr 
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Ramsay, William Bankes thinks that this was the reason why “the young don’t read 
Carlyle. A crusty old grumbler who lost his temper if the porridge was cold, why 
should he preach to us?” (Woolf, 2016, p. 53). In the same way, Mr Ramsay loses 
his temper over an absurd detail when Mr Carmichael asks for another bowl of soup 
and feels like the whole world needs to stop and attend to him when he hurts his 
finger. Indeed, why should people follow ideas from philosophy that are so far 
removed from their experience and written by people ignorant of others and their 
feelings? These inner thoughts emphasise the idea that philosophy, or any 
knowledge, should grow from life and lived experience in the world among the 
human and non-human. It should be, as Cixous (1993) proposes, that the ladder of 
writing should not ascend but descend – it is not only transcendental heights that 
hold knowledge, but embodied, affective experience on the ground, among material 
beings and things. 
Essentially, then, it is the understanding of thinking as merely rational that is 
questioned in Bennett and Deleuze, and Woolf draws attention to the gendered 
aspects of it. Bennett (2001) writes,  
a rationalizing culture encourages a particular style of thinking – the kind 
used in mathematics and scientific experimentation (that, unlike magic, is a 
“means of reliably controlling experience”)[…] One learns to relate to things 
by seizing upon their structure or logic, upon the principle of their 
organization, rather than, say, by discerning their inherent meaning as parts 
of a cosmos or by engaging their sensuous appeal in a world alive with 
animate bodies large and small. To residents of a disenchanted world, there is 
a significant difference between what a thing is in experience and what can 
be done to it in principle […] in a disenchanting world, the principle of 
calculability tends to overrule, even if it does not always overpower, 
experience (p. 59).  
In the same way, Mr Ramsay’s and Charles Tansley’s harsh remarks about the 
weather not being fine make James aware that “life is difficult; facts 
uncompromising […]” (Woolf, 2016, p. 6). Mr Ramsay’s and Charles Tansley’s 
calculated, rational view of the world kills the wonder that James feels about going 
to the lighthouse. Because these two men are “incapable of untruth; never tampered 
with fact; […]” (Woolf, 2016, p. 6), their declaration that there is no going to the 
lighthouse tomorrow with the wind “due west” (Woolf, 2016, p. 7) disenchants not 
only James’s world but the world itself. Mrs Ramsay, of course, tries to keep 
James’s wonder and joy that surrounds the trip alive by reassuring that there still is a 
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possibility of going, that “it may be fine” (Woolf, 2016, p. 6). It is, essentially, the 
clashing of these two worlds in To the Lighthouse: one enchanted, one disenchanted; 
one ruled by calculating and measuring the world around oneself, one by experience. 
It is the kind of thinking that leads to wonder, enchantment, and, accordingly, 
intimacy that is privileged in To the Lighthouse, and associated with femininity – the 
kind of thinking Mrs Ramsay practices in the lighthouse debate. In other words, what 
To the Lighthouse celebrates is, as Bennett (2001) puts it, “thinking [that is] a 
producer of that which could not be anticipated, [this kind of thinking] is a marvel” 
(p. 52). The kind of thinking that is privileged in To the Lighthouse is not thinking 
that leads necessarily to order and rationality, but to possibilities and marvel; the 
kind of thinking that acknowledges that no matter how much we measure the world, 
there will always be something mysterious the world has to offer, whether pleasant 
or not. It is a kind of thinking that is not concerned with knowledge and knowing, 
but acknowledging that various possibilities and forces exist. Thinking-wondering 
emphasises that how we think is more important than what we know. In other words, 
it is a kind of thinking that sees modern life as enchanting and puts (positive) feeling 
back into modernism.  
This kind of enchanted thinking is that which Beatrice Monaco (2008) calls 
‘positive passive’, and associates with femininity and affectivity.51 The positive 
passive, according to Monaco, is a feminine way of being in To the Lighthouse. 
Monaco (2008) writes, 
The positive passive (or the action of the plane of immanence) is the force 
that enables life to function: in Bergsonian composite terms the positive 
passive is the relaxation as opposed to active contraction, the necessary 
counterbalance to extension. It is one of the dynamic dualities, and perhaps 
one of the most fundamental because it concerns forces of life. […] The force 
of the positive passive that is being set up by Woolf here, which applies to 
                                                             
51 The active/ passive, masculine/ feminine binaries is a well-examined topic in Woolf’s oeuvre in 
general and also particularly in To the Lighthouse via Mr and Mrs Ramsay. In “‘Nothing is simply 
one thing’: Woolf, Deleuze and Difference’” (2013), Monaco (2008) notes that “the study of the 
relationship of the Ramsays is now well-traversed thematic critical ground in Woolf studies, as are the 
strategies, both structural and symbolic, by which Woolf undoes the external ‘masculine’ world and 
shows us the view ‘from below’” (p. 49). In Machinic Modernism (2008), she points out that 
“eminent readings of the novel tend to explore transcendent/immanent tension in terms of the strongly 
demarcated sexual roles of the central couple, Mr and Mrs Ramsay” (p. 23). She points to readings by 
Hermione Lee and Daniel Ferrer and departs from them, problematising “these readings somewhat by 
suggesting that the gender roles in the novel cannot be seen as nearly so clear cut (Monaco, 2008, 24). 
Indeed, the gender roles are not binary in To the Lighthouse; feminine is not intrinsic to women, and 
masculine to men. And the ability to wonder in both genders also complicates this binary. 
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both the narrative and to people, is enormously important in the process of 
life in balancing the outward force of extension (that which constructs the 
world) with a restful gestational state of creation and difference (pp. 38-39). 
Monaco associates the positive passive mostly with Mrs Ramsay, Lily, and Mr 
Carmichael and their silences, which mark the feminine, affective, and immanent 
knowledge or way of being. Monaco (2008) suggests that  
the novel is reconciling and validating the empirical epistemological enquiry 
concerning an alternative model of knowledge based on deferral, 
sense/intuition, and immanence (as opposed to transcendence) that has been 
occurring throughout […] As Mrs Ramsay knew, and Lily comes to know, 
wordless relationships can be the most profound (p. 50).  
To add to that, the figures of Mrs McNab and Mrs Bast, especially the former, also 
represent the counterbalance to the active (masculine) ways of being. Mrs McNab, 
although actively working, is not active in a way that she is dominant, asserting, or 
fighting and winning wars. She works silently, occasionally singing or humming, 
and wonders about life and what remains. Owing to the silent, often invisible and 
unpaid work of women, the other characters are able to return, largely being drawn 
back by another figure who represents this positive passivity, who herself actively 
wonders and is wondered about – Mrs Ramsay. 
Monaco (2008) explains the relevance of sensory, immanent, and affective 
experience in To the Lighthouse through three steps. She writes, “For Bergson, as for 
Mrs Ramsay, our important seeing and consciousness is through our bodies and 
senses, as much as it is through our eyes and intellect” (p. 44). Monaco (2008) links 
the sensory to the plane of immanence, which, accordingly, are, as she explains, 
related to “human experience in at least two ways: firstly, that the plane can be seen 
as a way of formalising or generating a model of what is otherwise known as 
intuition or instinct, and secondly, that it transmits information to us principally 
through our senses” (p. 27). The affective dimension of immanence, which Monaco 
opposes to transcendental (masculine) knowledge, is related to daily life and 
common human experience. Monaco (2008) suggests that through the plane of 
immanence, “liberated autonomy of consciousness” (p. 27) is achieved through three 
steps: firstly, through liberation from the Oedipal and homogeneous time and space 
(as we saw in the instances of strange intimacy between various characters through a 
complicated balance between distance and proximity, and also, importantly, in the 
ability to wonder about different ways of being); secondly, the narrative as liberated 
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from human activity (the world on non-human is crucial for the development of the 
plot); and thirdly, art as liberating, which happens through a female artist and creator 
(Lily, and through her, female desire can express alternative ways of being).52 In 
other words, for a new, more liberated system of being in, and relating to the world, 
that which is feminine, sensuous, and material has to be acknowledged and 
embraced. 
Woolf’s writing in To the Lighthouse, Lily’s painting, Mrs Ramsay’s 
attention to personal detail, and Mrs McNab all represent the affective, feminine, and 
immanent way of being. As outlined in the introduction, this knowledge, or way of 
being in the world and relating to the world, or discursive mode, is searched for in 
many theories and concepts.53 Gabriella Moise (2015) argues that in To the 
Lighthouse, “textual replicas highlight the underlying power of alternative expressive 
modes, resulting in alternative uses of language by the marginalised characters of the 
(female) painter, the androgynous poet, and Mrs Ramsay, the housewife” (p. 108). 
Along similar lines, many recent Deleuzian readings of Woolf examine the concept 
of becoming-woman and becoming-animal, to look at alternative ways of being and 
expressing oneself. These critics include Colebrook (2012, 2013), Ryan (2013), 
Mattison (2013), and Monaco (2008, 2013).54 Their works depart from the 
psychoanalytical and Oedipal readings of To the Lighthouse, looking instead at 
Deleuzian philosophies of the self, subjectivity, desire, and becoming, to also search 
for alternative modes of reading, writing and being than those offered by traditional 
(masculine) discourses.  
But why, then, should we associate that which is sensory, affective and 
material with femininity? As proposed in the introduction, and as is articulated 
throughout this thesis, embodied, sensory, and affective experiences are often 
associated with that which we see as feminine and are often considered of lesser 
value than abstract knowledge associated with the mind and masculinity. Although 
                                                             
52 For a longer discussion of subjectivity, and planes of immanence and transcendence in Deleuze, see 
Monaco’s Machinic Modernism (2008).  
53 These include the works of Hélène Cixous, Elizabeth Grosz, Luce Irigaray, Joanna Zylinska, Simon 
O’Sullivan, Rosi Braidotti, Jane Bennett, Kathleen Stewart and many other critics and philosophers 
associated with feminist, post-structuralist, new materialist, and affect studies. For a full list of these 
names, see the introduction to this thesis. 
54 For different explanations of what ‘becoming-animal’ and ‘becoming-woman’ are, see Elizabeth 
Grosz (1993), Derek Ryan (2013), and Claire Colebrook (2012, 2013). 
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the recent works on Woolf and Deleuze, brought together in the special issue of 
Deleuze and Guattari Studies in 2013, move somewhat beyond gender, the 
contributors to the issue still explore why gender-specific terms such as ‘becoming-
woman’ were introduced in the 1970s and are still worked with today.55 For 
example, Ryan (2013) writes about becoming-woman, saying that the term should  
be understood not as being about representation of the woman as ‘molar 
entity […] defined by her form, endowed with organs and functions and 
assigned as a subject’, but as involving a deterritorialization of subjectivity 
and the creation of ‘molecular’, multiplicitous, non-hierarchical attachments 
(p. 71).  
‘Molar’ and ‘molecular’ are other concepts from Deleuze and Guattari that are 
aligned with ‘majoritarian’ and ‘minoritarian’ identities which I discussed in the 
introduction. Ryan stresses here again the central idea for this thesis from Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work – that identities are not merely those ‘molar’ or ‘majoritarian’ 
identities of being a mother, a wife, a dinner host, but that identity that is 
‘minoritarian’ and formed via various attachments to both human and non-human 
worlds. Because the first kinds of identities are associated with patriarchy and 
masculinity, Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘becoming-woman’. Catherine 
Driscoll (2000) too suggests that ‘woman’ stands for “an infinitive, a process or 
event, a speaking position perhaps but not an identity” (p. 80). In other words, 
femininity is that which is not yet explored and therefore allows to dwell on 
possibilities of different ways of being and living. 
Hélène Cixous’s work is of help when trying to understand what femininity 
implies in To the Lighthouse. In an interview with Henri Quere, published in English 
in 2008 in White Ink, Cixous explains, “when I talk of femininity in writing, or I use 
heaps of quotation marks, I speak of ‘so-called feminine’ writing. In any case, 
femininity – to define it – also exists in men, it does not necessarily exist in women” 
(p. 22). For Cixous (2008), femininity is  
a certain type of generosity, a certain type of capacity to expend without fear 
of loss, without calling loss ‘loss’, but rather what is situated in another 
system of values […]  to lose could be a way of working with life  […] there 
are a thousand ways of perceiving this style of behaviour which is in relation 
                                                             
55 See Elizabeth Grosz’s (1993), Derek Ryan’s (2013) and Claire Colebrook’s (2012, 2013) writings 
for further discussion on why the term ‘becoming-woman’ includes the word ‘woman’.  
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to a libidinal economy, that is to say with the conservation of the self, the 
expenditure of the self, the relation to the other (p. 22).  
In short, the feminine is that which contains new possibilities because it represents a 
different set of values, including valuing the lived and embodied experiences and 
sensory and affective knowledge alongside that of intellectual and rational 
knowledge. To use Deleuzian explanations of becoming-woman, words ‘woman’ 
and ‘feminine’ allow for that which is not yet defined and thus leave open various 
possibilities, whereas ‘man’ and ‘masculine’ have been theorised and defined in 
strict terms. Another important idea from the aforementioned quotation by Cixous is 
that of loss. Cixous’s focus on loss speaks also to To the Lighthouse, which, as an 
elegy, is concerned with loss. But this loss is not merely loss; it is also gaining 
something – a new possibility, a new freedom, a new way of life, especially for 
women. This is explicit in Lily being able to remain single and create her art. But the 
notion of loss as not purely negative is also more implicit in Mrs McNab, a toothless 
woman having lost her youth and with it many other things, still finds power and 
enchantment in life. What she has lost has also given her strength; there is inspiration 
in her weariness. And perhaps most poignantly, in losing Mrs Ramsay and her values 
(significantly, the oppressive side of these values), Lily gains her freedom.      
  
Chaotic, Embodied Art 
Cultivating the kind of feminine thinking-wondering which is rooted in embodied 
experiences is encouraged in To the Lighthouse through art, not through the 
discipline of philosophy. Lily’s painting and Woolf’s writing is affective, but in 
order for it to become affective that which is feminine has to be embraced, 
celebrated, and included. Only then can the atmosphere of wonder and strange 
intimacy emerge. Their art is an entanglement of the nearness/distance, 
femininity/masculinity, immanence/transcendence, and non-human/human binaries, 
where the left sides represent that which is feminine. Their art, in other words, makes 
order out of disorder without losing the sense of chaos the characters experience in 
the novel. In turn, they can enhance the sense of wonder and strange intimacy. 
The final part of the novel emphasises that the atmosphere of wonder is often 
chaotic. In the same sense, what makes Bennett’s modern world enchanting is not 
embracing the divine teleological order of the pre-modern world but paying attention 
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to enchantment that is available in the undesigned, chaotic universe (Bennett, 2001, 
p. 52). All characters in To the Lighthouse go through the chaos of war, and because 
of it, lose family members and friends. This chaos, however, is also a source of 
wonder, and Lily makes sense of this chaos largely through her art. Mattison (2013), 
explaining a Deleuzian notion of neo-Baroque within Woolf’s work, looks at an 
event in Woolf’s fiction through which she argues that  
chaos can be understood not as a contradiction to order and/or art, but as the 
originary material out of which order and art continually de- and re-compose. 
With this understanding, we recognize that art does not create order; rather, 
the modernist artist, through a creative vision, sees chaos and order as two 
sides of the same fabric (p. 97).  
Similarly, Cixous writes in Stigmata: Escaping Texts (1998) that all writing is 
originally disorderly, as is life, from which it springs. But then, “in a way, one 
cheats: one reassembles, pastes together, puts it all in order. That order doesn’t come 
solely from outside, of course. What is order? It's a form hidden in disorder” (1998, 
p. 60). Thinking of Woolf, Mattison (2013) too argues that it is in the  
moments of creative vision, [that] the artist sees not order in contradiction to 
chaos, but as part of that same chaos, which can then be re-ordered through 
the unfolding of the fabric, so that a new order might rise to the surface (p. 
99).  
Indeed, Lily has her vision of a new order where all kinds of affections and 
friendships are embraced, and expresses this in her painting, which, we might 
assume, is chaotic with its green and blues and a line in the middle (Woolf, 2016, p. 
235).  
Having returned to the house, Lily muses in the final section of the novel: 
“‘How ‘you’ and ‘I’ and ‘she’ pass and vanish; nothing stays; all changes; but not 
words, not paint” (Woolf, 2016, p. 201), after which she nevertheless thinks that it is 
not the painting per se that will remain, but rather what it attempts. What does the 
painting attempt, then, and what is it that will remain? Lily’s eyes fill with tears at 
these thoughts, which are ultimately about Mrs Ramsay and how she, with her 
feminine, affective, short-sighted attention to domestic and personal detail created 
the moments in life that endured. Lily’s thoughts here are rather nostalgic. After 
finishing To the Lighthouse, Woolf indeed was concerned that the novel was too 
sentimental. Julie Taylor (2015) draws attention to the tendency in both modernist 
writers such as T.S. Eliot, and also in critics writing about modernism, to associate 
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emotional writing with the Romantics, and sentimental literature as inferior literature 
aimed at female readers, whereas high-modernist form was free of (personal) feeling 
(p. 2). However, this is a false dichotomy, as Taylor (2015) points out. For example, 
for Adorno, “kitsch and sentimentality are problematic [but] embodied affect is quite 
central to his understanding of the aesthetic responses produced by modernist art” (p. 
4).56 What remains from Lily’s painting is not necessarily the form of the painting 
but the affective registers the painting triggers as well as the lived experiences and 
personally felt emotions and feelings that initiated the painting. In other words, 
embodied affect is central to Lily’s creation where form derives from life, and often 
from that which is affective, feminine, and personal in life.  
Randi Koppen (2001) refers to how the idea for art often begins from an 
affect of a body, as Lily’s tears are a reaction to thinking of Mrs Ramsay. Cixous 
expresses a similar idea of how form is created by affect which begins in the body. 
She writes in Rootprints: “Writing begins from the fingertips, from the body”, which 
“also has a thing or two to say” (Cixous, 1997, p. 41). In the same sense, Lily also 
thinks that “it was a body feeling, not the mind” (Woolf, 2016, p. 200).  Cixous 
suggests the answer is to listen to the experience that the body has received from 
living and sensing. Isn’t Lily also listening to her body when she stands on the lawn, 
thinking of Mrs Ramsay, her friendship with William Bankes, and her strange, 
wordless connection to Mr Carmichael? Koppen reads Lily’s stroking rhythm on 
canvas as a rhythm of a physical body. Yet, he fails to draw attention to Lily’s 
specifically female body, and the different ways it experiences pleasure and how this 
difference is possibility differently registered in art. Lily is standing in front of the 
painting, remembering the words of Charles Tansley and thinking,  
Can’t paint, can’t write, she murmured monotonously, anxiously considering 
what her plan of attack should be. For the mass loomed before her; it 
protruded; she felt it pressing on her eyeballs. Then, as if some juice 
necessary for the lubrication of her faculties were spontaneously squirted, she 
began precariously dipping among the blues and umbres, moving her brush 
hither and thither […] as if it had fallen with some rhythm which was 
dictated to her […] by what she saw, so that while her hand quivered with 
life, this rhythm was strong enough to bear her along with its own current 
(Woolf, 2016, pp. 179-180). 
                                                             
56 See Julie Taylor’s introduction to Modernism and Affect (2015) for a longer discussion and more 
specific examples about the complex ‘status’ of affect and emotion in prominent modernist writers 
such as T.S. Eliot.  
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This passage is highly visceral – pressing on her eyeballs, lubrication of some 
faculties, dipping among blues and umbers, hand quivering with life – there is carnal 
pleasure in this passage. Although her hand quivering with life is opposed to the 
rhythm of art, which has its own current, the two are still connected. It is female 
desire that carries the new possibilities of both living and making art. The desire to 
live and express things in a new way, peculiar to one’s own vision, not to that of 
tradition, which has been largely dominated by men, Lily thinks of her painting 
[…] that was how Paunceforte would have seen it. But then she did not see it 
like that. She saw the colour burning on a framework of steel; the light of a 
butterfly’s wing lying upon the arches of a cathedral […] (Woolf, 2016, p. 
55).57  
To put it differently, Lily’s art comes from her chaotic lived experience, which, 
through painting becomes affective and impersonal, encouraging us to wonder about 
the painting, and what the painting aims to depict.  
In Lily’s tears, and in her passive anger against the canonical masculine way 
of painting, we see the melancholy and the revolutionary meeting – the passive 
becomes positive. In her use of her own, feminine, affective, and caring way of 
seeing and thinking, and in her being a woman living her life as she pleases, her art 
also includes a politically feminist statement. Goldman’s ‘From Mrs Dalloway to 
The Waves: New Elegy and Lyric Experimentalism’ (2010) looks at the role 
emotion, subjectivity and poetry play in Woolf’s formal aesthetics, and how her 
aesthetics reflect ethical, political, and historical issues and are not simply ‘art for 
art’s sake’ (p. 50). Urmila Seshagiri (2004) makes a similar point about racial 
politics, with emphasis on Lily’s ‘Chinese’ eyes. She suggests,  
privileging the completion of Lily’s painting over mending broken familial 
structures, Woolf creates a racially differentiated model for modern English 
subjectivity that holds itself separate from patriarchal and imperialist 
hierarchies. Lily Briscoe’s vision signals a new English femininity that, 
paradoxically, employs Orientalist creativity to conceive of itself apart from 
Englishness rooted in the colonialist domination of non-white races (p. 78).  
As stressed, I do not agree that Woolf privileges art over family relations – she sees 
both as important. Yet, it is important to emphasise here the political aspects of 
                                                             
57 Jane Goldman (1998) has written about the suffragist colour tropes and symbols in To the 
Lighthouse, and Woolf’s references to the liberating potential her sister Vanessa Bell’s art held for 
Woolf and how she depicted it through the figure of Lily. 
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Woolf’s work. There are many other critical works on Woolf that examine the 
political aspect of her fiction, a tradition perhaps beginning with Jane Marcus’s 
reading of The Waves (1931) in her ‘Britannia rules The Waves’ (1988), and its 
reconsideration in Hearts of Darkness: White Women Write Race (2004). Important 
for my point here is the fact that the concern with the political and social is, in other 
words, a concern with the lived experience of specific bodies of specific sex, gender, 
class, and ethnic background. It is thus Lily’s, a woman’s, fight against the 
patriarchal tradition.        
The affective, immanent and daily dimension of the material world becomes 
most clearly articulated by Lily’s thoughts and her desire to express the intimate 
atmosphere in her art that Mrs Ramsay created: 
But what she wished to get hold of was that very jar on the nerves, the thing 
itself before it has been made anything […] it was a miserable machine, an 
inefficient machine, she thought, the human apparatus for painting or for 
feeling; it always broke down at the critical moment; heroically, one must 
force it on (Woolf, 2016, p. 218).  
Does Lily wish here to get to affect, to a root of emotion before it is emotion, before 
it has been given a name? Cixous writes in ‘Love of the Wolf’ (1998) that,  
one day […] it was decided to call love a set of strange, indescribable 
physical phenomena, is it pain? – but from the moment that the name is given 
to that burning in one’s breast, the violence of the strangeness is interrupted 
and the ancient horror, hidden behind the new word, begins to be forgotten. 
Let’s go back to before language […] (p. 112).  
Although in the quotation about Lily it was not intimacy or love she was agonising 
about specifically, Cixous’s idea still speaks to Lily’s concern – how do we get to 
the root of various feelings and by which means can we express them? It is a well-
established view in criticism on Woolf that her textual silences and her use of visual 
aesthetics is her way of demonstrating the shortcomings of language.58 Perhaps for 
the same reason, Lily’s medium is paint not words.  
Although Lily is aware how humans are incapable of fully capturing the thing 
itself, or the root of feeling, she nevertheless forces it on in her art, realising, like 
Mrs Ramsay did, and as Monaco points out, that the most profound form of 
connection resides in silence. Just as Mrs Ramsay loses herself in moments of 
                                                             
58 See Patricia Laurence (1991) and Makiko Minow-Pinkney (1987), for instance.  
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silence by herself in ‘The Window’, Lily loses herself when she paints, for “certainly 
she was losing consciousness of outer things” (Woolf, 2016, p. 180):  
And now she had put [her brush] right, and in so doing had subdued the 
impertinences and irrelevances that plucked her attention and made her 
remember how she was such and such a person, had such and such relations 
to people, she took her hand and raised her brush [...] Here she was again, she 
thought, stepping back to look at it, drawn out of gossip, out of living, out of 
community with people into the presence of this formidable ancient enemy of 
hers – this other thing, this truth, this reality, which suddenly laid hands on 
her, emerged stark at the back of appearances and commanded her attention 
(Woolf, 2016, pp. 178-179).   
This passage brings to mind Simon O’Sullivan’s idea that in art, and precisely in 
affective art, we lose our subjectivity. Lily’s painting does not depict concrete 
objects or scenes. It is abstract; it plays with impressions and feelings. Lily’s 
painting breaks with the tradition and conservative forms. In the above quotation, the 
embodied nature of affect is also explored – although it may seem that art requires, 
or encourages, leaving our bodily selves and daily lives behind, as Lily felt that 
before she exchanged the fluidity of life for the concentration of painting she 
had a few moments of nakedness when she seemed like an unborn soul, a 
soul reft of body, hesitating on some windy pinnacle and exposed without 
protection to all the blasts of doubt (Woolf, 2016, p. 179).  
This loss of subjectivity is indeed tied to the loss of a body, meaning that our body 
and its relation to other bodies and environments makes us who we are. If we lose 
our body momentarily, we also lose our self. But we also find ourselves anew after 
emerging back to the level of daily experience.  
The affective art that begins from the body, and from the root of emotion, 
embeds disorder in which order is hidden, and in which the binaries entangle and add 
to one another. To put it differently, art that takes into account lived, embodied 
experience has to be somewhat chaotic because lived experience too is chaotic. In a 
similar way, the colours in Lily’s painting are entangled: “all its green and blues, its 
lines running up and across, its attempt at something” (Woolf, 2016, p. 235). In the 
novel’s final part, although the order that the pre-war society held is lost, and the 
orderly gender roles are no longer in place, there is freedom and new order in this 
seeming disorder, in these human and non-human assemblages. Selves are not 
formed according to a role assigned to one through Oedipal relations (a mother, a 
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wife) but through being mingled with life of all sorts. Throughout the novel, 
however, that which remains and endures is the intimate act of care towards the 
other, the curiosity to know the other and be intimately attached to the world. In 
other words,  
It was love, [Lily] thought, pretending to move her canvas, distilled and 
filtered; love that never attempted to clutch its object; but, like the love which 
mathematicians bear their symbols, or poets their phrases, was meant to be 
spread over the world and become part of the human gain. So it was indeed. 
The world by all means should have shared it, could Mr Bankes have said 
why that woman pleased him so; why the sight of her reading a fairy tale to 
her boy had upon him precisely the same effect as the solution of a scientific 
problem, so that he rested in contemplation of it, and felt, as he felt when he 
had proved something absolute about the digestive system of plants, that 
barbarity was tamed, the reign of chaos subdued (Woolf, 2016, p. 54). 
It is love, but not a conventional love, but a kind of impersonal, yet strange, intimate 
feeling as one would have for a painting, that is enhanced by the freedom to live as 
one pleases that subdues the seeming chaos. If in ‘The Window’, it seemed as if 
intimacy only exists in familial forms, then ‘The Lighthouse’ makes explicit that 
intimacy also grows from creating art and diverse non-romantic friendships. Lily, 
with her certain foreignness, her artistry, and her freedom, creates these new ways of 
being, taking something from Mrs Ramsay, but perhaps directing the affective, 
feminine care towards new possibilities beyond Oedipal frames. With an intimate 
attention to the strange workings of human intimacy and human entanglement with 
the non-human, To the Lighthouse creates an atmosphere of constant wondering and 
strange intimacy. Accordingly, it enchants both its characters and its readers. In the 
‘The Lighthouse’ section, Lily realises that Mrs Ramsay, the mother-figure, was 
central to the atmosphere of belonging and family feeling all characters despite their 
differences felt at the dinner in the Window section. Lily also realises, however, that 
a communal feeling, or a sense of being embedded in the world, does not only come 
from the familial relations that Mrs Ramsay praised, but also from various kinds of 
affections and attachments to both human and non-human life.  
Instead of exploring grand narratives of intimacy, To the Lighthouse explores 
“unclassified affections of which there are so many” (Woolf, 2016, p. 115), and 
which can come across as strange. For instance, Lily as a single female artist, 
valuing the non-romantic friendship of William Bankes as one of the greatest 
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pleasures of her life, renders different the means by which intimacy is achieved and 
understood (Woolf, 2016, p. 215). The story in ‘The Lighthouse’ is mediated 
through Lily’s consciousness which shifts towards different shapes of love and 
intimacy, for “love had a thousand shapes” (Woolf, 2016, p. 217). There is no longer 
just one shape of love dominating: the domestic and romantic love, but different 
affections and shapes of love and the different shapes a person can wear (Woolf, 
2016, p. 219), are taken into account. These affections indeed include conventional 
models of intimacy, but always expose that these intimacies contain something odd, 
which is mostly non-human. In the end then, what remains is the sense of wonder 
about the realisation that intimacy has many chaotic forms. 
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Chapter Two  
A ‘whizzing, whirring, buzzing’ history in Between the Acts 
 
They were talking – not shaping pellets of information or handling ideas from one to 
another, but rolling words, like sweets on their tongues; which, as they thinned to 
transparency, gave off pink, green, and sweetness. 
Virginia Woolf, Between the Acts  
 
In Between the Acts (1941), Woolf gives the reader both the Woolf of To the 
Lighthouse (1927) and the Woolf of Orlando (1928) – she mixes poetic, abstract 
musings with mischievous humour and playful sensations. In Woolf’s final novel, 
we see the continuation of many themes explored in To the Lighthouse, such as the 
role of family and marriage, women’s freedom, and the importance of art and female 
artists, but here, as in the opening quotation, the air the novel gives off, even if 
mixed with the terror of the coming war, is that of sweetness and pleasure. 
Knowledge here is certainly not Mr Ramsay’s disenchanted reasoning, but 
something that is felt in character’s bodies; language in this novel is not a tool to 
communicate abstract ideas but to express what it feels like to have a body, be alive, 
and acknowledge other bodies. Woolf’s attention to sensations in her last novel is 
explicit:  
[Mrs Manresa] looked before she drank. Looking was part of drinking. Why 
waste sensation, she seemed to ask, why waste a single drop that can be 
pressed out of this ripe, this melting, this adorable world? Then she drank. 
And the air round her became threaded with sensation. Bartholomew felt it; 
Giles felt it. Had he been a horse, the thin brown skin would have twitched, 
as if a fly had settled. Isabella twitched too. Jealousy, anger pierced her skin 
(Woolf, 2000, p. 36).  
Here, Woolf takes further the idea of a future of freedom for women; here, Woolf 
gives her female characters bodies that desire, sense, and indulge without shame. 
Between the Acts is the most sensual of Woolf’s novels, and it is so without guilt. In 
this novel, we see many instances where an affective thread hangs between bodies, 
and sometimes violently draws them together as “all was sun now” and “their mind 
and bodies were too close, yet not close enough” (Woolf, 2000, p. 41). The idea that 
they are physically very close to one another in heat, but yet feel that they are not 
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close enough, echoes the distance and proximity debate explored in the previous 
chapter – physical closeness does not necessarily provide grounds for (ethical) 
intimacy in Woolf’s novels. Between the Acts, like To the Lighthouse, is concerned 
with what intimacy is, but in a more communal sense of the word. The otherwise 
sensual, pleasurable novel is haunted by a phrase “dispersed are we” (Woolf, 2000, 
p. 59, p. 60, p. 63, p. 116, etc.), a slightly more positive version of To the 
Lighthouse’s “we perish, each alone” (Woolf, 2016, p. 167, p. 186, p. 215, etc.). 
Against perishing alone, and against being dispersed, Woolf gives us a hot summer 
evening splashed with refreshing rain, a scenic old house, and cows, and, above all, 
she gives us ordinary people, sharing a common present moment. In this novel, 
Woolf explicitly asks her readers to pay attention to that which her characters share 
in space and time, not to the differences between them, because common place and 
time seems to be the one thing that creates some sense of togetherness and meaning 
in the world that is otherwise “scraps, orts and fragments” (Woolf, 2000, p. 112).  
In what follows, I begin by exploring various intimacies that attach people to 
one another and to life. I explain how we can distinguish between at least two types 
of intimacies in the novel: one more physical and ‘fleshly’; and the other more 
poetic. I then show how intimacy is often atmospheric and therefore not merely 
human. I then explore how, via these strange intimacies, Between the Acts offers a 
Cixousian sense of history: not a linear narrative of great men’s lives, but  “time’s 
horizon line” (Cixous, 2009, p. 11), a here and now shared by common people, 
where what Gilles Deleuze terms as ‘a life’ is laid out. I suggest that Woolf’s version 
of history and Englishness can be understood with Deleuze’s concept of ‘a life’, as 
this allows us to see history as ‘a history’, and Englishness as not a fixed identity but 
something fluid, depending on a present moment shared with specific people, and the 
intimacies that “tingle and tangle” (Woolf, 2000, p. 12) in that moment. I follow 
Lauren Berlant to suggest that Woolf’s sense of historical time is affective. I also 
demonstrate how we can distinguish between two versions of Englishness, and why 
in Woolf, and in various readings of her works, the affective version of Englishness 
and history writing is associated with femininity. Finally, I explore how in Between 
the Acts a Cixousian affective language, or what Gillian Beer (1993) calls “earth-
bound and sacred” language (p. 3), is evoked to emphasise the idea that humans, as 
well as non-humans, are embedded in the material world they share together, and 
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how this creates a historical affective present moment. Via this language, history and 
Englishness also become an intimate and strange wire that attaches people to one 
another and to their environment. 
 
Tingling, Tangling, Vibrating Intimacy 
Intimacy in Between the Acts is a network, a wire between bodies that draws them 
together. Between the Acts is void of figures like Charles Tansley in To the 
Lighthouse who “with his acid way [peels] the flesh and blood off everything”, 
indicating that his cold reasoning kills the joy of being alive and experiencing 
sensations (Woolf, 2016, p. 10). In Woolf’s final novel, on the contrary, Mrs 
Manresa has “complete faith in flesh and blood [...]. And aren’t we all flesh and 
blood? And how silly to make bones of trifles when we’re all flesh and blood under 
the skin – men and women too!” (Woolf, 2000, p. 26). Similarly, the elderly siblings 
of the Oliver family – Lucy Swithin and Bartholomew Oliver – represent quite 
different worldviews as I will show later, but are nevertheless united by blood. 
Woolf writes, “brother and sister, flesh and blood was not a barrier, but a mist. 
Nothing changed their affection; no argument; no fact; no truth. What she saw he 
didn’t; what he saw she didn’t – and so on, ad infinitum” (Woolf, 2000, p. 18). We 
may think, in line with the general ambivalence of this novel, that this can also 
indicate the danger of fascism, of celebrating a certain kind of blood and flesh. Yet, 
Mrs Manresa, a stranger to the family, musing about how all are flesh and blood, and 
beneath our differences, people are the same, places emphasis on the fact that our 
bodies, very generally speaking, are all human flesh and blood. Because “family is 
not a family in the presence of strangers” (Woolf, 2000, p. 31), Between the Acts 
entertains the idea that ethical relations within familial ties are possible, first, 
because family members are also infinitely and radically other to one another, as I 
already demonstrated in the previous chapter. Jessica Stiff Berman (2004) has 
written about Levinasian ethics in Woolf’s The Waves (1931) and how Woolf, like 
many feminist critics, renders different, Levinasian ideas about the ethics of care and 
radical alterity. Where Levinas sees familial relations as void of ethics and radical 
alterity, Woolf places emphasis on the ethical potential of close relations. The 
relation between Bart and Lucy, for instance, is an example of that. Despite their 
differences, they find a way of caring for one another.  
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Second, and more importantly for this chapter, flesh and blood is important 
because it allows the bodies to experience sensation that can draw those bodies 
together. From this approach, intimacy too becomes something bodily and 
sensational. In this model, intimacy is almost the same as desire – intimacy does not 
assume an in-depth knowledge of another person but a simple desire to know another 
person in the shared time and space in Between the Acts.59 Woolf creates an image of 
physical sensation when dwelling on characters’ desires. Isa, for example, “drew the 
comb through the thick tangle of hair” (Woolf, 2000, p. 11), and then 
she returned her eyes in the looking-glass. ‘In love,’ she must be; since the 
presence of [Rupert Haines’s] body in the room last night could so affect her; 
since the words he said, handing her a teacup, handing her a tennis racquet, 
could so attach themselves to a certain spot in her; and thus lie between them 
like a wire, tingling, tangling, vibrating – she groped, in the depths of 
looking-glass, for a word to fit the infinitely quick vibrations of the aeroplane 
propeller that she had seen once at dawn at Groydon. Faster, faster, faster, it 
whizzed, whirred, buzzed […] (Woolf, 2000, p. 12).  
We see here how love, or passion, or some sort of affect –  the wire “tingling, 
tangling vibrating” (Woolf, 2000, p. 12) – is exactly what encircles people and forms 
a string between them. It is not something that is simply attached to two people and 
can be expressed in one word, but it includes others, and things like grass, teacups 
and tennis rackets. It might be interesting to consider here that modern tennis comes 
from England, but the origins of the game are also in France. Tea, in the same way, 
is considered a very English beverage although largely imported from Asia, Africa, 
and India. Perhaps the objects that ‘hold’ Isa’s desire towards Mr Haines then 
indicate that this desire is not exactly proper according to Victorian courtship values. 
To express the bodily nature of modern desire and intimacy, the narrative 
voice needs a contemporary object, such as an aeroplane propeller. Gillian Beer 
(1987) writes that “Between the Acts opens with the new aerial perspective of the 
aeroplane, which unmasks history never before observed in the landscape”.60 
Perhaps an aeroplane propeller as a symbol of desire also indicates that we see desire 
                                                             
59 For these reasons, I will treat desire and intimacy as almost equivalents in this chapter. The intimate 
atmosphere in Between the Acts is an atmosphere loaded with desiring – desire seems to create 
intimacy, and this strange intimacy seems to create more desire, but not simply desire as a sexual 
desire for another person, but desire as such – desire for drinking water, for poetry, for looking at the 
view. See the introduction for a longer discussion about desire. 
60 See her review of monographs on Woolf:  https://www.lrb.co.uk/v09/n08/gillian-beer/what-about-
the-aeroplanes 
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as it has not been seen before because of courtship conventions wherein the man is 
the active part, expressing a desire for a woman, women’s desire has normally been 
repressed.61 To express this, Woolf chooses a modern technological object such as an 
aeroplane propeller to draw an image of desire and intimacy. This might indicate that 
desire and intimacy cannot be understood in conventional (Victorian) models of 
courtship anymore, and that women, too have desire.  
In this sense, Isa’s feeling towards Rupert Haines, the gentleman farmer, is 
not very different from what goes on between Mrs Manresa and Isa’s husband, Giles 
Oliver. Isa, seemingly the opposite of “over-sexed” (Woolf, 2000, p. 27) Mrs 
Manresa, experiences passion with and towards the gentleman farmer just like Mrs 
Manresa experiences it towards and with Isa’s husband. For example, Mrs Manresa 
“looked over her coffee cup at Giles, with whom she felt in conspiracy. A thread 
united them – visible, invisible, like those threads, now seen, now not, that unite 
trembling grass only, at cricket match” (Woolf, 1941, p. 36). And Isa has this silent 
thread hanging between her and Mr Haines, the gentleman farmer as “in his ravaged 
face she always felt mystery; and in his silence, passion” (Woolf, 1941 p. 6). Just as 
Isa is aware of the affect between her husband and Mrs Manresa, so “Mrs Haines 
was aware of the emotion circling [her husband and Isa], excluding her. She waited, 
as one waits for the strain of an organ to die out before leaving church” (Woolf, 
2000, p. 6). Both Mrs Manresa and Isa are aware of their own desire. There is 
perhaps a slight difference in the fact that Manresa is more explicit in her sexuality 
and desire. It is interesting here also to note that Mrs Manresa looks at Giles “over 
her coffee cup” (Woolf, 2000, p. 36), while it is the teacup Mr Haines hands to Isa 
(Woolf, 2000, p. 12) – tea, although not from England, is something very English, 
while coffee is more continental or American. Perhaps this indicates that Isa’s 
desires are still more like the Victorian courtship– reserved, suppressed, 
conventional, while Mrs Manresa, with her coffee cup, signals a more liberal look on 
desire.  
                                                             
61 Many critics acknowledge Woolf’s fascination with technology and the opportunities, as well as 
catastrophes, it might bring. Technology is sometimes associated with fascism in Between the Acts. 
See for example Michele Pridmore-Brown’s ‘1939-40: Of Virginia Woolf, Gramophones, and 
Fascism’ (1998). Other times, however, it is associated with new possibilities and feminism: for 
example, in Gillian Beer’s chapter in Virginia Woolf (1992), ‘The Island and the Aeroplane: The Case 
of Virginia Woolf’.  
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Importantly, these desires create an atmosphere that extends beyond Mrs 
Manresa and Isa. Towards the end of the novel, Isa sees “Giles attached to Mrs 
Manresa” (Woolf, 2000, p. 123) until Mrs Manresa drives away in the car. What 
binds many characters in Between the Acts together is the largely bodily sensation 
that creates intimacy – shared space and time that is filled with shared affect. It is not 
just Giles and Mrs Manresa who are involved in this charged atmosphere, but Isa too 
sees them attached to one another. Earlier, the narrator wonders, when Mrs Manresa 
sips from her coffee-cup, “Then she drank. And the air round her became threaded 
with sensation. Bartholomew felt it; Giles felt it. Had he been a horse, the thin brown 
skin would have twitched, as if a fly had settled. Isabella twitched too. Jealousy, 
anger pierced her skin” (Woolf, 2000, p. 36). The reader too can almost feel this, or 
can at least very well imagine the feeling of a fly settling on her skin and the 
sensation, the goose bumps it produces on the body. In order to feel this sensation 
then, having a body is essential. At the centre of this shared affect seems to be Mrs 
Manresa; perhaps she is the body here that affects other bodies the most – producing 
pleasurable sensations in men and jealousy and anger in Isa. All people involved can 
feel it because they are embodied in a shared moment in the same place, sensing and 
desiring. Similarly, towards the end of the novel, Isa thinks again about Rupert 
Haines and “the flesh poured over her, the hot, nerve wired, now lit up, now dark as 
the grave physical body” (Woolf, 2000, p. 123). The words such as ‘nerve wired’, 
‘hot’, ‘physical body’, and ‘attached’, all create an intense atmosphere of strange 
intimacy that is full of desire; an atmosphere that is not just involving two people 
between whom this particular wire might hang, but something that charges all 
characters. This can be seen as strange intimacy, because odd people, strangers, are 
drawn together by nothing else than being made of flesh and blood, and inhabiting 
the same place and time, which because of their affectively charged encounter, also 
binds them together momentarily.  
The passage when Mrs Manresa drinks coffee is loaded with brief physical 
intimacy, but it is not intimacy in the sense of having knowledge of another person. 
Despite the fact that no one involved knows anything ‘substantial’ about her,  
Her hat, her rings, her finger nails red as roses, smooth as shells, were there 
for all to see. But not her life history. That was only scraps and fragments to 
all of them, excluding perhaps William Dodge, whom she called ‘Bill’ 
publicly – a sign perhaps that he knew more than they did. Some of the 
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things that he knew – that she strolled the garden at midnight in silk pyjamas, 
had the loud speaker playing jazz, and a cocktail bar, of course they knew 
also. But nothing private; no strict biographical facts (Woolf, 2000, p. 26).  
Mrs Manresa’s life history is just scraps and fragments to everyone in the present 
moment. That does not mean, however, that Mrs Manresa is unknowable. On the 
contrary, the sensational, affective knowledge is also an important way of knowing. 
Oddly enough, it is William Dodge who seems to know Mrs Manresa beyond her 
fingernails. Dodge, who is a natural conspirator of Lucy and Isa, sharing poetic 
musings and peaceful, non-sexual wondering with them (as I will show shortly), is 
also intimate with someone who seems to present values opposite to him. Intimacy 
in Between the Acts can be formed between unexpected pairs: between Mrs Manresa 
and Dodge, and between the people on the terrace, feeling Mrs Manresa’s very 
bodily presence.  
A similar strangely intimate, albeit suffocating, wire hangs between the 
pageant audience. Before the play starts and when the audience assembles,  
They were silent. They stared at the view, as if something might happen in 
one of those fields to relieve them of the intolerable burden of sitting silent, 
doing nothing, in company. Their minds and bodies were too close, yet not 
close enough. We aren’t free, each one of them felt separately, to feel or 
think separately, nor yet to fall asleep. We’re too close; but not close enough. 
They fidgeted. The heat had increased. The clouds had vanished. All was sun 
now…the cows were motionless; the brick wall, no longer sheltering, beat 
back grains of heat (Woolf, 2000, p. 41; emphasis mine). 
Like in the above passages, characters experience the uncomfortable togetherness, 
and this is expressed in narrative by the increase of heat and silence. 62 Like in the 
boat in To the Lighthouse, and like the motor car incident in Mrs Dalloway (1925), 
silence combined with heat are familiar techniques Woolf uses to draw attention to 
the invisible threads that pull people together. Woolf’s interest in silence in writing 
in Between the Acts serves as a technique, especially when coupled with heat, to 
create a strangely intimate atmosphere in which her characters are absorbed. The 
violence in Between the Acts is not just that of the rape that happened in London 
(Woolf, 2000, p. 15), or that of fascism, war, and patriarchy, but the violence of 
having a body that senses and forms invisible yet strongly felt threads with other 
                                                             
62 Woolf is known to be a great novelist of silence, as Patricia Ondek Laurence and Mark Hussey 
(2012) note among many other critics. For a longer discussion of different layers of silence, see 
Laurence’s The Reading of Silence: Virginia Woolf in the English Tradition (1991).  
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bodies. Threads, which sometimes indeed may lead to actual violence such as rape, 
or war.   
Within this atmosphere wherein characters feel the presence of other bodies 
acutely, it is possible to distinguish at least two versions of intimacy and desire that 
sometimes melt into one another: one that is explicitly physical, fleshly, and almost 
violent, as in the above passages; and the other more poetic, peaceful, and perhaps 
less bodily. Among the more explicitly bodily and romantic desires and intimacies, 
there are also more poetic desires and intimacies, like those between Isa and Dodge, 
and Lucy and Dodge, and Mrs. Sands and Isa, which nevertheless also depend on the 
material world around the people involved. These intimacies are, in a sense, less 
violent and resemble the intimacy in To the Lighthouse. These intimacies offer a 
more peaceful and intuitive way of being drawn together. For example, “Mrs. Sands 
fetched bread; Mrs. Swithin fetched ham. One cut the bread; the other the ham. It 
was soothing, it was consolidating, this handwork together” (Woolf, 2000, p. 23). 
Here, the cutting of bread and ham binds them together. It is not just them, but 
something external, non-human, that allows the affect to emerge between them. This 
is also true of other instances: for example, Isa and Dodge establish an intimacy with 
their common interest in art and literature: 
‘I had a father,’ said Dodge beneath his breath to Isa who sat next him, ‘who 
loves pictures.’ ‘Oh, I too!’ she exclaimed. Flurriedly, disconnectedly, she 
explained. She used to stay when she was a child, when she had the 
whooping cough, with an uncle, a clergyman; who wore a skull cap; and 
never did anything; didn’t even preach; but made up poems, walking in his 
garden, saying them aloud.  
‘People thought him mad,’ she said. ‘I didn’t…’ (Woolf, 2000, p. 33). 
Dodge’s father and Isa’s uncle are also included in this intimacy. It is also, 
importantly, literature and stories that bind them, songs and words murmured from 
the past, carried on to them by ‘odd’ relatives. Perhaps this highlights the fact that 
intimacies within families are more ethical when they are not simply there because 
of blood ties, but because there is something common, an external interest not an 
internal bloodline, that they share. In another instance in the greenhouse, Isa and 
Dodge have the external world around them from which they are apart, sitting under 
vine leaves, putting flowers in each other’s pockets. And  
then they talked as if they had known each other all their lives; which was 
odd, she said, as they always did, considering she’d known him perhaps one 
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hour. Weren’t they, though, conspirators, seekers after hidden faces? That 
confessed, she paused and wondered, as they always did, why they could 
speak so plainly to each other. And added: ‘Perhaps because we’ve never met 
before, and never shall again’ (Woolf, 2000, p. 70; emphasis mine).  
We do not learn about the things they speak of exactly, but we know there is an 
intimacy between them. This intimacy is cultivated precisely because they are 
strangers and shall never meet again; there is an odd distance between them that 
creates proximity and allows them to be intimate. After Isa’s claim that their 
intimacy is driven by their strangeness, the sound of someone practising for the play 
reaches the greenhouse, for they had left the door open, and Dodge is then reminded 
of the “doom of sudden death hanging over us” (Woolf, 2000, p. 70). They continue 
to sit, but the intimacy in the greenhouse is not the same because their present 
moment is interrupted by the voices that come in from the world outside that they are 
only half part of now, with the open door being the connection. There is, in a sense, a 
future interrupting of their intimacy which is rooted in present moment and place. 
Earlier, Lucy and Dodge experience a similar moment when Lucy shows 
Dodge the house. In a way, all these strange pairs of intimacies exist in a different 
time – they exist in-between; they resist time, slow time down, and they seem to 
exist outside what is happening in the surroundings. For instance, Lucy and Dodge 
see from the house that “the audience was assembling. But they, looking down from 
the window, were truants, detached. Together they leant half out of the window” 
(Woolf, 2000, p. 45). They are only half part of the assembling audience, drawn 
together by Miss La Trobe’s art and a story of English history, which is, in itself 
already an alternative to the grand historical narrative. But the intimacy they 
experience outside the pageant is even more radical break in the history offered by 
books than that offered by the pageant and Miss La Trobe: Lucy and Dodge are 
indoors (just like Isa and Dodge were in the greenhouse), separated by others, 
forming odd intimacy by choice, coming together by their own initiative. The 
audience, although also there to see the pageant voluntarily, are drawn together by 
Miss La Trobe, the playwright. Lucy and Dodge are half detached from this, half out 
of the window, half part of the audience. These various moments of strange intimacy 
and desire are moments when characters are willingly embedded in the present 
moment, where time slows down and they are able to see what goes on around them 
from a certain distance, allowing space for critical evaluation, perhaps – hence 
  
111 
 
Dodge’s sense of doom and the future crashing into present in the greenhouse. All 
these intimacies, whether romantic or non-romantic, form larger nets of intimacies, 
including teacups, tennis rackets, fingernails, straw hats, and grass. Intimacy of any 
sort in Between the Acts is not something that simply happens to two human 
individuals, but is something that happens in between them where the external world 
of things, animals, and nature is as important as the two or more people involved. 
Intimacy in Between the Acts is a network, or a wire, tingling, tangling, 
vibrating, whizzing, whirring, buzzing. Woolf explains how human bodies 
experience it while also indicating that it cannot be understood in solely human 
terms; hence the aeroplane propeller metaphor to explain what intimacy and desire 
feel like in Isa’s body, and the animal references when the characters see and feel 
Mrs Manresa sipping her coffee in heat. It is also a more poetic, intellectual 
encounter between Isa and Dodge, and Lucy and Dodge. Intimacy in Between the 
Acts is like how Cixous writes in Rootprints:  
If one could x-ray-photo-eco-graph a time, an encounter between two people 
of whatever sex they might be, by some extraordinary means; and if one 
could consume the radiation of this encounter in a transparent sphere, and 
then listen to what is produced in addition to the exchange identifiable in the 
dialogue – this is what writing tries to do: to keep the record of these 
invisible events […] all that will not have been pronounced but will have 
been expressed with means other than speech – that can be taken up in the 
web of writing (1997, p. 48).  
Between the Acts too captures “a radiation of this encounter” (Cixous, 1997, p. 48) 
and that which goes on in silence (and heat) in these encounters and is not expressed 
in dialogue. While Cixous wishes we had a means to “x-ray-photo-eco-graph” (1997, 
p. 48) to capture the intimacy that happens in an encounter, Woolf similarly uses an 
object that is ‘possible’ because of technological progress to capture the nature of 
(modern) desire and intimacy that tingles, tangles, and buzzes.  
 
More Than Human Intimate Atmosphere  
Choosing an aeroplane propeller as a symbol of desire and intimacy indicates that 
intimate atmospheres do not simply emerge between humans, but that an intimate 
atmosphere is dependent on humans being embedded in the external world – hence 
the importance of the heat of summer days, of various objects, and the sensation of 
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coffee. Within these moments, desire it is not necessarily personal, and not 
necessarily directed towards humans, although it sometimes is. Isa desires Mr Haines 
not just as Mr Haines but who Mr Haines is in particular situations and settings, 
which are all made up of the non-human world. Because desire is not always 
personal, it does not tie characters simply to one another but to life. As already 
stressed in the introduction, and as demonstrated by exploring the desire to create 
something that lasts in To the Lighthouse, desire in Woolf’s work, and other works 
explored in this thesis, is not simply human. Claire Colebrook (2012) writes that, 
“desire is not some human set of embodied interests that must be repressed or 
articulated through language; desire is the multiplicity of forces of life as such, 
which is diminished and impoverished when represented as human” (p. 67). Seeing 
desire as not just human might also be the reason why Woolf gives us the aeroplane 
propeller as a symbol for intimacy and desire, and why this tingling and tangling 
wire then hangs not just between Isa and Mr Haines, and Gilles and Mrs Manresa, 
but between the objects they share, the environment they inhabit, and the other 
characters they share space and time with.  
I established in the previous chapter that characters, especially Mrs Ramsay 
and Lily, are haecceities in the Deleuzian sense. Here, we too see how characters’ 
selves are created in the moments they experience within their environment with 
other people. However, it is not individual characters that Woolf explores here 
primarily, but rather the non-human atmosphere and through that, the historical 
moment they share. Quite early in the novel, Lucy Swithin thinks: “‘But we have 
other lives, I think, I hope,’ she murmured. ‘We live in others, Mr…We live in 
things.’” (Woolf, 2000, p. 44). Woolf here more explicitly gives us the idea, which 
she already developed in To the Lighthouse, that selves are constantly made and 
remade in relation to the external non-human world of sensations, impressions, and 
sights. 
There are many readings that explore the importance of the material world, 
and the importance of the non-human in Woolf’s writing. For instance, critics such 
as Bonnie Kime Scott (2013), Christina Alt (2010), and Gillian Beer (1996) have 
looked at nature, ecofeminism, and the material world in Woolf. More important for 
this thesis and chapter are the Deleuzian readings of Woolf as well as Rasheed 
Tazudeen’s work (2015), wherein she specifically reminds us that “Lucy’s ‘we’ 
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refers less to the group of individuals than to the human species as a whole” (p. 
500).63 Lucy’s ‘we’ that is both human as well as non-human is particularly relevant 
because it allows us to understand the emergence of intimate atmospheres and, as I 
will soon demonstrate, how these atmospheres depict a different concept of 
Englishness and history.  
First, however, we need to look at the various instances when Woolf engages 
with the world of the non-human. Some of it is simply represented via careful and 
intimate detail to nature and environment. For instance, the narrator pays close 
attention to the surrounding landscape:  
Beyond the lily pool the ground sank again, and in that dip of the ground, 
bushes and brambles had mobbed themselves together. It was always shady; 
sun-flecked in summer, dark and damp in winter. In the summer there were 
always butterflies; fritillaries darting through […] (Woolf, 2000, p. 37). 
During the pageant, the cows take their part in, and the rain fills in the awkward 
silences (Woolf, 2000, pp. 107-109).64 An important passage that demonstrates the 
diversity and ‘silent’ presence of the non-human life takes place in the barn, before 
the audience goes there to have tea. The narrative voice claims that “[t]he barn was 
empty” (Woolf, 2000, p. 62). Yet, the following sentence also immediately 
demonstrates that  
mice slid in and out of holes or stood upright, nibbling. Swallows were busy 
with straw in pockets of earth in the rafters. Countless beetles and insects of 
various sorts burrowed in the dry wood. A stray bitch had made the dark 
corner where the sacks stood a lying-in ground for her puppies” (Woolf, 
2000, p. 62).  
The barn is not empty; on the contrary, it is full of life – life, which offers many 
different perspectives: “All these eyes, expanding and narrowing, some adapted to 
light, others to darkness, looked from different angles and edges” (Woolf, 2000, p. 
62). Woolf does not depict just human life but life per se. 
In a similar manner, people outdoors cannot hear Isa knocking on the 
window because they are so embedded in their environment: “the drone of the trees 
                                                             
63 There is a whole issue (2013) of Deleuze studies dedicated to Woolf and Deleuze in which Laci 
Mattison, Claire Colebrook and Derek Ryan offer Deleuzian, new materialist readings of Woolf’s 
work; and various conferences have hosted panels on Woolf and the material world, one being 
organised in 2020 in Seattle: “Virginia Woolf and Grossly Material Things”. 
64 See Derek Ryan’s ‘Territory of the Cows’ (2013) for a more detailed contemporary interpretation 
of animals in Between the Acts.  
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was in their ears; the chirp of birds; other incidents of garden life, inaudible, invisible 
to her in the bedroom, absorbed them” (Woolf, 1941, p. 11). Here, Woolf 
demonstrates how from a distance – as Isa looks from the window, paying attention 
to how her son walks with the nursemaids, she misses all the other life that the 
characters experience outside. On the other hand, characters who are outside, are 
absorbed in the non-human life and its sounds outside the window, and are 
embedded in the material world. Woolf shows us how intimate atmospheres are 
made of the non-human life which often goes unnoticed by human eyes that pay 
attention to human life only – a fact which is nicely illustrated by Isa who looks only 
at her son, and taps on the window-glass which separates her from the non-human 
noises and life outside. In a similar manner, the attention to the lily pool, to the cows, 
the view, the various animals in the barn, and the rain all implicitly indicate that 
human intimacies and desires are always embedded in the world of the non-human. 
Derek Ryan (2013) suggests that by “blurring the boundaries between human 
and nature in order to refuse any fixed concept of human nature, Woolf, is providing 
a natural-cultural picture of intra-action which rejects the notion of hierarchical 
distinctions between human and nonhuman, culture and nature” (p. 369).65 It is 
important to note here, however, that although the hierarchy is indeed strongly 
undermined, Between the Acts nevertheless places a certain responsibility on humans 
and keeps a distinction between human and non-human – Woolf does not flatten out 
differences between the two. The instance where Isa is separated from the world 
outside by glass, and when the barn is initially described as empty indicate that it 
takes a certain attention to even notice the non-human, not to mention seeing it on 
the same level with humans. Although humans are entangled in the world of non-
human, Between the Acts places certain responsibility on humans towards the non-
human. The narrator muses: “The fire greyed, then glowed, and the tortoiseshell 
butterfly beat on the lower pane of the window; beat, beat, beat; repeating that if no 
human being ever came, never, never, never, the books would be mouldy, the fire 
out and the tortoiseshell butterfly dead on the pane” (Woolf, 1941, p. 13). It is the 
human activities of dusting, of lighting fires, of airing the rooms and opening 
windows to free butterflies that can aid preserving that which is not human, just like 
                                                             
65 For a longer discussion of intra-action, a phrase coined by Karen Barad, see Ryan’s article in 
Virginia Woolf in Context (2013). 
  
115 
 
Mrs McNab and Mrs Bast helped to preserve life in the Ramsay house in To the 
Lighthouse. In other words, Woolf emphasises the responsibility humans have in 
recognising the otherness of the non-human, and, at the same time, their own 
dependence on this otherness. 
We can see this dependence in the discussion about the weather. Like in To 
the Lighthouse, the weather is an important topic discussed in relation to whether 
certain human activities can take place in Between the Acts (Woolf, 2000, pp. 16-17). 
Isa thinks that “[e]very summer, for seven summers now, Isa had heard the same 
words; about the hammer and the nails; the pageant and the weather. Every year they 
said, would it be wet or fine; and every year it was – one or the other” (Woolf, 2000, 
p. 16). While Mr Ramsay and Charles Tansley in To the Lighthouse tried to predict 
weather, in Between the Acts we simply have a discussion that does not really try to 
predict but that accommodates the human activity to the weather – if it is wet then 
the pageant will be in the barn; if it is fine, then it will be outside. In either case, 
human activity nevertheless depends on nature’s ‘activity’. Echoing the discussion 
about the direction of the wind in To the Lighthouse, Bart asserts a similar 
knowingness about the distance from the sea in Woolf’s final novel. Unlike Isa’s 
more intuitive guess, Bart knows exactly how far the sea is: “‘Thirty-five [miles] 
only,’ her father-in-law said, as if he had whipped a tape measure from his pocket 
and measured it exactly” (Woolf, 2000, p. 20). The language Woolf uses is almost 
violent as Bart ‘whips’ his measuring on the world. Tazudeen (2015) suggests that 
part of the fascism and violence in Between the Acts is also the violent conceptual 
meaning that human consciousness tries to force on the non-human world. Tazudeen 
writes that “the fascism Woolf critiques would not only be the overt violent 
aggression of Hitler’s armies engulfing Europe, but also the protofascism of belief in 
the superiority of human consciousness and the drive to reduce all things to 
conceptual order” (p. 502). Controlling weather is an example of this ‘protofascism’ 
in Between the Acts. To avoid that kind of fascism, Woolf keeps the otherness of the 
nature and the non-human intact precisely because the human mind can never really 
capture and understand the non-human. For this reason, there is a certain 
responsibility and humility shown towards the non-human.  
Perhaps Woolf indicates that the largest non-human ‘thing’ that suffers the 
most from human conceptual order and meaning being imposed on it is land. By 
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shifting the focus to the non-human elements of land in Between the Acts, Woolf is 
able to depict land as different from the way it is depicted in history books. In Three 
Guineas (1938), written a few years before Between the Acts, Woolf explains how 
history is built on the oppression of the ‘other’, where the other is normally women, 
other countries than one’s homeland, and other nationalities. In this book-length 
essay Woolf demonstrates that history, as it is written in the many books, 
biographies, and speeches she references, is really a history “of phallocentrism, 
history of appropriation: a single history. History of an identity: that of man’s 
becoming recognised by the other (son or woman)”, as Cixous writes in ‘Sorties’ 
(1986, p. 204). Woolf argues, referring to various eminent figures such as Winston 
Churchill, Charles Gore, and Lord Frederic Hamilton, that the way in which their 
lives are depicted in biographies creates patriarchal and patriotic narratives.66 Woolf 
shows us how, when history is written down by eminent men, about eminent men 
leading eminent empires, patriarchal and patriotic narratives glorifying white 
European men are created. Similar to her questioning what a biographer should do in 
‘A Sketch’, Woolf also questioned history-writing as a narrative about the glory of 
different states, led by eminent male figures.  
Woolf, on the contrary, tries to imagine history without patriotism, 
patriarchy, and glorification of the ‘fatherland’. For this reason, Lucy is obsessed 
with prehistoric land; she wonders how the land will be there when we are not, and 
her favourite book is the outline of history. She is particularly caught up in the idea 
of prehistory, when the land of England was still connected to the continent and 
inhabited my mammoths and rhododendron forests. She thinks: “‘once there was no 
sea,’[…]‘No sea at all between us and the continent. I was reading that in a book this 
morning. There were rhododendrons in the Strand; and mammoths in Piccadilly’” 
(Woolf, 2000, p. 20). Surely this passage is important also because it questions the 
boundaries between England and continental Europe – of the political conflicts there 
and their relevance to England as a nation on the eve of the Second World War.67 
                                                             
66 For the list of separate books, speeches, biographies, and literary sources Woolf engages with in 
Three Guineas, see the bibliography included in the appendix of Three Guineas. Some of the sources 
Woolf engages with there include books about English history such as G. M. Trevelyan’s History of 
England (1926), G. L. Prestiges’s The Life of Charles Gore - A Great Englishman (1935), and Lord F. 
Hamilton’s The Days before Yesterday (1920).  
67 See Jed Etsy (2003), and various articles such as Alex Zwerdling ‘Between the Acts and the 
Coming of War Novel’ (1977), Hena Maes-Jelinek’s Criticism of Society in the English Novels 
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However, what is important for my discussion is that prehistoric land as such is a 
space free of concepts such as nation and borders.   
In other words, prehistoric land offers an option to depict land simply as land, 
which is essentially an attempt to imagine land free of humans and their imposed 
concepts. It can be argued that humans living on the land in a way that imagines a 
certain piece of land belonging to a certain group of people (or individuals) is itself a 
form of occupation. Woolf, then, tries to imagine a different form of being on the 
land – a way that is not subjugating the land merely to human control but rather a 
sort of symbiosis where humans acknowledge the life-giving properties of the land. 
This idea is also emphasised when the pageant ends, and Miss La Trobe goes to the 
pub, has a drink, and a vision for her next play, 
She raised her glass to her lips. And drank. And listened. Words of one 
syllable sank down into the mud. She drowsed; she nodded. The mud became 
fertile. Words rose above the intolerably laden dumb oxen plodding through 
the mud. Words without meaning – wonderful words” (Woolf, 2000, p. 125).  
Tazudeen (2015) interprets this muddy, fertile land as “the site from which new 
sensuous and nonconscious modes of inhabiting the earth might emerge [...] La 
Trobe’s vision is of a language born out of the earth itself, the replanting of human 
‘words’ into the living world from which they have emerged” (pp. 508-509). 
Similarly, Gillian Beer (1996) suggests that “for Woolf the common reader and the 
common ground are at once earth-bound and sacred, as near as she ever gets to the 
language of faith or patriotism” (p. 3). For Woolf, common ground depends on a 
common moment shared in a specific place, as demonstrated in the previous section. 
Woolf depicts a land where a history can be created and written on the one hand, but 
more importantly, a land that also influences how and what kind of history can be 
written on that land. For instance, it is “nature [that] had provided a stretch of turf 
half a mile in length and level” (Woolf, 2000, p. 9) that men used for building a 
house.68 The land, however, determines which house will be built, which materials 
will be used, and what kind of life can be lived there. Focusing on the non-human 
                                                             
Between the Wars (1970), and David Shackleton’s ‘The Pageant of Mutabilitie: Virginia Woolf’s 
Between the Acts and The Faerie Queene’ (2017). 
Most of these critics explore the relevance of the prehistoric in relation to human social history in 
Woolf’s own time. All these works are relevant and insightful. However, I am interested in exploring 
the role of land simply as a land, as much as this is possible.  
68 Woolf writes how “man” built a house on that land (2000, p. 9), indicating that the specific kind of 
life and history created on the land is largely man- not woman-made.   
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life on the land of England and referring back to a time when there was no human 
life on that land at all is a device that Woolf uses to create a language, and a 
narrative that is directly related to the earth it comes from.  
 
An Affective History, An Affective Englishness 
Julia Briggs (2005) argues that for Woolf the English landscape was inextricably 
bound up with English literature. She writes that in April 1926, Virginia and Leonard 
spent five days in Iwerne Minster, a village in Dorset close to Cranborne Chase. 
Woolf describes this holiday as follows: “we stole off and were divinely happy […] 
in a country, for a moment, which really made one almost ashamed of England being 
so English; and carpeting the woods, and putting cuckoos on trees, and doing exactly 
what Shakespeare says” (qtd. in Briggs, 2005, p. 192). Briggs (2005) suggests that  
being in an old country makes [Woolf] feel that poetry, like landscape, can 
bring back the past. But Woolf’s pleasure in the countryside was always 
disturbed by knowing that during the war such obvious ‘Englishness’ had 
been exploited for patriotic propaganda (p. 192).  
Instead of associating the woods and cuckoos specifically with romantic stories of 
the English countryside, Woolf in Between the Acts presents us with all kinds of non-
human life, and a pageant that does not include the army, but a picture of 
Englishness that depicts daily lives and the atmospheres of certain historical 
epochs.69 More importantly, she gives us the historical present of late modernity in 
the moments that happen between the acts. Between the Acts can be seen as Woolf’s 
attempt to save England from patriotic propaganda, as well as from her own 
somewhat clichéd conception of what England is. Instead, she offers an idea of 
Englishness that is not defined by flags, armies, and great men by depicting history 
as ‘a history’ and Englishness as ‘an Englishness’ without entirely getting rid of 
scenic English landscape, old country houses, and other things that may be seen as 
typically English, such as teacups and tennis rackets.  
                                                             
69 It is interesting to note here that the Bloomsbury Group, including Woolf, was criticised by 
Wyndham Lewis and people involved with the Vorticist movement about being upper class and not 
‘modern’ enough. Part of that criticism was that the Bloomsbury set reinforces the idea of England 
and Englishness as upper class, conservative, and effeminate. Woolf’s writing here proves the 
contrary. 
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At the centre of Between the Acts, in the midst of the many human and non-
human intimacies, is a village pageant, telling the story of English history. But it is 
not a history of great men’s lives, or of major political events, or of wars. In the 
novel, the mayor, having come to see the pageant, asks his wife: “Why leave out the 
British Army? What’s history without the Army, eh?” (Woolf 1941, p. 94). Miss La 
Trobe, Woolf’s playwright, leaves out the army to create a version of history that is 
not violent, hence questioning the legitimacy of patriarchy and patriotism. Instead, 
history in this pageant is constructed from English Literature – the audience within 
the novel, and we, the readers, see Elizabethan drama, Restoration comedy, 
Victorian melodrama, and the present day. The pageant is not presented factually, 
but rather affectively. In a diary entry of 14 October 1938, Woolf noted about Pointz 
Hall, the working title of Between the Acts, that she wanted to gather all literary 
notes that come to her mind and “to collect, even bind together, [her] innumerable 
T.L.S notes: to consider them as material for some kind of critical book: quotations? 
Comments? Ranging all through English literature as I’ve read it and noted it down 
in the past 20 years” (Woolf, 1972, p. 305). Depicting history as represented in 
specific examples in English literature’s scattered phrases allows Woolf, and her 
playwright Miss La Trobe, to critique the idea of history as a series of lives lived by 
great men leading armies. Instead, as Julia Briggs (2005) and Matthew Webber 
(2017) point out, Woolf in the novel, and Miss La Trobe in the pageant, imagine a 
collective English past. History in Between the Acts ceases to be a vertical line and 
becomes what Cixous calls “time’s horizon line” (2009, p. 11) on which the daily 
lives, intimacies, and desires of ordinary people, as well as the non-human world in 
which these intimacies are embedded, is depicted. Time’s horizon line depicts 
history as time embedded in living people, or the environment around people “on 
which are painted or deposited the physical effects of what we happen to live. Of 
what happens to us, living” (Cixous, 2009, p. 11). It is these horizontal bonds and 
intimacies that I examined above, then, that interest Woolf and Miss La Trobe in 
exploring the historical narratives and concepts of history and Englishness these 
narratives create.  
History becomes affective – it becomes horizontal, not linear and focused 
around the lives of great men. In ‘Sorties’, Cixous writes that “History [is a] history 
of phallocentrism, history of appropriation: a single history. History of an identity: 
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that of man’s becoming recognised by the other (son or woman)” (1986, p. 204). 
Woolf is aware of how history as a history of great men’s lives produces the narrow, 
often over-romanticised image of what Englishness means. As her diary entry from 2 
February 1940 indicates, her ‘patriotism’ and her love of England does not depend 
on the victories won by Great Britain, but on a sense of sharing a certain place and 
time with people beside her, and the atmosphere these places and people create:  
Odd how often I think with what is love I suppose for the City: of the walk to 
the Tower: that is my England: I mean, if a bomb destroyed one of those little 
alleys with the brass bound curtains and the river smell and the old woman 
reading, I should feel – well, what the patriots feel (1972, p. 325).  
If patriots feel what they feel because of the glory that armies led by great men bring 
to the Britain in battles, then Woolf loves ‘her’ England because she shares this with 
other people, together creating a specific atmosphere in a specific place with specific 
sights, sounds, and smells. In other words, Woolf wants to construct a history of 
England and a sense of Englishness without losing her modernism, feminism, and 
socialism. But then the question remains how to do that without becoming patriotic? 
Jed Etsy asks in A Shrinking Island (1993), 
how could Woolf, an intellectual pacifist, respond to the growing menace of 
fascism? […] What stance could a lifelong Outsider—a woman artist who 
cherished her idiosyncratic and dissenting freedoms—take in relation to the 
wagon-circling patriotism of the late 1930s? Woolf had always been 
suspicious of British nationalism (linked as it was to patriarchy, imperialism, 
and xenophobia), yet in the end she wanted to find ways to express her 
affinity for England and to assert the value of English traditions (p. 86).  
I too am interested in how Woolf combines her love for England with her modernism 
and feminism without reproducing patriotic and patriarchal narratives.  
One possible way to do that is to write a book that depicts the atmospheric, 
affective part of history; a book that sees history as time’s horizon line, a book where 
all the tingling, tangling, whizzing and buzzing intimacies are recorded – intimacies 
that indeed create so many of the moments that will be history for ordinary people. 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write, “[t]he ideal for a 
book would be to lay everything out […] on a single page, the same sheet: lived 
events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social formations” 
(2004, p. 10). Between the Acts is not a single page – it is still a traditional book with 
a story in linear order between covers. Yet, in content, Woolf entertains the idea that 
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history is not simply a linear narrative. Her playful mixing of genres, of fact and 
fiction, of poetry and colloquial language, and her fitting English literary history into 
a few hours of pageant while also depicting the present moment of the audience 
seems to be a similar attempt to present history as a time’s horizon line, not a linear 
narrative. Gillian Beer (1996) proposes a very similar idea: “much of the wit of the 
book depends upon its turning aside any notion of development as implying 
improvement […] the novel is a spatial landscape, not a linear sequence” (p. 20). 
Woolf attempts to write a novel that constructs history from scattered phrases from 
all over English literature, as it is remembered by Isa and Dodge, for example. She 
includes village gossip and depicts the lives of ordinary people as well as the famous 
figures remembered by English literature to gather up these phrases. This method 
allows us to see history, and with it the sense of Englishness as something 
horizontal, scattered in space and time, creating the sense of a book that lays out 
everything on the same sheet.  
History in Between the Acts is then similar to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of ‘a 
life’, becoming ‘a history’. In “Immanence: A Life” (1995/2002), Deleuze writes 
about a life that is not subjective, but is impersonal and asubjective, proposing that 
life is an assemblage of all things, animate and inanimate, natural and artificial. He 
writes,  
We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. [...] A life 
is everywhere [...]: an immanent life carrying with it the events and 
singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects […]The life of 
the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life […]This 
indefinite life does not itself have moments, close as they may be one to 
another, but only between-times, between-moments; it doesn’t just come 
about or come after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one 
sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the absolute of an 
immediate consciousness (Deleuze, 2002, 27-29).70  
Woolf’s final novel too depicts a life as it happens to be experienced by many 
characters in the novel, some of them sensing the threat of war in the air, and some 
of them taken out of their subjective lives for a moment by the pageant and 
encounters with other audience members. None of the characters is more prominent 
than the others, or more prominent than the non-human environment, or the 
                                                             
70 ‘Plane of immanence’ is, as Berlant succinctly reminds us in an endnote in Cruel Optimism, “Gilles 
Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s term for the absorption, embeddedness, and consistency of life as it 
moves” (2011). 
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historical pageant. The novel’s resistance to offer any substantial personal histories 
of the characters, and its lack of patriarchal linage in the Oliver family, who 
“couldn’t trace their descent for more than two or three hundred years” (Woolf, 
2000, p. 21), allows seeing history in Between the Acts as a history, a history not of a 
certain country or an eminent, symbolical figure, but a history of a life experienced 
as a ‘we’, both human and non-human.71  
Woolf’s own ideas around working with the novel also support such an 
approach. In a much-quoted diary entry from 26 April 1938 about Pointz Hall, 
Between the Acts’ working title, Woolf wrote,  
a centre: all lit[erature] discussed in connection with real little incongruous 
living humour; & anything that comes into my head; but ‘I’ rejected: ‘We’ 
substituted: to whom at the end there shall be an invocation? 
‘we’…composed on many different things … we all life, all art, all waifs and 
strays – a rambling capricious but somehow unified whole – the present state 
of my mind? And English country; & a scenic old house – & a terrace where 
nursemaids walk? & people passing – & perpetual variety & change from 
intensity to prose. & facts – & notes; &  – but eno’” (1972, pp. 289-290).  
What Woolf seems to suggest here is very similar to another of her ideas, which is 
also recorded in her other famous quotation from ‘A Sketch of the Past’ that I 
already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Woolf’s idea that “we are the 
words, we are the music, we are the thing itself” (Woolf, 1979, p. 85) and how there 
are no great individuals, is very similar to Deleuze’s idea of a life, a moving 
immanent life made of many different things, yet somehow unified. This idea is also 
expressed in Between the Acts through Mrs Swithin, vaguely gazing at the view:  
She was off, they guessed, on a circular tour of the imagination – one-
making. Sheep, cows, grass, trees, ourselves – all are one. If discordant, 
producing harmony – if not to us, to a gigantic ear attached to a gigantic 
head. And thus – she was smiling benignly – the agony of the particular 
sheep, cow, or human being is necessary; and so – she was beaming 
seraphically at the gilt vane in the distance – we reach the conclusion that all 
is harmony, could we hear it. And we shall. Her eyes now rested on the white 
summit of a cloud (Woolf, 2000, p. 104).  
                                                             
71 Also, Woolf wrote the novel during the war, knowing that the war did happen. The novel, however, 
is set in June 1939, in an ambivalent atmosphere of not knowing. We can therefore consider the war 
as the event that is yet to come and already happened, and the characters somehow exist in empty 
time, somehow sensing it coming in their bodies, like the audience sitting together passively, the 
characters looking at the view, and Dodge feeling the sense of doom in the greenhouse, that somehow 
binds all the characters together by invisible threads (Woolf, 2000, pp. 37-38, p. 34, p. 70). 
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Lucy’s one-making that includes all in the living world echoes both Woolf’s idea of 
a ‘we’ and predicts Deleuze’s idea of a life. Although individuals themselves in their 
private lives may not realise their collective roles, it is nevertheless possible to notice 
that harmony through Woolf’s writing, especially through her attention to the strange 
intimacies experienced in the atmosphere that the non-human environment creates. 
This approach to history and Englishness allows us to see both as inclusive, in 
motion, and essentially made up of a web of connections between humans and their 
environment in the historical moment they share. 
The notion of history as a history, of life as a life depends on being immersed 
in the present moment with all senses, as demonstrated above in the intimate, 
desiring moments. Lauren Berlant (2011) reminds us that “affect emerges not in the 
nervous systems of persons but worlds […] because atmospheres are shared, not 
solitary, and bodies are continuously busy judging their environments and 
responding to the atmospheres in which they find themselves” (p. 14). In other 
words, the intimate moments in Woolf that allow us to see history as time’s horizon 
line that depicts the ordinary stories of a collective ‘we’, depend also on the non-
human environment, as I emphasised above. This atmosphere is also what creates a 
sense of the historical present moment. Berlant (2011) puts forward the idea that 
history does not happen in great events or figures, but happens in atmospheres, and 
moods, and how people are embedded in these atmospheres and moods (p. 65). 
Woolf’s ‘historical method’ in Between the Acts is very similar to Berlant’s (2011) 
method for examining how “aesthetically mediated affective responses” create a 
“shared historical sense” (p. 5). In Between the Acts, Miss La Trobe, by presenting 
the mirrors to the audience in the end, expresses what Berlant does in Cruel 
Optimism – examining the historical present moment from within that moment, 
while thinking about how that came to be and where it might lead. Berlant (2011) 
writes,  
One of [Cruel Optimism’s] central claims is that the present is perceived, 
first, affectively: the present is what makes itself present to us before it 
becomes anything else, such as an orchestrated collective event or an epoch 
on which we can look back […] If the present is not at first an object but a 
mediated affect, it is also a thing that is sensed and under constant revision, a 
temporal genre whose conventions emerge from the personal and public 
filtering of the situations and events that are happening in an extended now 
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whose very parameters (when did “the present” begin?) are also always there 
for debate (p. 5).  
Isn’t the filtering of ongoing events and situations in the present moment also what 
goes on in Woolf’s final novel? And isn’t Between the Acts also concerned with 
affective registers of time, of how history feels? When the play within the novel 
reaches its end, the audience reads from the programme that now it is the present 
moment, and people then wonder,   
‘Ourselves …’[…] But what could [Miss La Trobe] know about ourselves? 
The Elizabethans, yes; the Victorians, perhaps; but ourselves; sitting here on 
a June day in 1939 – it was ridiculous. ‘Myself’ – it was impossible. Other 
people, perhaps […] Cobbet of Cobbs Corner; the Major; old Bartholomew; 
Mrs. Swithin – them, perhaps. But she won’t get me – no, not me (Woolf, 
2000, p. 106).  
Miss La Trobe is not claiming any objective knowledge of history, but she is 
creating an affective intuition about the times she depicts, based on literature that 
these times have ‘left behind’. The Elizabethan time represents certain glory, 
Victorian time domestic values and the power of the Empire, and then with the 
mirrors, the audience is asked to think about their own role in history, and the way 
they experience their present moment, and the way they perceive themselves and 
others in this moment. What Miss La Trobe, and Woolf through her, might be 
indicating is the fact that the atmosphere that people share in their present moment 
makes up history, and defines a certain Englishness.  
Claire Colebrook (2012) explains, following Deleuze, that “the intensity of 
experience is impersonal, and for that reason something like a moment or a force that 
transcends any specific individual can be experienced” and that “the present that is 
experienced by any self is possible only because there are forces, waves, particles, 
colours, intensities from which this actual world is composed” (p. 70). The moment 
of intimacy, for example, in the veranda when Mrs Manresa sips coffee is also a 
moment composed of various forces and intensities such as the heat and stillness of 
the summer air, and Mrs Manresa’s body sending out signals of pleasure from 
sipping hot coffee. There is nothing personal known about Mrs Manresa by the 
characters or by the readers. Yet, for all the characters involved, the experience of 
this moment is intense, as they can all feel the forces from it on their bodies. In the 
same way, the other intimate moments are built upon a certain common shared 
moment and experience, and from these moments, a historical affective present also 
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emerges. History in Between the Acts, then, is not a linear narrative of the patriarchal 
identities that should make up Englishness and English history, but rather a history 
that is experienced as an affective charge of “forces, waves, particles, colours” 
(Colebrook, 2012, p. 70). Englishness in Between the Acts is not simply certain 
ethnicity but something much less tangible – it is an assemblage of various 
characteristics, of clothes, of people from various ethnicities (Miss La Trobe’s 
assumed Russian background), of teacups, of tennis rackets, of land, and everything 
found on that land, human and non-human. Tennis rackets and teacups, things that I 
paid attention to at the very beginning of this chapter, and the history of these things 
in a context where history is a compound of many different things, are worth 
highlighting again: although tennis and tea are considered very English things, their 
origin is not England. This indicates that history and Englishness in Between the Acts 
really are a compound of various objects and intimacies, not some grand narrative of 
pure Englishness.  
 
A Feminine and a Masculine Englishness? 
The notion of history as a history, and Englishness as a fluid, horizontal bond 
between people and their environment in Between the Acts is associated with 
femininity. As many critics, including Jed Etsy (2003), have pointed out, the elder 
siblings at Pointz Hall, Lucy Swithin and Bart Oliver “represent competing versions 
of Englishness: one pastoral and insular, one barbaric and expansive […] Bart’s 
aggressive imperialism threatens the peace of Lucy’s insular humanism, just as 
Lucy’s mad devotion to pastoral and aesthetic values fester Bart’s utilitarianism” (p. 
88). Etsy writes that “the novel’s political tension is driven precisely by Woolf’s 
awareness that she might not be able to prize apart these two nationalisms, that it 
might not be possible to celebrate the right kind of English civilization without 
fuelling the wrong kind of British patriotism” (Etsy, 2004, p. 90). Gillian Beer 
(1996), Julia Briggs (2006), Ashley J. Foster (2016), Nora Eisenberg (1981), Alice 
Wood (2013), and many other critics agree that, as Foster (2016) puts it, La Trobe’s 
“parodic version of England’s cultural and social history is a critique of the 
patriarchal narrative of masculine national identity” (p. 61). 
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The version of Englishness associated with Lucy and Isa, on the other hand, 
depicts history not as a sequence of great men’s lives but as time’s horizon line that 
depicts a life, or a history. As already mentioned, Cixous writes that “History [is a] 
history of phallocentrism, history of appropriation: a single history. History of an 
identity: that of man’s becoming recognised by the other (son or woman)” (1986, p. 
204). To move beyond the phallocentric history writing that focuses on the ego, the 
self, and identity, Cixous wants to create a new writing. She seeks a new mode of 
writing via écriture féminine that could write the myriad ways through which 
selfhood and subjectivity, and beyond and through that, also historical narratives are 
written. There is a body of work that reads Between the Acts in the French feminist 
tradition: for instance, Emily M. Hinnov’s (2007) reading of the discourse in the 
novel in relation to Kristeva’s semiotic ‘chora’ and Galia Benziman’s (2006) reading 
of Between the Acts as casting Miss La Trobe as the lost mother who can offer the 
nation a new way of growing up.72 Melba Cuddy-Keane (1997), Rachel Bowlby 
(1997) and Angeliki Spiropoulou (2010) have explored the re-writing of history from 
                                                             
72 Benziman (2006) has drawn attention to Miss La Trobe as a symbolic mother figure thanks to 
whom England and its inhabitants have a chance to grow up (p. 62) and create a better world. Nora 
Eisenberg in “Virginia Woolf’s Last Words on Words: Between the Acts and ‘Anon’” (1981) and 
Emily M. Hinnov in “‘Each is Part of the Whole: We Act Different Parts; But Are the Same’: From 
Fragment to Choran Community in the Late Work of Virginia Woolf” (2007) both read Between the 
Acts with Kristeva’s idea of semiotic chora; a novel full of anti-patriarchal language. Hinnov writes 
how  
Woolf draws fascism, patriarchy, and militarism together under the category of a ‘history’ 
defined as master narrative and tool of oppression whose form relies upon notions of 
progress and teleology. Her understanding of counter-history to fascism, as represented most 
explicitly in her later work through textual choran community, advocates for more personal, 
creative, and eventually communal narratives rather than authorized versions of history as 
told by fascist and/or patriarchal institutions of power (2007, p. 2). 
  
These readings perform a Lacanian and Winnicottian psychoanalytical readings, which, indeed speak 
a lot to what is happening in Between the Acts. However, I depart from these readings as I offer a 
Deleuzian, Cixousian reading that pays attention to the non-human and life as such under the concept 
of ‘femininity’. For the clarification of ‘chora’, Colebrook explains in ‘Woolf and Theory’ in Virginia 
Woolf in Context (2012) that Kristeva’s chora is “the ‘semiotic’ dimension of language: not language 
as communication or sense, but the dynamic differences of sounds that enabled a sensible, bodily, 
fluid and directly revolutionary exploration of the borders of language” (p. 66).  
Further, critics such as Jed Etsy (2004), Michele Pridmore-Brown (1998), Julia Briggs 
(2005), Melba Cuddy-Keane (1990), Karen Schneider (1989), Galia Benziman (2006), Patricia 
Kliendienst Joplin (1989), and Andrew John Miller (2001) all explore the relationship between ‘we’ 
and ‘I’, between community and individual, and between art and society. All of them argue, in their 
different ways, that Between the Acts offers a vision of collective (national) identity that is open to 
difference, as opposed to fascist communal sameness, and as John Whittier-Fergusson (2011) and 
Matthew Weber stress, her aesthetics of suspension of historical time marks her pacifism. To different 
extents these articles also tie her collective ‘we’ to her feminist resistance to a fascist ‘we’. 
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feminist perspectives, and the role of history and historiography in Woolf’s works.73 
Spiropoulou (2010) points out how  
Woolf’s modernist work proves to be not only deeply implicated in the 
historical actuality of modernity but at the same time a means of critically 
(re)doing historiography. Indeed, one of the main arguments of the book is 
that in her prose, the nature of modernity is mainly brought into relief by 
means of historiography, either through modernity’s contrast with the past or 
through a reactivation of aspects of history which in turn highlight the 
ailments, the opportunities and the emancipatory demands of the modern 
present (p. 2). 
Between the Acts (re)does historiography by highlighting the aspects of history that 
have often gone unnoticed, aspects which are often associated with femininity and 
women’s lives. What is important from the above readings in relation to Woolf’s 
engagement with history, then, is the emphasis on and inclusion of that which is 
feminine – that which affect, new materialist, and post-humanist theories include and 
work with, that which, as I explained in the introduction, makes up Cixous’s 
affective writing.74  
Although there are no binaries in the sense of what is essential to women and 
what is essential to men (Mrs Manresa is allied with Bart and Giles, and William 
Dodge is allied with Isa and Lucy) in Between the Acts, there is nevertheless a very 
clear distinction between masculinity and femininity. Isa’s poetic musings are an 
example of that femininity: 
‘Where do I wander?’ [Isa] mused. ‘Down what draughty tunnels? Where the 
eyeless wind blows? And there grows nothing for the eye. No rose. To issue 
where? In some harvestless dim field where no evening lets fall her mantle; 
nor sun rises. All’s equal there. Unblowing, ungrowing are the roses there. 
Change is not; nor the mutable and lovable; nor getting nor partings; nor 
furtive findings and feelings, where hands seeks hand and eye seeks shelter 
from the eye.’ […] ‘Where we know not, where we go not, neither know nor 
care,’ she hummed. ‘Flying, rushing through the ambient, incandescent, 
summer silent…’ […] ‘There to lose what binds us here,’ she murmured 
(Woolf, 2000, p. 93. p. 12).  
                                                             
73 See Bowlby’s Feminist Destinations and Further Essays on Virginia Woolf (1997) and Cuddy-
Keane’s ‘Virginia Woolf and the Varieties of Historicist Experience’ in Beth Carole Rosenberg and 
Jeanne Dubino’s Virginia Woolf and the Essay (1997). See also Angeliki Spiropoulou’s Virginia 
Woolf, Modernity and History: Constellations with Walter Benjamin (2010) for a thorough discussion 
of the role of history, historiography, and art in Woolf’s oeuvre. 
74 For a longer discussion of femininity, French feminism, and affective writing in Woolf’s and 
Rhys’s fiction, and why it is still relevant to stress the association of certain general human 
characteristics with femininity, see the introduction.  
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What binds us here? And where is here? Presumably, here is England, and what 
binds Isa is her marriage and her role as a wife to her brute husband, Giles, who, 
with his violence, distaste for otherness, and love for convention, represents imperial 
power, just like his father Bart. Isa’s ‘there’ comes across as an alternative to ‘here’; 
a changeless place where all is equal, free of feelings, and perhaps free of any human 
relations that tie people to one another. It is indeed tempting to imagine this place as 
what Kristeva’s semiotic chora would look like. Yet, what is important is that this 
‘there’, no matter how stagnant, to an extent, also represents common life as ‘all’ is 
equal there, and the references to wind, fields, and summer indicate that this all 
refers to life beyond the human.  
Importantly, Isa’s musings do not simply end ‘there’. Her wanderings are 
also related to a wider context, as Isa thinks of the past, and the burden it has laid on 
her in a way that offers more direct references to the relevance of remembering the 
collective past, seeing life as a common life:  
How am I burdened with what they drew from the earth; memories; 
possessions. This is the burden that the past laid on me, last little donkey in 
the long caravanserai crossing the desert. ‘Kneel down,’ said the past. ‘Fill 
your pannier from our tree. Rise up, donkey. Go your way till your heels 
blister and your hoofs crack.’ ‘That was the burden,’ she mused, ‘laid on me 
in the cradle; murmured by waves; breathed by restless elm trees; crooned by 
singing women; what we must remember; what we would forget’ (Woolf, 
2000, p. 93).  
What must we remember, what ought we forget? And who tells us that? And who are 
these ‘they’ that drew the burden from the earth, and what does Isa have to pick up 
and carry from the tree? At first glance, what she seems to remember is the 
burdensome history associated with imperialism, and the communal element of the 
past seems to be forgotten, as she is like a donkey (a domesticated animal), kneeling 
down, bearing her burden which is being a wife to a husband who represents brutal 
imperialism. It is interesting to note here that the donkey is depicted as a loyal 
serving animal in the Bible, which, accordingly, is the book that has laid a 
foundation for patriarchy, as Cixous notes in her various works, including ‘The 
Laugh of Medusa’ (1975/1976) and Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing (1993). In 
addition, the image of a tree is prevalent here as she is supposed to “fill her pannier 
from our tree” (Woolf, 2000, p. 93). Following Deleuze and Guattari, trees are 
always, in contrast to rhizomes, associated with families, which are the smallest units 
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of patriarchy, as I already demonstrated in the chapter on To the Lighthouse. Ryan 
(2013) explores grass and trees in To the Lighthouse. Following Deleuze and 
Guattari, he proposes that Woolf too depicts trees as stagnant, representing 
patriarchal values, whereas grass is rhizomatic, a possible site for change and endless 
new connections (pp. 83-89). Here, the tree and its fruit also seem to be associated 
with the burden that Isa carries as a donkey: “She had come into the stable yard 
where the dogs were chained; where the buckets stood; where the great pear tree 
spread its ladder of branches against the wall. The tree, whose roots went beneath the 
flags, was weighted with hard green pears” (Woolf, 2000, p. 93). It is when Isa looks 
at “cracked flags between beneath which the roots spread” (Woolf, 2000, p. 93) and 
touches the pear, when she feels the burden the most. The image of Isa as a donkey 
kneeling before a tree might then indicate a woman kneeling before patriarchy.  
Nevertheless, Isa chooses to stumble on, away from the tree with its roots. As 
a rebellion then, Isa also thinks, despite what the past says to her:  
On, little donkey, patiently stumble. Hear not the frantic cries of the leaders 
who in that they seek to lead desert us. Nor the chatter of china faces glazed 
and hard. Hear rather the shepherd, coughing by the farmyard wall, the 
withered tree that sighs when the Rider gallops; the brawl in the barrack 
room when they stripped her naked; or the cry which in London when I thrust 
the window open someone cries […] (Woolf, 2000, p. 94).  
Here we see how, instead of listening to the history of great men’s lives, Isa’s 
musings acknowledge the importance of listening to one another, to the daily joys 
and toils of common folk. By encouraging hearing the cough of a shepherd, the cry 
someone cried in London, and the brawl in the barrack room when a girl was gang-
raped by royal guards (an incident that happened and was reported by newspapers), 
the narrative voice encourages seeing all the sounds, including sounds of violence 
and rape, as parts of Englishness and English history. The reverend in Between the 
Acts acknowledges that even “[the idiot] too […] is part of ourselves. But not a part 
we like to recognize […]” (Woolf, 2000, p. 115). Isa’s musings then, and the novel 
as a whole, represent the kind of Englishness and historical narrative that is inclusive 
of otherness and difference. Because this inclusion is associated with femininity in 
many critical traditions, including that of French feminism, and because Woolf 
herself associates patriotism, war, and violence with patriarchy and masculinity – for 
example, in Three Guineas (1938) – it is important to emphasise that, in Between the 
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Acts, it is femininity rather than masculinity that allows us to imagine history as a 
history and Englishness as an Englishness.  
 
Affective Storytelling 
To draw this chapter to a conclusion, I want to turn to art, first on the story level by 
focusing on Miss La Trobe and her pageant, and then on Woolf’s affective language. 
Miss La Trobe’s pageant, like Woolf’s writing, can be seen as an example of écriture 
féminine, or rather, what I call affective writing, taking into consideration also 
Cixous’s more recent works in the light of contemporary theories of affect and new 
materialism. Like in To the Lighthouse, art has an important role in mediating certain 
affects and unravelling emotions in Between the Acts; like in To the Lighthouse, here 
we also have a female artist who differs from the rest of the people, herself thinking 
that “nature had somehow set her apart from her kind” (Woolf, 2000, p. 125). 
Earlier, Miss La Trobe’s ethnic origin is questioned, and she is associated with 
Russia (Woolf, 2000, p. 37), and Lily has Chinese eyes. Miss La Trobe however, is 
more mature and confident about her own talents as well as about her way of life 
than Lily was. She offers a critical version of English history to the audience, and the 
audience, through the play, has a potential to unlearn and learn, to see history 
without the army, to experience historical epochs as specific atmospheres. As 
Deleuze and Guattari, and critics working with art and affect following them, argue, 
art has the potentiality to take us out of our subjectivity. The audience in Between the 
Acts too feels, “how could one put it – a little not quite there. As if the play had 
jerked the ball out of the cup; as if what I call myself was still floating unattached, 
and didn’t settle. Not quite themselves, they felt” (Woolf, 2000, p. 90). The audience  
sat exposed […] All their nerves were on edge […]The machine ticked. 
There was no music. The horns of cars on the high road were heard. And the 
swish of trees. They were neither one thing nor the other; neither Victorians 
nor themselves. They were suspended, without being, in limbo (Woolf, 2000, 
p. 106; emphasis mine). 
Surely, Woolf quickly adds humour to it: “Or was it simply that they were clothes 
conscious?” (Woolf, 2000, p. 90). Indeed, the pageant hints that clothes from a 
different era could be all it takes to take one out of one’s subjectivity and act a 
different role. 
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However, I would also like to suggest that it really is art as such that enables 
the characters to ‘lose’ their selves. Mrs Swithin tries to tell Miss La Trobe that the 
latter has given her something she cannot exactly express in words: “She gazed at 
Miss La Trobe with a cloudless old-age stare. Their eyes met in a common effort to 
bring a common meaning to birth. They failed; and Mrs. Swithin, laying hold 
desperately of a fraction of her meaning, said: ‘What small part I’ve had to play! But 
you’ve made me feel I could have played … Cleopatra!’” (Woolf, 2000, p. 92). What 
Lucy means is that Miss La Trobe, or rather her art “stirred in [her] [her] unacted 
part” (Woolf, 2000, p. 92). And Miss La Trobe silently adds, 
‘You’ve twitched the invisible strings,’ was what the old lady meant; and 
revealed – of all people – Cleopatra! Glory possessed her. Ah, but she was 
not merely a twitcher of individual strings; she was one who seethes 
wandering bodies and floating voices in a cauldron, and makes rise up from 
its amorphous mass a re-created world. Her moment was on her – her glory 
(Woolf, 2000, p. 92).  
Besides having the ability to take people out of their daily lives and roles, Miss La 
Trobe thinks she had, with her art, a certain control over a collective impersonal 
affect.  
Accordingly, one of the central questions, articulated through Miss La Trobe, 
is the question of art in times of political upheaval, and whether art and artists can 
make any change. To be more precise, she questions whether art can change the way 
we construct collective identities, particularly that of the patriotic, patriarchal sense 
of Englishness, and whether there are links between an artist who imposes meaning 
on the audience and a political dictator. As demonstrated, different, perhaps more 
organic, forms of intimacy, albeit on a much smaller scale, go on between the acts 
between individuals such as Lucy and Dodge, Isa and Dodge, Isa and Mr Haines, 
and Mrs Manresa and Giles. The drawing together by art, by play, is thus somewhat 
artificial. This summoning positions Miss La Trobe as a dictator – people do not 
come together from their own accord but are called by the gramophone voice. 
Similarly, they are seemingly dispersed when the gramophone voice says so. Rather, 
it was at the intervals that people formed voluntary attachments and the intimacies 
between individuals emerged. Or did the intimacy emerge between Lucy and Dodge, 
and Isa and Dodge, because of what they saw in the play? In a way, Miss La Trobe 
shows the complexity of this: her power indeed has fascist leanings – she summons 
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and disperses people, and yet, she does give people the ability to think beyond their 
personal lives and identities without imposing any single meaning on them, or telling 
them who they are and what their roles are.  
It is how, then, Miss La Trobe draws her audiences together – by 
emphasising that which is ordinary, daily, and shared between ‘common’ people, in 
short, is also that which is considered feminine in the Western patriarchal societies. 
Unlike a fascist dictator, Miss La Trobe conjures a communal intimacy based on 
difference and multiplicity, including village idiots, people with a foreign 
background and queer identity like herself, and the non-human world. Woolf too in 
her writing emphasises the same thing through Isa’s reference to hearing the voice of 
the shepherd, by giving us various ordinary and strange intimacies, and by paying 
close attention to the non-human. In ‘Anon’, an essay written in 1940, Woolf writes, 
“save for Anon singing his song at the back door the English might be a dumb race, 
a race of merchants, soldiers, priests; who left behind them stone houses, cultivated 
fields and great churches, but no words” (Woolf, 1979, p. 383). It is Anon’s song 
that Woolf, and La Trobe, encourage others to hear – the song that represents 
common people and their songs of toil and joy, of love and hate. Ashley Foster 
(2016) argues that Woolf’s “writing has the power to ‘change us – not because of 
what it says or means but because of the habits of mind that it cultivates as we 
experience it’” (p. 66). In the same manner, Melba Cuddy-Keane (2016) suggests 
that Between the Acts creates “this particular kind of writing [that] for her 
[establishes] a different system of values from the mentality that leads to war”, 
instead of writing about a specific subject or creating a plot that avoids war explicitly 
(p. 66). In Between the Acts, the narrative voice muses, itself an important aspect of 
choosing no one in particular to utter this, that “it didn’t matter what the words were; 
or who sang what. Round and round they whirled, intoxicated by the music” (Woolf, 
2000, p. 58). It is a kind of language that the nursemaids use: “they were talking – 
not shaping pellets of information or handling ideas from one to another, but rolling 
words, like sweets on their tongues; which, as they thinned to transparency, gave off 
pink, green, and sweetness” (Woolf, 2000, p. 9). It is not the words forming 
informative phrases but it is what they give off: sweet, pink, green. What they 
convey is certain affects and feelings. By presenting language as affective, Woolf 
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aims to depict it as how Anon’s song for the common people, about the common 
people, would look like when it is written down. 
In this language, what matters more than the actual historical events depicted 
is the atmospheres, moods, and affects that surround and emerge from these events, 
or from which these events emerge. At some point, a narrative voice wonders in 
Between the Acts: “Did the plot matter? […] The plot was only there to beget 
emotion. There was no need to puzzle out the plot […] Don’t bother about the plot: 
the plot’s nothing” (Woolf, 2000, p. 56). What is important is not a linear historical 
narrative of England but how the stories that make up history affect what is 
perceived as Englishness; or the affect they produce and which becomes associated 
with Englishness. Then again, events, and indeed stories, produce affects, so stories 
do matter, including the story of the past, which essentially is history – a story about 
a past. But stories can be told very differently using different language, and this is 
Woolf’s aim in Between the Acts: to tell different stories, or to tell the same stories 
from new perspectives by using language in a different way, in a way that depicts 
multiple desires and intimacies, blending together colloquial gossip and poetic 
soliloquies, fact and fiction, to beget different affects and most importantly, to 
construct a different kind of history, based on a different kind of ‘we’, which 
includes village idiots, people with a ‘suspicious’ ethnic background, animals, and 
nature. This ‘we’ in Between the Acts is, through Isa’s poetic musings, a feminine, 
affective ‘we’ that includes otherness and creates a whizzing and buzzing history 
with all the tingling, tangling and vibrating intimacies and desires experienced by 
ordinary people in their daily lives. 
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Chapter Three  
Anti-Oedipal Desire in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie 
 
She walked on towards the quay, feeling serene and peaceful. Her limbs moved 
smoothly; the damp, soft air was pleasant against her face. She felt complete in 
herself, detached, independent of the rest of humanity.  
Jean Rhys, After Leaving Mr Mackenzie 
 
At the centre, both figuratively and structurally, of After Leaving Mr Mackenzie 
(1930) is the thought and image of the protagonist Julia Martin’s mother: 
Julia sat there remembering that when she was a very young child she had 
loved her mother. Her mother had been the warm centre of the world […] 
And from being the warm centre of the world her mother had gradually 
become a dark, austere, rather plump woman, who, because she was worried, 
slapped you for no reason that you knew. So that there were times when you 
were afraid of her; other times you disliked her (Rhys, 1997, pp. 106-107). 
The image of Julia’s dislikeable, not entirely human mother, as she makes noises like 
“dogs howling” and looks like a “wild animal” with “bloodshot, animal eyes” (Rhys, 
1997, pp. 97-100), informs the other themes in the novel, such as the lack of 
intimacy between women, anti-Oedipal desire, the concept of self in relation to the 
world of the non-human, and the role of art. I suggest that After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie takes the same place in Rhys’s oeuvre that To the Lighthouse (1927) does 
in Virginia Woolf’s.75 Both novels are organised into three parts, and the second part 
is a space of change or at least a potential for change. While in To the Lighthouse the 
middle part is the shortest and most empty of human presence, in Rhys’s novel the 
                                                             
75 Also, Woolf claims in her diary entries that after writing To the Lighthouse, she was able to let the 
thought of her mother go. Similarly, Rhys writes in Smile Please (1979): “Gradually I came to 
wonder about my mother less and less until at last she was almost a stranger and I stopped imagining 
what she felt or what she thought” (p. 30). Whether this is true is, of course, questionable in both 
Woolf and Rhys, but it is very possible that writing these novels functioned as a sort of aid in 
understanding the role of their mother in their own lives. 
I have chosen to read Mackenzie, not, say, Voyage in the Dark with Wide Sargasso Sea 
because Mackenzie also already portrays the attention to place and the non-human. Instead of post-
colonial elements that are normally compared to and examined when reading Voyage and Sargasso, I 
want to offer a new materialist, affective reading of Mackenzie and Sargasso to show that there is a 
variety of continuities in Rhys’s themes and styles in her late Sargasso and modernist fiction. Also, 
the focus on family allows us to put it in a very interesting dialogue with To the Lighthouse and 
Virginia Woolf. Therefore, as mentioned briefly in the introduction, although I have structured the 
thesis by authors, it can also be read by pairs of novels.  
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second part most thoroughly dissects the problems related to families, women, and 
desiring. After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, albeit in a different manner, puts forward an 
idea that is also central in To the Lighthouse: that women should not be defined by 
their ‘motherness’, ‘daughterness’, or ‘wifeness’, all majoritarian, conventional 
identity categories.76 On the contrary, Rhys suggests a woman, or any self for that 
matter, is impossible to define as a constant but is in perpetual becoming in relation 
to the world of the non-human. For these reasons, I have chosen After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie for opening the part of thesis that closely examines Rhys’s fiction in the 
light of Deleuze-inspired affect theories and new materialisms while also offering an 
interesting parallel reading to the chapter on Woolf’s To the Lighthouse. 
In this chapter, I trace intimacies other than those of familial ones, and how 
these intimacies keep people who have been pushed “outside the circle of warmth” 
(Rhys, 1997, p. 79) attached to life. To trace these intimacies, I offer a Deleuzian 
anti-Oedipal reading of After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. I begin by demonstrating that 
the seemingly dismal atmosphere of the novel is caused by the lack of intimacy 
between women. I suggest that we cannot understand Rhys’s protagonists if we try 
to understand their desire, and desire in general, in solely psychoanalytical frames, 
whether Oedipal or pre-Oedipal, as scholars like Ann B. Simpson (2005), Sylvie 
Maurel (1998), and Patricia Moran (2007) have done. Besides working with Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s texts, I use Claire Colebrook’s understanding of 
Deleuzian anti-Oedipality as a reference for explaining Rhys’s modernism in After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie to demonstrate that Rhys’s writing, like Woolf’s, is anti-
Oedipal. I then move to trace references to the animal world and the importance of 
places and things to demonstrate that in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, the world of 
the non-human explicitly gains more and more importance in the formation of selves 
in Rhys’s fiction – a notion that is also central to Wide Sargasso Sea, as the next 
chapter shows. Finally, I examine how art, and Rhys’s writing itself embodies the 
affective potential to open up alternative ways of being in the world. I offer the anti-
Oedipal, Deleuzian frame for understanding the novel to demonstrate how Rhys’s 
                                                             
76 See the Strange Intimacy section in the introduction to this thesis for a lengthier explanation of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s terms such as ‘majoritarian’ and ‘minoritarian’, and ‘molar’ and ‘molecular’ 
as well as ‘micropolitics’. In short, and relevant for this chapter, what I indicate by these terms is the 
fact that Julia cannot be understood as, and is not portrayed as fitting any of the molar or majoritarian 
identity categories such as mother, child, or sister.  
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writing as such functions as an example of Cixous’s affective writing that lets the 
other speak in the text. By doing so, I demonstrate that the absent, haunting presence 
of the dying, animal-like mother is not at the centre of the novel to teach the reader a 
moral lesson about the relevance of motherhood, but functions as a reminder that 
Julia’s mother, like Mrs Ramsay, or any other (female) figure cannot be understood 
only through identity categories such as a mother, a daughter, or a wife.  
 
The Lack of Intimacy Between Women 
From the first pages of the novel, we learn that the protagonist Julia Martin has to 
live in a cheap hotel, described as a “lowdown sort of place”, smelling of cats (Rhys, 
1930, p. 9). We also learn that she lives there because it is all she can afford on the 
‘allowance’ her ex-lover has left her after leaving her. We then learn that Julia’s 
landlady thinks Julia’s existence  
was extraordinary […] not to be believed. ‘Always alone in her bedroom. But 
it’s the life of a dog.’ Then she had decided that Julia was mad, slightly 
pricked. Then […] she had ceased to speculate and had gradually forgotten 
all about her” (Rhys, 1997, p. 11).  
Not too long afterwards, we learn that Mr Mackenzie, Julia’s latest ex-lover, 
considers her condition grim. He muses that Julia’s life was bearable only because 
she had created illusions about herself: 
As far as he could make out she had a fixed idea that her affair with him and 
her encounter with [a lawyer] Maitre Legros had been the turning-point in her 
life. They had destroyed some necessary illusion about herself which had 
enabled her to live her curious existence with a certain amount of courage 
and audacity (Rhys, 1997, p. 31).  
Even Mr Horsfield, a new lover initially interested in Julia, thinks after their first 
encounter that Julia “has a rum existence” (Rhys, 1997, p. 45), where ‘rum’ does not 
seem to indicate a good strangeness. It is no wonder then that critics, if they look at 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, look for an explanation, for a tragedy in Julia’s life that 
has caused her to live such a grim life.77 Conveniently, the reason is ready at hand in 
                                                             
77 See Patricia Moran’s Virginia Woolf, Jean Rhys, and the Aesthetics of Trauma (2007), and Ann B 
Simpson’s Territories of the Psyche: The Fiction of Jean Rhys (2005), for psychoanalytical readings. 
See Helen Carr’s Jean Rhys: Writers and their Work (2012), Sylvie Maurel’s Jean Rhys (1998) and 
Elaine Savoury’s The Cambridge Introduction to Jean Rhys (2009) for an overview of 
(psychoanalytical) criticism in Rhys’s fiction. Also, it has to be noted that After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie is one of the least explored novels in Rhys’s oeuvre, as Jason R. Marley (2017) notes. He 
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the middle of the novel where we learn that Julia’s mother has not been a ‘good’ 
mother (Rhys, 1997, pp. 106-108). The centrality of the mother-figure who failed to 
offer love and be the warm centre of the world has inspired readings – for example, 
by Ann B. Simpson (2005) and Patricia Moran (2007) – that interpret Julia’s 
inability to live a happy life and form long-lasting healthy relationships with her 
fellow humans as a direct result of Julia’s mother’s failure as a mother.  
Interestingly, all the above examples of Julia’s seemingly unpleasant life are, 
however, not given by Julia herself but by characters who encounter Julia. I therefore 
want to offer a different reading: one that sees Julia’s life not through the eyes of the 
people Julia encounters, but through the moments when Julia feels attached to life 
and does not blame her mother. Right after the landlady thinks that Julia’s life is not 
to be believed, we learn that “Julia was not altogether unhappy. Locked in her room 
– especially when she was locked in her room – she felt safe. She read most of the 
time” (Rhys, 1997, p. 11). We also know that although the hotel room is cheap, it is 
nevertheless clean and Julia likes that (Rhys, 1997, p. 9), and the effect of the 
wallpaper is “oddly enough, not sinister but cheerful and stimulating” (Rhys, 1997, 
p. 10). Towards the end of the novel, when the policeman thinks Julia is about to 
commit suicide, she tells him: “I haven’t the slightest intention of committing 
suicide, I assure you” (Rhys, 1997, p. 183). Although we cannot take Julia’s words 
for granted, I would like to take seriously the idea that she indeed has no intention to 
end her life. First, because she is a character and in this sense will live forever in the 
novel. Second, and more importantly, because, as will be demonstrated, there is a 
certain attachment to life present in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, and this attachment 
cannot be discovered if we try to understand happiness in terms of Mr Mackenzie 
and other characters who represent what Julia calls the “organized society” (Rhys, 
1997, p. 22). On the contrary, by giving us hints of moments when Julia does feel 
                                                             
writes that “seemingly lacking the complexity and depth of her later writings, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Rhys’s second novel captures so little interest. Like many of her early works, the 
novel is centred on an aging single woman who spirals into depression and poverty, yet it is not 
overtly experimental, like Good Morning, Midnight (1939), nor does it explicitly confront questions 
of race and immigration, as does Voyage in the Dark (1934). As such, critics have frequently 
dismissed the novel for its seeming simplicity, choosing instead to focus on Rhys’s other works” 
(2017, p 1). For example, he refers to Veronica Marie Gregg’s Jean Rhys’s Historical Imagination: 
Reading and Writing the Creole (1995) as dismissive of Mackenzie. Although Marley argues that the 
narrative voice of Mackenzie is unique and needs attention, he offers a reading that explores “the 
trauma of cosmopolitan life” (Marley, 2017, p. 3) for an individual’s subjectivity, following rather 
humanistic, Enlightenment ideas of what constitutes a subject and individual. For this reason, his 
work does not resonate much with mine.  
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content, such as when she takes walks, looks at streets and rivers, and self-ironically 
thinks she is quite happy when she is locked up reading (Rhys, 1997, p. 12, p. 15, p. 
11), Rhys presents a critique of what Lauren Berlant calls heteronormative ideas 
about good life and happiness; Rhys undermines the idea that a life revolving around 
marriage and reproduction will bring everyone bliss. In ‘Intimacy: A Special Issue’ 
(1998), Berlant distinguishes between major narratives of intimacy (heteronormative 
family relations) and minor narratives of intimacy (brief gestures, glances, and 
silences among people, including strangers).78 Berlant is interested in the minor 
intimacies in order to give a chance to intimacies that otherwise go unnoticed in 
capitalist and patriarchal societies. In Rhys’s novel too, we have to look at glances 
and gestures between Julia and her sister, for example, and between Julia and the 
non-human world, if we want to discover traces of intimacy and attachment to life. 
Importantly, these intimacies and attachments demonstrate a resistance to and 
criticism of patriarchy, capitalism, and heteronormative ideas about how women, or 
anyone, should live their lives. 
Despite the minor intimacies and attachments, to which I will turn shortly, the 
overall atmosphere of After Leaving Mr Mackenzie is that of lack of intimacy, 
especially between women. Women are depicted as competitors in the market with 
the ticking clock – a notion that is seen in jealousies between Norah and Julia, and 
between women on the street and on screen, and in the lack of understanding and 
communication in female relationships. Watching a film in London, Julia thinks how 
the girls were perky and pretty, but it was strange how many of the older 
women looked drab and hopeless, with timid, hunted expressions. They 
looked ashamed of themselves, as if they were begging the world in general 
not to notice that they were women or to hold it against them (Rhys, 1997, p. 
70).  
Julia is also constantly concerned about how old she looks, and whether men notice 
her age – an anxiety that has its culmination at the end of the novel in a scene when a 
young man follows Julia until he sees her face in lamplight (Rhys, 1997, p. 188). 
Rhys draws a link between women’s value in social systems at that time: when a 
woman is young and pretty she has value as she is marriageable, but when she is old, 
she should be ashamed of herself, and of the fact that she is a woman. Norah, too, 
                                                             
78 See the introduction to this thesis or Berlant’s article (1998) for a longer discussion of minor and 
major intimacies. 
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unable to fall asleep, looks into the looking-class in her nightdress, touching her lips 
and hair, smiling at her reflection, thinks how she has wasted her best years: “My 
life’s like death. It’s like being buried alive. It isn’t fair, it isn’t fair” (Rhys, 1997, p. 
103). Norah, at the age of 26, is worried about her value as a woman as time passes, 
as she knows that she will be unable to compete with others on the market sooner or 
later, as the clock ticks for her: “You’re young yet – young yet – young yet” (Rhys, 
1997, p. 139). 
Valuing women based on age and looks is directly related to women not 
being able to form intimacies with one another in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. They 
gaze at one another with envy or contempt: “The girl standing next to [Julia] in the 
lift stared at her persistently. [Julia] grew angry and thought: ‘Well, I can stare too, if 
it comes to that’” (Rhys, 1997, p. 119). Then the narrator describes the girl very 
precisely, being aware of Julia’s envy of the girl’s youth and the girl’s value in the 
eyes of “some male fool-counterpart with round eyes and a little button mouth” 
(Rhys, 1997, p. 120). Here we see how the obsession with youthful looks is related 
to how women are perceived by men – how much chance, in other words, they have 
in finding a partner and committing to heteronormative ways of life. What is more, 
women perceive one another as competitors in the fight for men who can grant them 
this heteronormative way of life.  
Not only is there lack of intimacy between strangers, but also Norah and Julia 
envy one another. Although both Norah and Julia are aware of their similarly 
entrapped situations as young women, they are incapable of doing something about 
it. Norah has been taking care of their ill, dying mother for the most of her young 
adult life. Her friends and family have congratulated her for submitting to the care-
taking role, as it is appropriate for a woman: “You’re wonderful, Norah, you’re 
wonderful. I don’t know how you do it” (Rhys, 1997, p. 104). An important thing 
that keeps Norah going is the admiration she gets from friends and family for caring 
for her mother. The narrator explains this as “the feeling that one was doing what one 
ought to do, the approval of God and man. It made you feel protected and safe, as if 
something very powerful were fighting on your side” (Rhys, 1997, p. 104). It is the 
feeling of safety and approval that comes from succumbing to heteronormative 
conventions that encourages Norah to suppress her own desire to do something else 
with her life and time, although she dreams of a different life with “some money of 
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her own [to] be able to do what she liked” (Rhys, 1997, p. 105). The approval from 
God and man, both figures who represent the organised patriarchal society, is what 
makes Julia envy Norah for her relatively secure situation as she has a house to stay 
in and good relationships with her family. Norah has the security that Julia lacks and 
now desires. Norah, on the other hand, seems to envy Julia for the freedom the latter 
has. She thinks that Julia is “better dressed” than she is (Rhys, 1997, p. 74). 
Although Norah thinks that “[Julia] doesn’t even look like a lady now” (Rhys, 1997, 
p. 73) and “it seemed to her that in the last three years her sister had indisputably 
changed for worse” (Rhys, 1997, p. 73), there is nevertheless a certain regret 
expressed on Norah’s part that she, out of the two sisters, has been the one who has 
had to take care of their dying mother while Julia has been living as she pleases.  
Interestingly, Norah’s contempt and rebellion for her own situation are 
aroused in her after Julia’s return: “It was as if meeting Julia has aroused some spirit 
of rebellion to tear her to bits” (Rhys, 1997, p. 106). The sight of her sister makes 
Norah feel alive: “[Norah] hated [Julia], but she felt more alive when her sister was 
with her” (Rhys, 1997, p. 106). Both Norah and Julia become more aware of their 
own entrapped situations when they see each other’s lives, but they fail to 
communicate their problems to one another, or possibly not even to themselves, as 
we learn that  
[e]verything about [Norah] betrayed the woman who has been brought up to 
certain tastes, then left without the money to gratify them; trained to certain 
opinions which forbid her even the relief of rebellion against her lot; yet 
holding desperately to both her tastes and her opinions (Rhys, 1997, p. 74). 
This passage clearly demonstrates how women are trapped in the system they have 
been raised to admire. What unites them is the fact that both of them are stuck in 
societal conventions that proscribe them as young women. Because of their 
jealousies and anger, they are unable to come together to fight the oppression. As 
both sisters have not been able to pursue their dreams and desires, intimacy cannot 
really develop between them because they see each other as reasons for their own 
misfortunes.  
Not only are there societal expectations that women have to live up to on the 
story level, but critics also often reproduce the idea that characters should indeed in 
the story conform to the societal expectations if they want to find happiness. When 
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Julia and Norah might blame one another, and, as mentioned, critics sometimes 
blame their mother. For instance, there is a passage in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie 
when Julia thinks of her childhood, and her childhood happiness (Rhys, 1997, pp. 
157-162). When thinking of her childhood, Julia describes how she felt safe in the 
shadows, but was “afraid in the sun” (Rhys, 1997, p. 160). Simpson (2005) reads the 
image of sunlight, and Julia’s fear of it, as a metaphoric reminder of the warm centre 
of the world that had been Julia’s mother (p. 56). Simpson (2005) explains that the 
light became “harsh and menacing, as the mother’s dominance [gave] way to the 
uncle’s and the ‘huge’ thing stalking young Julia is the predatory, sexually intent 
male” (p. 56). In other words, Simpson indicates that there is a connection between 
Julia’s mother neglecting her child, and the fact that Julia might have fallen prey to 
sexual abuse, and that this connection is hinted at by a sunlight that is harsh and 
menacing.79 This passage, however, with the light and shadow, can also be read 
when considering the role of light and shadow in the Hegelian binaries, where the 
sun, and hence the sunlight, is associated with masculinity, the sun being the ultimate 
symbol of masculine subjectivity, as Jane Goldman (1998) points out, following the 
Cixousian binaries that I also explained in the introduction.80 Perhaps the light is not 
just menacing because the mother as such is no longer the warm centre of the world, 
radiating protective light, but because femininity, and feminine guidance and 
companionship are lacking and suppressed by patriarchal conventions. It is therefore 
not only the mother as a biological mother who is absent, but femininity, and the 
freedom to follow female desire and establish intimacy between women that is 
absent yet hauntingly present in After Leaving Mr MacKenzie.81  
The desire for intimacy between women is always present in Rhys’s fiction, 
where women do reach out for one another, although sometimes in odd ways and 
                                                             
79 See Ann B. Simpson (2005) and Patricia Moran (2007) to further explore the readings of trauma in 
Rhys’s childhood, and especially the case about her family friend molesting her in the Botanic 
Gardens in Dominica.  
80 See the introduction for a lengthier discussion of the role of that which is female in both society and 
writing, and how Cixous encourages writers to embrace that which is feminine (feelings, bodies, 
materiality, emotions, not knowing the other).  
81 I use also the term feminine desire following my discussion in the introduction and other chapters 
to indicate that an alternative to the patriarchal and capitalist system is, in the theories I use, and in the 
fiction of Rhys and Woolf, associated with femininity. Femininity is also primarily ascribed to female 
characters, but both writers also demonstrate that a strict gender binary does not manifest itself in 
sexes, but applying it to femininity and masculinity is ‘present’ to different extents in all characters. In 
other words, acknowledging and embracing women’s desire is one way of challenging the system, but 
another is embracing femininity.  
  
142 
 
places. For instance, Norah has hired a woman named Wyatt to help her, and Julia 
looks for intimacy with a “slim, nice-breasted woman” in a bar in Paris, wanting to 
tell her all about why she (Julia) “felt unhappy” (Rhys, 1997, p. 184) as well as the 
story of her life, just like she wanted to tell this to a woman who painted her (Rhys, 
1997, p. 51). We find those moments of strange intimacy, or the desire for that 
intimacy also elsewhere in Rhys’s fiction; in Good Morning Midnight, Sasha likes 
Lisa, with whom she laughs and cries, and Christophine and Antoinette are perhaps 
the only pair in the entirety of Rhys’s oeuvre that demonstrate a long lasting bond 
that transcends age, race and class. In After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, intimacy 
between women is also found in glances and gestures between Norah and Julia – 
glances and gestures that linger but have no life, as Berlant puts it.  
One of those strange moments of intimacy occurs when both Julia and Norah 
seek companionship in one another. When they meet again for the first time in three 
years, Julia  
made an awkward gesture. Her eagerness made her awkward. She had been 
longing for some show of affection […] she wanted to say: do you remember 
the day I took off my shoes and stockings when we were paddling and carried 
you because the pebbles hurt your feet? Well, I’ve never forgotten that day 
(Rhys, 1997, p. 73).  
She helped her sister when she was in need, even if this was a minor need like 
crossing pebbles. Between Norah and Julia, it is the bodily presence that gives hints 
of intimacy – them being in the same room, and Julia indicating with a hand to move 
closer: “Julia said: ‘That chair’s awfully uncomfortable. Won’t you sit on the bed 
near me, and let’s talk?’ She made an awkward gesture” (Rhys, 1997, p. 73; 
emphasis mine). Even though this moment does not lead to the grand narrative of 
intimacy – quite the opposite, the sisters drift apart – it is still a moment, a gesture of 
intimacy that, by its telling, leaves a trace. After the fight between Norah and Julia, 
at their mother’s funeral, Julia is unwilling to leave on her own accord and Miss 
Wyatt has to give “her a slight push” (Rhys, 1997, p. 138) to get her out of the house. 
On the one hand, we see how a third party, also a woman, instead of reconciling the 
sisters, quite literally pushes them away from one another. But on the other hand, we 
see the remainder of intimacy in both sisters, as Norah too, “in a hysterical voice”, 
says that “we can’t send [Julia] away like that. I don’t believe she’s got any money” 
(Rhys, 1997, p. 138). Although it is seemingly Julia’s financial situation that Norah 
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worries about, it is clearly also more than that, as already at their first meeting, Julia 
states: “Oh, God!...But it wasn’t money I wanted” (Rhys, 1997, p. 75). It is not 
money Julia wants or Norah desires to give – it is a female bond they seek to 
establish, and through that, another way of being in the world. 
There is another intimate moment between Julia and Norah in a passage with 
a reference to a cart-horse. When Norah and Julia meet for the second time, there is a 
moment of relief and silence between them, followed by a half-laugh, when they 
realise that neither of them has really done well in the eyes of the other, or rather, 
that the world is not a world that is kind to women (Rhys, 1997, p. 100). When 
Norah tells Julia about how their mother called Norah Dobbin, a name of an old cart-
horse that the family used to have in Norah and Julia’s childhood, they both laugh 
hysterically, because Norah was able to relate to the old cart-horse who worked 
himself to death (Rhys, 1997, p. 101). Here, both sisters realise how unfair life is 
towards women; how the world for women might indeed look like the world looks 
for an old, over-worked cart-horse. Before leaving her sister, Julia “stopped because 
she was unable to put her emotion into words. At that moment her sister seemed to 
her like a character in a tremendous tragedy moving, dark, tranquil, and beautiful, 
across a background of yellowish snow” (Rhys, 1997, pp. 101-102). Although it is 
their childhood memory and a reference to the past that unites them, the sight of 
Norah as a stranger moving in a tragedy is also what binds them together – Julia sees 
Norah as simply another woman suffering who has not been able to live her life 
freely.  
Instead of Julia seeing Norah as her sister, with all the family history, seeing 
her as a stranger who shares time, space, and perhaps also misery with her could 
establish a connection between the two women.82 Here we see the complex interplay 
                                                             
82 This novel too, then, presents ethics in Levinasian sense. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes 
that “the Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign” (1961, p. 195), or at least, it should 
remain so for ethical interactions. It is this radical otherness that resists ‘killing’ the other, as Levinas 
writes that “there is here a relation […] with something absolutely other: the resistance of what has no 
resistance – the ethical resistance” (1961, p. 199). Jessica Berman (2004) further explains that 
“Levinas’s ethical thought rests upon the stark division within the moment of ethical awareness 
between the self and the face of the other—startling in its otherness, compelling in its demands upon 
the self. His writing insists upon the other as “infinitely foreign” (Levinas, 1961, p. 194, qtd. in 
Berman, 2004, p. 155). Berman, following others working within feminist ethics, offers a reading that 
also allows us to see relations between lovers and family members as ethical, something which 
Levinas does not. When I have demonstrated in the previous chapters in this thesis that in Woolf’s 
fiction ethical relations are possible between people who are intimate also in conventional terms, then 
in Rhys’s fiction, intimacy more likely requires radical otherness in the Levinasian sense. See the 
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between intimacy and radical otherness within family members that I have already 
addressed in the previous chapters. It does not mean that Norah is not Julia’s sister, 
rather, she is not simply her sister. This is why the intimacy is strange – her sister is 
also a stranger. The encounter with her sister, although it does not lead to a 
reconciliation, gives Julia some willingness to live, as she “had lost the indifference 
to her fate, which in Paris had sustained her for so long. She knew herself ready to 
struggle and twist and turn” (Rhys, 1997, p. 77). However, she is not ready to 
struggle because she feels longing for her family, but because some part of her 
senses that she and Norah suffer in the same way. Seeing Norah as another woman 
creates a strange sense of intimacy between them. The moments between Julia and 
her sister, although just moments, have already left a trace of alternative ways of 
living and creating intimacy. These moments are not dependent on Julia and Norah 
recognising a familial relation between one another but rather an acknowledgement 
of sharing the same time, space, and oppressed condition. We can only see this when 
we look at the small glances and exchanges, and the physical sensations and 
emotional responses they trigger in and between the characters. 
 
Anti-Oedipal Desires 
These moments are also moments when we see traces of repressed desire in women, 
a desire that is anti-Oedipal.83 Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1970) that Freud’s greatness 
lies in having determined the essence or nature of desire, no longer in relation 
to objects, aims, or even sources (territories), but as an abstract subjective 
essence – libido or sexuality. But he still relates this essence to the family as 
the last territoriality of private man – whence the position of Oedipus, 
marginal at first in the Three Essays, then centering more and more around 
desire…at least it won’t go further than the family! (1988, p. 270). 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie can be seen as a critique of Oedipal narratives and 
Freudian psychoanalysis as it radically challenges how Freud perceives desire, 
                                                             
introduction to this thesis for a longer discussion about radical Otherness and its relevance to strange 
intimacy.  
83 By anti-Oedipal I mean that, as Colebrook puts it “language is not the way in which speakers are 
subjected to signifiers, beyond which they cannot think. Rather, in the beginning are perceptions from 
which subject positions are formed, but which are not yet privatized. There is a perception of ‘x’, and 
it is from that perception or affection that there emerged something like a subject who speaks” (2012, 
p. 73). Although Colebrook refers to Woolf’s modernism as anti-Oedipal, Rhys’s is also explicitly so.  
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especially desire in women. The novel demonstrates how the idea that desire is 
always a desire for a family member or a desire to be a family member is a direct 
reason why there is sometimes no intimacy between women. As partly already 
demonstrated above, it does so by first showing the reader how little intimacy there 
is between women if society tells them to identify themselves and one another within 
the narrow categories of a daughter, a mother, and a wife, the latter two largely 
dependent on whether they have good enough looks to become wives and then 
mothers. Ann B. Simpson (2005) suggests that the narrative focus on the mother-
daughter dyad in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie’s indicates Rhys’s refusal to write 
about “conventional and male-inscribed claims about the appropriate contents for 
aesthetic discourse: traditionally masculinized renditions of Oedipal conflict” (p. 64). 
Rhys’s refusal to write in masculinised renditions of Oedipal conflict often means for 
critics that Rhys’s fiction is read in pre-Oedipal terms. Indeed, her aesthetics are 
tempting to read as a discourse on the pre-Oedipal which reflect “the blurriness 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Simpson, 2005, p. 10).  
Yet, the pre-Oedipal already predicts the Oedipal; it entails that there will be 
Oedipal relations. But After Leaving Mr Mackenzie cannot be understood in either 
pre-Oedipal or Oedipal structures, as the pre- already assumes that there will also 
have to be the Oedipal phase.84 Norah says to Julia: “The fact is […] that there is 
something wrong with our family. We’re soft, or lazy, or something” (Rhys, 1997, p. 
102). Although this can be seen as a failure to conform to Oedipal models and the 
characters’ anguish about this failure, the phrase might also indicate that the 
members of their family simply cannot be understood in Oedipal terms. Turning 
                                                             
84 After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, like many other Rhys’s novels, has prompted many readings, which 
examine the mother from a psychoanalytical point of view, seeing her as a primary object of 
identification and the primary lost object that triggers much of the later trauma in Rhys’s fiction. In 
Territories of the Psyche (2005), Anne B. Simpson reads Rhys’s fiction, including After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie, through Kleinian psychoanalysis, focusing on the mother-daughter dyad and pre-Oedipal 
subject-formation. Although Simpson provides many useful insights into Rhys’s works and criticises 
Freudian psychoanalysis and egalitarian feminism, her work nevertheless tries to understand Rhys’s 
work in psychoanalytical, (pre-) Oedipal terms. Other predominantly psychoanalytical criticism 
include Sylvie Maurel’s, Women Writers: Jean Rhys (1998). 
Helen Carr’s Jean Rhys (1996, 2012) gives an overview of different issues in Rhys but the 
psychoanalytical tone remains underlying.  Also, Patricia Moran’s relatively recent work on Virginia 
Woolf, Jean Rhys, and the Aesthetics of Trauma (2007) offers a comprehensive overview of the role 
childhood abuse played in Rhys’s and Woolf’s aesthetics.  
For a thorough overview on different strands of criticism on Rhys’s fiction see Elaine 
Savory’s Jean Rhys (1998) and in The Cambridge Introduction to Jean Rhys (2009). Savoury offers a 
nuanced overview of various kinds of criticisms (post-colonial, race studies, feminist criticism, 
psychoanalytical).  
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from Oedipal and pre-Oedipal interpretations to an alternative, non-Freudian 
understanding of the formation of the self and the self’s intimacy with others is 
important because, among other things, it allows us to see the different routes desire 
can take. Accordingly, seeing women’s desire as more complex than a desire to be a 
wife and a mother enables us to move away from seeing mothers as what Griselda 
Pollock (2009) calls “ready-made mother monsters” (p. 3). In After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie, we have a ready-made mother monster, who is both central and absent, 
who on the one hand is seen as a missing mother-figure, and on the other hand her 
absence is what makes her so present. Delia Caprasso Konzett (2002) suggests that 
“there is no Oedipal fantasy, the father dream is left behind in Good Morning, 
Midnight [but] in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, [Rhys] still tackles with it fruitlessly” 
(p. 160). I would not say that Rhys tackles the Oedipal fantasy fruitlessly but rather 
that her critics have tried to tackle it, because After Leaving Mr Mackenzie is the 
novel that most obviously demonstrates how reductive it is to try to understand 
Rhys’s characters only in terms of successful or unsuccessful completion of the 
Oedipal phase.85 
For this reason, I read the novel with Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘becoming-
woman’ and ‘becoming-animal’ and examine the concept of desire in these 
becomings. Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plateaus about the restrictive 
way in which desire is understood in Freudian psychoanalysis, and how seeing desire 
in Freudian, Oedipal terms is directly related to keeping the established, capitalist 
and patriarchal social order intact: 
it is a desire for the mother and for the death of the father […] only because it 
is repressed, it takes a mask on under the reign of the repression that models 
the mask for it and plasters it on its face […] the real danger is elsewhere. If 
desire is repressed, it is because every position of desire, no matter how 
small, is capable of calling into question the established order of a society: 
not that desire is asocial; on the contrary. But it is explosive; there is no 
desiring-machine capable of being assembled without demolishing entire 
social sectors (2004, p. xxiii).  
If we approach desire from the same view, we can trace or at least imagine the paths 
women’s desire takes in After Leaving Mr MacKenzie because desire as such is 
                                                             
85 I would, however, also not say that critics have tackled it fruitlessly because psychoanalytical 
insights still offer significant understanding about trauma, memory, and women’s roles in Rhys’s 
work. The more materialist and affected-oriented interpretations today would not be possible without 
the earlier work done by critics who engaged with psychoanalytical interpretations.  
  
147 
 
productive and has the possibility to shape the world and challenge the established 
order of society, which, in Rhys’s fictional worlds, is patriarchal and capitalist. 
Desire in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie would allow the characters to establish 
intimacy and companionship between women, as this could alter the patriarchal 
power relation where women are always subjugated to men and depicted as 
competitors against one another. In other words, any desire that is outside the 
familial relations is also repressed in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie because it 
threatens the social order.   
In the above quotation, Deleuze and Guattari write that “if desire is repressed, 
it is because every position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into 
question the established order of a society” (2004, p. xxiii). The idea that a desire can 
undermine the order of society resonates with Rhys’s writing in After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie. Julia’s desire, which is “like iron” (Rhys, 1997, p. 51), indicating the 
materiality of, as well as strength of desire, has the capacity to challenge the existing 
social norms where seemingly only boys have desire. Early in the novel, after Mr 
Mackenzie stops Julia’s monthly allowance, she follows him to a restaurant, and 
sitting opposite him, despising him, she thinks, “[t]ogether [Mr Mackenzie and his 
lawyer] perfectly represented organized society, in which she had no place and 
against which she had not a dog’s chance” (Rhys, 1997, p. 22). Against Mr 
Mackenzie and his lawyer, who represent the organized society and what Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to as ‘majority’, Julia stands like the ‘minority’. In A Thousand 
Plateaus they write, 
The notion of minority is very complex, with musical, literary, linguistic, as 
well as juridical and political, references. The opposition between minority 
and majority is not simply quantitative. Majority implies a constant, of 
expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it. 
Let us suppose that the constant or standard is the average adult-white-
heterosexual-European-male-speaking a standard language […] It is obvious 
that “man” holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes, 
children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc. […] Majority assumes 
a state of power and domination, not the other way around. That is why we 
must distinguish between: the majoritarian as a constant and homogeneous 
system; minorities as subsystems; and the minoritarian as a potential, creative 
and created, becoming (2004, p. 196). 
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Rhys’s protagonists, who are all women, stand against and outside the society which 
they try to fit into without really desiring to fit in.86 Her protagonists represent the 
minority who struggle against majoritarian characters, such as Mr Mackenzie, Uncle 
Griffiths and Mr James – all white, heterosexual European male adults. Uncle 
Griffiths, for instance, is described as “solid and powerful”, and Julia feels “a great 
desire to please him” (Rhys, 1997, p. 81). When Julia is back in London, short of 
money, and goes to her Uncle Griffiths, the latter refuses to give her anything 
beyond one pound because “[Julia] always insisted on going [her] own way. Nobody 
interfered with [her] or expressed any opinion on what [she] did” (Rhys, 1997, p. 
84). He refers to the fact that Julia is “outside the circle of warmth” (Rhys, 1997, p. 
79), that she does not belong to society, to the majority. Uncle Griffiths says to Julia, 
“[y]ou deserted your family” (Rhys, 1997, p. 84), indicating that Julia made the 
choice to live a life that does not conform to the standards that would give her access 
to money and power. In other words, it is impossible to please Uncle Griffiths, the 
representation of the majority, without conforming to the standards of majority, 
which Julia does not do.  
We may ask then, why did Julia want to go her own way, and how is going 
her own way any resistance to the society that Uncle Griffiths and other male figures 
represent? Although there are not many instances in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, or 
in Rhys’s fiction in general, where we can see female desire, there are still some 
moments, including the one where Julia narrates the story of her life to a woman 
named Ruth who paints her portrait. These instances give us hints why Julia might 
have wanted to go away. Although the reader knows from the story that Julia asked a 
question about understanding her desire to get away from Ruth directly, we also 
know that by retelling the story, she asks this again from Mr Horsfield. By repetition, 
the narrative voice addresses the following question seemingly to no one in 
particular, so also to everyone, therefore rendering it important for everyone to 
consider it:  
I wanted to go away with just the same feeling a boy has when he wants to 
run away to sea – at least, that I imagine a boy has […] You understand, 
                                                             
86 Antoinette tries to make her marriage with her English husband work, Sasha tries to find work in 
various posts, Marya tries to fit into a society she enters via a couple who ‘help’ her while her 
husband is in jail, and Anna tries to make England her home. 
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don’t you? Do you understand that a girl might have that feeling? I wanted to 
get away. I wanted it like – like iron” (Rhys, 1997, p. 51).  
The above quotation is central to understanding the desire to escape not just 
elsewhere, to the sea, or to another country, but rather as a general desire to escape 
the patriarchal and capitalist system. Ironically, Julia knew her only way to follow 
her desire was, in a way, repressing that desire – she had to marry. She explains, 
“[s]o I did get away. I married to get away” (Rhys, 1997, p. 52). Right after Julia 
admits that she did get away, the narration goes no further in terms of what happened 
when she got away. This passage demonstrates that there is a strong desire present in 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie that is anti-Oedipal, but it has no life, because social 
conventions expect women to conform to their roles as wives and mothers, or carers, 
as Norah does. Regardless, even if this desire does not develop into a major plotline, 
the traces of it undermine the power and authority of characters like Uncle Griffiths.
   
Although it is indeed women who suffer the most in the ‘organized society’ 
that is designed to favour white adult men, it is important to emphasise here that 
Rhys does not offer us a simple binary of oppression and power where women are 
subjugated to men. Rather, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, the 
novels examined in this thesis engage with the issue of undervaluing that which we 
consider feminine in Western cultures. Accordingly, it is insightful to consider 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept ‘becoming-woman’. They write that  
[w]omen, regardless of their numbers, are a minority, definable as a state or 
subset; but they create only by making possible a becoming over which they 
do not have ownership, into which they themselves must enter; this is a 
becoming-woman affecting all of humankind, men and women both (2004, p. 
233).  
Claire Colebrook in ‘Woolf and “theory”’ (2012) further explains that ‘becoming-
woman’ “is the key to all becomings precisely because man has been a definitive 
figure in the concept of the subject: man is that being who must present, know and 
master a world that is always given to him as so much objective reality” (p. 75). In 
the same way, Julia is a woman, representing a minority and becoming-woman 
because the men, as demonstrated in the characters of Mackenzie, Griffiths, and 
James, largely already represent being that is defined by and confined to patriarchal 
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and capitalist terms, whereas in Julia we see a desire to struggle and get away from 
it.  
However, the youthful poems Mackenzie wrote, Julia’s uncle’s second 
impulsive marriage, and James’s love for his collection of paintings all indicate a 
possibility of becoming-woman in them. For example, Mr Mackenzie, whom we 
already know represents the organised society,  
had discovered that people who allow themselves to be blown about by the 
winds of emotion and impulse are always unhappy people, and in self-
defence he had adopted a certain mental attitude, a certain code or morals and 
manners, from which he seldom departed (Rhys, 1997, p. 24).  
Yet, we learn that he does depart from these morals when he is sure no one finds out; 
his behaviour is still haunted by the side of him that made him write “youthful 
poems” (Rhys, 1997, p. 24). In the same way, Julia’s uncle’s one instinctive decision 
was marrying his second wife, and it was a decision he never regretted (Rhys, 1997, 
p. 81), and Mr James’s usual confidence is shaken in the presence of the artwork he 
has collected (Rhys, 1997, pp. 111-115). Within these moments, the otherwise 
majoritarian characters start to question the legitimacy of their own power and 
influence – they seem to move away from their identity as the already defined figure 
of ‘man’ toward a becoming-woman. In other words, there are traces of becoming-
woman present also in male characters, and it seems that encountering Julia triggers 
this becoming, even if only shortly. When Julia is in a car, going to her mother’s 
funeral, her uncle thinks “how he disliked that woman and her expression, and her 
eyes, which said: ‘Oh, for God’s sake, leave me alone. I’m not troubling you; you’ve 
no right to trouble me. I’ve as much right as you to live, haven’t I?’” (Rhys, 1997, p. 
129). It is important that the narrative voice designates the thought that Julia has a 
right to live to Uncle Griffiths, not to Julia, although Uncle Griffiths thinks Julia is 
the one thinking so. In other words, Julia does make Uncle Griffiths question 
whether his way of living is the only right way of living. What is at stake in 
becoming-woman is a creation of selves and subjects who are not defined in Oedipal 
terms, and what is at stake in Julia’s struggle to sustain her right to live is affirming 
her, a woman’s, a minoritarian figure’s desire. Colebrook (2012) writes that  
becoming-woman allows moving beyond heteronormative subjectivity […] 
the becoming of becoming-woman is a non-subjective, aesthetic, and sexual 
mode of becoming: non-subjective, because there is not a self who becomes 
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so much as a movement from which self-hood emerges as relatively stable, 
but always in relation to what is perceived (aesthetic) and to which one is 
drawn (sexual) (pp. 74-76). 
Julia is the embodiment of becoming-woman as her self is not a self that is fixed in a 
certain Oedipal category but a self that is in constant relation to the non-human 
environment she inhabits and people she encounters, as I will demonstrate shortly in 
the next section. She is constantly desiring things and life outside Oedipal relations, 
and she also triggers that desire in other characters.  
 
More-Than-Human Selves 
Colebrook (2012) says of Woolf that “at the most general level, Woolf’s writing 
described the ways in which selves […] are nothing more than the sounds, surfaces, 
lights, and bodies they perceive” (p. 73). The same can be said of Rhys. To 
understand that, focusing on how Rhys describes the non-human environment in her 
fiction is crucial. Recent criticism on Rhys looks at the non-human world and the 
importance of affects and emotions and explores how this invites a new 
understanding about how Rhys’s characters’ selves are formed in After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie.87 The most relevant of these for my work is a Deleuzian reading by Erica 
L. Johnson (2015). Johnson succinctly points out the shortcomings of criticism that 
try to understand human relations in terms of sex, money, and power in After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie. Johnson (2015) writes that  
[a]ttempts to sort these relations into the narratives of will and agency that 
rely on the notion that individuals either do or do not possess such properties, 
stop short of understanding Rhys’s larger portrait of how such affective 
attachments build upon and produce a model of subjectivity in which her 
heroines are enmeshed within the world in which they dwell, and amongst 
the subjects and objects alike of which that world is made (p. 214).  
                                                             
87 Such criticism includes a monograph, Jean Rhys: Twenty-First-Century Approaches (2015) edited 
by Erica L. Johnson and Patricia Moran, and various articles such as Aberheen Hai’s ‘“There is 
always the other side, always”: Black Servants’ Laughter, Knowledge, and Power in Jean Rhys’s 
Wide Sargasso Sea’ (2015), Rebecca Colesworthy’s ‘Jean Rhys and the Fiction of Failed Reciprocity’ 
(2014), Erica L. Johnson’s ‘Haunted: Affective Memory in Jean Rhys’s Good Morning, Midnight’ 
(2014), Octavio R. Gonzales ‘The Narrative Mood of Jean Rhys’s Quartet’ (2014?), Delia Caprasso 
Konzett’s ‘White Mythologies: Jean Rhys’s Aesthetics of Posthumanism’ (2002), Betsy Berry’s 
‘Between Dog and Wolf: Jean Rhys’s Version of Naturalism in “After Leaving Mr Mackenzie”’ 
(1995), and Panayiota Chrysochou’s ‘In-Between States: Twilight Horror in Jean Rhys’s After 
Leaving Mr. Mackenzie and Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood’ (2011). 
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Although Colebrook refers to selves as combinations of non-human perceptions, 
Johnson also indicates that subjectivity too is influenced by this contact and 
becoming with the non-human. I agree with Johnson that to understand Rhys’s sense 
of self, and subjectivity, we need to examine how her characters are constantly made 
and remade by the non-human world they inhabit.  
If the self is not merely made up by interaction with the mother and other 
family members, it is made up of thousands of other points of (intimate) contact with 
the world at various points in time. In fact, Rhys seems to associate, like Deleuze and 
Guattari, the power to affect and be affected with something other than human. The 
chapters in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, including ‘Norah’, ‘Uncle Griffiths’, ‘Mr 
James’, ‘Acton’, and ‘Notting Hill’, are not merely about Norah, Uncle Griffiths, or 
Mr James, or those parts of London. Instead, they are as much about Julia as they are 
about other characters or places. Julia’s self is laid out between them and made and 
remade in the encounters with the people she meets, places she visits and 
environment she encounters. Naming chapters after places, people, and sometimes 
abstract concepts is possibly a technique to demonstrate that human selves and 
subjectivities are formed in relation to places, and in encounters with the world of 
non-human and the environment in as much as subjectivities are formed in relation 
to other humans, particularly one’s family members.  
Rhys’s references to physical places and animals in After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie give us the idea that desire, especially desire in women, is something 
varied, affirmative, and world-making, and that it is the repression of this desire that 
undermines Rhys’s protagonists’, including Julia’s, attachment to life and love for 
life. Colebrook (2012) writes that, “desire is not some human set of embodied 
interests that must be repressed or articulated through language; desire is the 
multiplicity of forces of life as such, which is diminished and impoverished when 
represented as human” (p. 67). As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, other 
characters perceive Julia’s life as not worth living because they are unable to 
imagine that there is more than one way of being happy, or finding joy in life. Julia, 
however, has her own way of wanting to live. Her attachment to life becomes clear 
in the way Julia feels about places, streets, rivers, and the atmosphere these non-
human elements create. 
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Already at the beginning of After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, Julia muses that “it 
was always places that she thought of, not people” (Rhys, 1997, p. 10). For instance, 
Julia loves the Seine at night; she  
looked out of the window at the bookstalls on the quay. And beyond the 
bookstalls was the Seine, brown-green and sullen. When a river-boat passed, 
it would foam and churn up for a while. Then, almost at once, it was again 
calm and sluggish (Rhys, 1997, p. 15).  
She thinks, lying in bed,  
of the dark shadows of houses in a street white with sunshine; or of trees with 
slender black branches and young green leaves, like the trees of a London 
square in spring; or of a dark-purple sea, the sea of a chromo or of some 
tropical country that she had never seen (Rhys, 1997, p. 12).  
And she walks the quiet streets of the city “feeling serene and peaceful. Her limbs 
moved smoothly; the damp, soft air was pleasant against her face. She felt complete 
in herself, detached, independent of the rest of humanity” (Rhys, 1997, p. 17). Much 
later in the novel, already in London, on the way to her mother’s funeral, Julia 
thinks, “it was a mild day. The sky was the rare, hazy, and tender blue of the London 
sky in spring. There was such sweetness in the air that it benumbed you” (Rhys, 
1997, p. 130). After her mother’s funeral, we get the description of “[t]he French 
window into the little garden was open. The room was full of sunlight subdued to a 
grey glare and then suddenly of shadows. ‘Life is sweet and truly a pleasant thing.’” 
(Rhys, 1997, p. 132). The tone in these passages is very different from the tone the 
narrator has when describing most of the human encounters in the novel; here we see 
detailed attention to colours, the quality of air, and the movement of the protagonist’s 
body that seems to blend into the environment. There is no anxiety in these passages 
as there often is when Julia encounters humans. In other words, the human world in 
general diminishes and represses Julia’s desire to live, which is not a set of embodied 
interests but rather, as Colebrook (2012) writes, “the multiplicity of forces of life as 
such” (p. 67).  
Within the moments when Julia is absorbed by her external environment, she 
seems to be content and to be detached from humanity also in a sense that she does 
not have to worry about her particular individual life and the things she should be 
and do as a woman. To put it differently, at her moments of ease, Julia can be seen as 
what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as ‘haecceity’. Or, Julia is the moments she feels 
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the air, and experiences sensations and impressions from the external world as when 
she walks down the quay and lies thinking of shadows of houses and the way lights 
falls on trees. Deleuze and Guattari write that  
there is a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, subject, 
thing, or substance. We reserve the name haecceity for it. A season, a winter, 
a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even 
though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject […] you 
will yield nothing to haecceities unless you realize that that is what you are, 
and that you are nothing but that […] You are longitude and latitude, a set of 
speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified 
affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life 
(regardless of its duration)—a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack 
(regardless of its regularity). Or at least you can have it, you can reach it. It 
should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a decor or backdrop 
that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the 
ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a 
haecceity; it is this assemblage that is defined by a longitude and a latitude, 
by speeds and affects (2004, pp. 261-262; emphasis mine). 
Julia, feeling the soft air against her face, seeing the sky of London, and imagining 
the shadows of houses also seems to be those sights, impressions, sensations, and 
thoughts. Julia too is in an assemblage with her non-human environment, which is 
not simply a backdrop to her as a self. She, as a self, is formed by the impressions 
and sensation the world of the non-human offers her, hence the chapters that are 
titled by places and people’s names are also what Julia is.   
Julia is also described as lacking any definite ways of identification: “Her 
career of ups and downs had rubbed most of the hall-marks off her, so that it was not 
easy to guess at her age, her nationality, or the social background to which she 
properly belonged” (Rhys, 1997, p. 14). Instead, it seems that she has been shaped 
and is shaped constantly by different places she inhabits, people she interacts with, 
clothes she wears, and impressions she receives from the external world, as 
demonstrated. There is a general vagueness about her life history if we wanted to try 
to understand it in conventional terms, beginning with where she grew up, when and 
whom she married, and what happened to her marriage. First, when Julia wants to 
tell about her life – her marriage and journey to continental Europe, and the death of 
her baby – to the painter Ruth, the latter does not believe her (Rhys, 1997, p. 54). 
Then, when retelling the story to Horsfield, the latter also thinks the story is vague 
and that talking about her life, Julia, should know that “your life is your life, and you 
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must be pretty definite about it” (Rhys, 1997, p. 50). The unreality of Julia’s life is 
expressed also on her behalf when she thinks,  
I wanted to say to Ruth: ‘Yes, of course you’re right. I never did all that. But 
who am I then? Will you tell me that? Who am I, and how did I get 
here?’[…] When I got home I pulled out all the photographs I had, and letters 
and things. And my marriage-book and my passport […] But it had all gone, 
as if it had never been” (Rhys, 1997, p. 54).  
After her attempts to recover her past and her self through narrating her story, Julia 
then decides to go back to England, to her family, to find some sort of affirmative 
identity there, without success. Rhys seems to suggest with this that selves do not 
depend on past memories as much as they do on the present moment which they 
inhabit and share with others in time and space.  
Julia’s life, in other words, cannot so much be understood as the life of an 
individual but rather as ‘a life’. Like Woolf’s writing in Between the Acts and in To 
the Lighthouse, Rhys’s fiction somewhat predicts Deleuze’s writing in ‘Immanence: 
A Life’ (1995/2002). To emphasise again a quotation that has been discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis, Deleuze writes,  
A life is everywhere […]: an immanent life carrying with it the events and 
singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects […] Between 
[a person’s] life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life 
playing with death. The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and 
yet singular life … The life of such individuality fades away in favor of the 
singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be 
mistaken for no other […] (1995, pp. 27-29).  
Julia’s feeling of unreality about her individual past supports the idea that I 
emphasise throughout this thesis – it is not small individual lives of men and women 
Woolf and Rhys engage with primarily, but a common life – a life lived in relation to 
and with the world of the non-human. Julia’s life should not be measured as a life of 
an individual, but as ‘a life’ in Deleuzian terms – not a subjective life but a singular 
life lived in relation to things, places, animals, seasons, weather, and anything a self 
encounters. When Julia is drunk and out with Mr Horsfield, she tells him that, “I hate 
people. I’m afraid of people. I never used to be like this [...]” (Rhys, 1997, p. 42). 
Rhys suggests that it is not life as such that Julia struggles with, but a life of an 
individual, expected to be lived according to patriarchal and capitalist assumptions 
about happiness in relation to other individuals. The fact that Julia says that she 
  
156 
 
“never used to be like this” (Rhys, 1997, p. 42), indicates that there has been a time 
when Julia did love life in a Deleuzian sense.  
One time when Julia was happy, as it turns out, was when she was a child. 
Chapter Twelve at the end of the second part of the novel is interestingly titled 
Childhood, beginning with sentences, “Every day is a new day. Every day you are a 
new person” (Rhys, 1997, p. 157). In this chapter, although it is only six pages long, 
Rhys spends three of these pages describing an intense happiness of Julia’s 
childhood: “You ran as if you were flying, without feeling your feet. And all the time 
you ran, you were thinking with a tight feeling in your throat: ‘I’m happy – happy – 
happy […]’” (Rhys, 1997, p. 159). It is worth noting that Julia refers to her child self 
as ‘you’, indicating that her adult self is indeed a new person who has lost the 
happiness of childhood. Like Woolf in To the Lighthouse, wherein Mrs Ramsay is 
poignantly aware that when Cam and James grow up, they will lose the happiness of 
their childhood, Rhys indicates that there is something particular in the way children 
experience life and happiness. In these three pages in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, 
life is described as a life lived in relation to everything. The only time Julia claims 
she felt like herself is in her childhood, when she was free, and felt intimate with the 
environment around her:  
When you were a child, you put your hand on the trunk of a tree and you 
were comforted, because you knew that the tree was alive – you felt its life 
when you touched it – and you knew that it was friendly to you, or, at least, 
not hostile. But of people you were always a little afraid […] When you are a 
child you are yourself and you know things prophetically. And then suddenly 
something happens and you stop being yourself; you become what others 
force you to be. You lose your wisdom and your soul (Rhys, 1997, p. 158).  
The conflict between who Julia would like to be and who society wants her to be is 
clear here – in childhood, Julia was who she herself thought she was; in adulthood, 
she has to be what society expects her to be. To put it differently, in childhood, she 
had the freedom to experience life as a relation between the human and non-human; 
in adulthood, she has to be confined to living her life as an individual, with 
expectations society has about individual lives. I will come back to childhood in the 
next chapter on Wide Sargasso Sea, which is the only novel in Rhys’s oeuvre, and 
the only novel examined in this thesis, that has a section which depicts the 
protagonists’ life in childhood. Like in this very short section about childhood in 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, Rhys’s final novel also indicates that childhood is a 
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‘place’ where the attachment to non-human life is easier and more natural to develop. 
To put it differently, Rhys seems to suggest, like Deleuze and Guattari, that children 
are more open to experiencing life as a life, and seeing themselves as part of and 
made by the non-human world they inhabit (2004, p 256).88 What is particularly 
important to emphasise in terms of After Leaving Mr Mackenzie is the fact that 
Julia’s childhood happiness has nothing to do with her mother, and everything to do 
with the world of non-human, and her being able to experience a life as desiring, and 
her self as part of it.   
 
The Importance of Animal Imagery 
In After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, references to childhood are interesting to consider 
alongside the references to animal imagery. Thus far I have pointed out the relevance 
of becoming-woman in understanding some of the issues around women, femininity, 
and desire in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. I now want to examine Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ‘becoming-animal’, as the animal references are central in Rhys’s novel. 
Betsy Berry (1995) writes that “Mackenzie contains at least fifty references to 
creatures and beasts, thirty of them specific to individual species and five of them to 
the insect and reptilian world” (p. 545). For example, Julia’s last name is Martin, 
referring to a small, blue-black-white coloured bird. Julia and other characters often 
refer to themselves and others as animals. For instance, Julia has “a dog’s chance 
against Mackenzie and his lawyer”; she is “kind of a worm” in comparison to Mr 
James; she feels stimulated and cheered by a wallpaper with “half-bird, half-lizard” 
creatures; her mother is like a “dying animal, howling like a dog”; and her sister is 
compared to a cart-horse Dobbin (Rhys, 1997, p. 22, p. 12, p. 10, p. 33, p. 100). 
Also, Mr Griffiths’ voice, when pronouncing ‘“a lady?” […] sounded alarmed and 
annoyed, as he might have said: ‘A zebra? A giraffe?’” (Rhys, 1997, p. 79).89 Rhys 
finishes the novel with the ambivalent thought that “the street was cool and full of 
grey shadows. Lights were beginning to come out in the cafes. It was the hour 
                                                             
88 I will engage Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on childhood directly in the next chapter. 
89 These are just a few examples of the many, varied references to the animal and insect worlds in 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. See Betsy Berry’s article ‘Between Dog and Wolf: Jean Rhys’s Version 
of Naturalism in “After Leaving Mr Mackenzie” (1995) for a more thorough overview of animal and 
insect references and also Panayiota Chrysochou’s In-Between States: Twilight Horror in Jean Rhys’s 
After Leaving Mr. Mackenzie and Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood (2011).  
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between dog and wolf, as they say” (Rhys, 1997, p. 191). This passage (if Woolf had 
read Rhys, of which there is no record) might have easily influenced Woolf’s ending 
of Between the Acts (1941), which also depicts a twilight hour when “the dog fox 
fights with the vixen” (Woolf, 2000, p. 129).  
 What is at stake with these animal references is a potential for change of the 
twilight moment described in the end of both Between the Acts and After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari write that becoming-
animal has nothing to do with becoming ‘real’ animals. Rather, there is a potential 
for change, for being in the world otherwise in what animals represent (2004, p. 
262). 90 Coming back to childhood and children, Deleuze and Guattari write that it 
was largely Freud’s misinterpretation of what the wolf or horse stood for in the 
stories of Little Hans. Deleuze and Guattari say that the horse stands for nothing but 
a horse and the potential it represents:  
again, we turn to children. Note how they talk about animals, and Little 
Hans’s horse is not representative but affective. It is not a member of a 
species but an element or individual in a machinic assemblage: draft horse-
omnibus-street. It is defined by a list of active and passive affects in the 
context of the individuated assemblage it is part of […] These affects 
circulate and are transformed within the assemblage: what a horse ‘can do’ 
(2004, p. 255).   
Claire Colebrook further explains the role of desire in ‘becoming-animal’, and what 
‘becoming-animal’ means, in Gilles Deleuze (2002):  
The child’s fascination for the wolf is not for what the wolf represents but for 
the wolf’s entirely different mode of becoming: wolves travel in packs, at 
night, wandering. There is a desire here that is directed to a multiplicity of 
affects (all that the wolf does and can do and that is not attached to any single 
wolf character so much as a collection or ‘swarm’). This is a desire, not for 
what the wolf is or symbolises, but for potential actions (p. 134; emphasis 
mine). 
Important from these explanations about animal imagery in After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie is precisely the idea that animals are not referred to because Julia, or 
other characters, desire to literally become animal. Rather, Julia’s last name as 
                                                             
90 I am not trying to present the argument that Deleuze and Guattari’s work does not engage with real 
animals. Donna Haraway, for example, has criticised their work in terms of not engaging with real 
animals. See Derek Ryan and Mark West’s edited issue of Modernist Ethics and Posthumanism 
(2015) for a response to that criticism. My aim here is simply to engage with the part of becoming-
animal that does not necessarily refer to ‘real’ animals but to what becoming-animal means. I do so 
because it resonates with what Rhys might be aiming to do with her text.  
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Martin might refer to her desire to live a life like a bird. I explained above why Julia 
is not well understood via identity categories such as a wife, a mother, or a child – 
because she is a becoming, and what matters, like in the case of Little Hans’s horse, 
is what a human or an animal can do, not what he or she is by filiation. What also 
matters is the particular human or animal’s relation to the environment she or he 
inhabits. In other words, the animal references in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie can 
also be seen as indicators to see humans, particularly women, not in narrow ways 
such as a wife, a child, a mother, but as what these specific women could actually do.  
Interestingly, many of the references in Rhys’s novel are to domesticated 
animals or dying animals: her mother is like a dog who is no longer healthy and her 
sister is like a cart-horse. Both are animals who have been domesticated – a cart-
horse is a domesticated version of a wild horse, and the dog a domesticated version 
of the wolf. These references give us the idea that Julia’s desire is a desire also for 
the potential actions that these animals allow her to imagine, but are cut off from; 
like Julia’s own desire to get away, the horse and the dog, once wild and free, are 
now limited to certain domestic roles. In Part II, chapter 5, Julia meets her mother in 
London, after having spent many years somewhere in continental Europe, and shares 
a moment of intimacy with her. In this moment, Julia and her dying mother make 
eye contact; this moment is very ambivalent – Julia thinks her mother recognises her, 
and the reader may believe she does:  
Her mother’s eyes opened suddenly and stared upwards. Julia put her face 
closer and said in a frightened, hopeful voice: ‘I’m Julia, do you know? It’s 
Julia.’ The sick woman looked steadily at her daughter. Then it was like 
seeing a spark go out and the eyes were again bloodshot, animal eyes. 
Nothing was there (Rhys, 1997, p. 98). 
We do not know exactly what happens during this gaze. But there is a glance and a 
connection is made. It is an encounter, and whichever the outcome is, the intimacy is 
held for a brief moment, at least on Julia’s part. Simpson (2005) interprets a passage 
where Julia and Norah look at their mother and think of her as “a beautiful dying 
animal” (Rhys, 1997, p. 98) as well as the above passage as a representation of their 
infantile desire to become one with the good part of the mother. Simpson (2005) 
argues that for the sisters, the mother is what a mother is for an infant according to 
Freudian psychoanalysis – either a good or a bad object, but never good and bad 
combined in the same object (p. 49).  
  
160 
 
Rather than being good or bad, at that point, her mother is just “dead weight”, 
as Julia “hauled at the inert mass”, or simply an animal, “like a dog howling” (Rhys, 
p. 99, p 99, p. 100). Julia’s clear memory of loving her mother, and then coming to 
dislike the same person, and then seeking self-assurance from the same person, while 
seeing her as merely an animal-like mass of flesh, demonstrates the ongoing 
complex relationship between the mother and daughter. Looking at desire in 
becoming-animal, we get an understanding why the mother might be compared to a 
dog, and it is not because she is a good or a bad object:  
the wolf does not stand in for that original scene of trauma where the child 
loses his mother to his father. The desire directed to the wolf is not one of 
possessing or regaining some object towards which desire is directed; it is a 
desire to expand or become-other through what is more than oneself. The 
wolf is not a signifier of some human quality or figure; it is another mode of 
perception or becoming. In perceiving the wolf we perceive differently, no 
longer separated from the world in the human point of view (Colebrook, 
2002, p. 135). 
Perhaps we can also understand Julia’s likening of her mother to a dying dog as her 
desire to see her mother as something other than a mother. She might want to see her 
as a woman who, instead of symbolising conventional narratives of intimacies and 
what a woman might become, symbolises, like a wild dog howling, a desire to 
“become-other through what is more than oneself” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 135). 
Perhaps if we stop seeing the loss of Julia’s mother as necessarily negative and 
traumatising and somehow also responsible for Julia’s unhappiness, then we can 
begin to see that Julia could establish her self through other images than that of her 
mother as a human mother and woman. Perhaps seeing her mother as a dog howling 
is an indication that Julia also identifies herself with something other than human.  
Although the references to the animal world are rather hopeless (old cart-
horse, dog’s chance against powerful people, worm compared to others, dying dog), 
they allow seeing the hierarchies and inequalities in the human world with fresh 
eyes. Berry (1995) writes that at the end of the novel,  
insect imagery, still a lower order, replaces animal references. Julia sees 
herself and others in her Paris hotel after going back from a failed trip to 
England as ‘mites in a cheese’ and is assaulted by the smell of sulphur when 
a room nearby is disinfected for lice (p. 558).  
The insects here are not necessarily symbols for something, but they are here to 
trigger a certain perception in the human reader. To emphasise the restrictive 
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conventions of human society that reproduce the same system that suppresses desire, 
Rhys refers to animals to open up new ways of seeing the world in her reader. The 
animal references in the novel also do not necessarily indicate that the characters are 
like animals, but that there is a potential in humans to form communities other than 
those organised by the family and the State. Deleuze and Guattari write,  
The Universe does not function by filiation. All we are saying is that animals 
are packs, and that packs form, develop, and are transformed by contagion 
[…] But we should not confuse these dark assemblages, which stir what is 
deepest within us, with organisations such as the institution of the family and 
the State apparatus […] There is an entire politics of becoming-animal, as 
well as a politics of sorcery, which is elaborated in assemblages that are 
neither those of the family nor of religion nor of the state. Instead, they 
express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in 
revolt […] (2004, p. 267, pp. 272-3).  
Perhaps we can also see the envy between Julia and other women, and the envy 
mixed with strange intimacy in Julia and her sister, and their relation to their dying, 
animal-like mother as a sort of unrealised female pack that could have a potential to 
undermine the patriarchal, capitalist system.   
Colebrook (2002) writes that “the fascination for the animal is a fascination 
for the world seen, not from an already organised position of opinion, but seen 
anew” (p. 138). The animal references in Rhys, despite being gloomy, thus signal to 
a hope towards life becoming something different from what it is. Colebrook 
suggests, referring specifically to the potential of becoming-animal in literature, 
“[b]ecoming-animal is the power of literature to present precepts and affects freed 
from their moorings in the drama of human interests” (p. 137). This is also what 
Rhys is trying to convey: her references to animals are not there to show that people 
are necessarily similar to animals, but to initiate a fresh view on human relations. 
The detailed attention to the world of the non-human that creates moments when 
Julia is content, and the animal imagery functions as an indicator of a desire to be in 
the world otherwise; that there are ways of being that do not confine to the rules and 
laws of the ‘organised’ patriarchal and capitalist society.  
 
Art as a Space for Non-Human Impressions and Affects 
In the introduction I explained how Cixous’s work is relevant for affect studies and 
new materialisms because she talks about the importance of materiality and ‘imund’ 
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beings in writing. In Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing (1993), in ‘The School of 
Roots’, Cixous talks about a ladder of writing that descends to Earth. Rhys seems to 
be on a similar journey in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie – her references to animals 
and insects indicate a desire for knowledge that does not transcend the Earth but 
descends into it. Rhys’s writing in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie predicts a Cixousian 
approach to writing that takes place on the ground, going deeper into the Earth 
instead of aiming for transcendental, immaterial heights. It is that kind of affective 
writing per se, a writing rooted in the ground that takes emotions, feelings (Julia’s 
instinctive decisions to go to London, her crying hysterically at the funeral) and the 
world of the non-human into account, which embodies a potential for change. This is 
the kind of writing that lets the other, be it human or non-human, speak in the text; 
this writing embodies a potential to see the world in a different light.91 Rhys’s 
writing itself, her decision to tell the story of Julia, offers a space that criticises the 
organised society and the way it represses desire, especially in women, and how 
these repressions result in the lack of female intimacy. It is a kind of writing that 
depicts life as a general life lived by humans in relation to the world of the non-
human, where humans are ‘made’ by the non-human impressions, affects, and 
sensations they experience.  
Berry argues that both language and human touch fail in After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie, and suggests that art, however, may lead the reader out of this 
miscommunication. Berry (1995) examines the series of paintings which “can be 
narrowed to Modigliani’s “Reclining Nude” series, where bodies are depicted as 
hanging earthward” (p. 547). Indeed, Julia looks at one of those paintings where the 
woman painted is like an animal, and Julia thinks that the woman says to her: “I am 
more real than you. But at the same time I am you. I am all that matters of you” 
(Rhys, 1997, p. 53). By looking at the painting, Julia realises how society sees all 
women as the same, as sexual objects, and depicts them as the same and ultimately 
makes them think that they all desire the same thing. Looking at the women in the 
painting makes Julia feel like “all [her] life and all [herself] were floating away from 
[her] like smoke” (Rhys, 1997, p. 53). Here too, she realises that women’s different 
desires are suppressed in a society that considers all women to be the same in 
relation to one another and different from men, when in reality, the differences are 
                                                             
91 See the introduction for a lengthier discussion on affective writing. 
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much more multiple between individuals rather than between sexes. In short, the 
painting triggers a realisation in Julia that her desire has no place in the society she 
lives in. Paintings have a similar effect on Mr James. When Julia and Mr James 
“looked at the pictures [Mr James] became a different man. Because he loved them 
he became in their presence modest, hesitating, unsure of his own opinion” (Rhys, 
1997, p. 115). The paintings in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie function as having an 
effect on people’s views of the world and on themselves – Julia realises her own 
trapped situation and Mr James becomes humble, unsure of his ways. Again, 
although no change happens in the story, these moments in the presence of artwork 
interrupt the plot and make the reader pause and rethink the story Rhys is telling. 
Art having an effect on people’s views of themselves and the world predicts 
the idea that art can take people out of their isolated subjective experience. Simon 
O’Sullivan (2001), also following Deleuze and Guattari, and also thinking along the 
same lines as Cixous in her writing school, proposes that “art’s function [is] to 
switch our intensive register, to reconnect us with the world. Art opens us up to the 
non-human universe that we are part of” (p. 128). O’Sullivan sees art as the dwelling 
place of affect, which, ultimately, is able to take people out of their own 
subjectivities. He writes, “this world of affects, this universe of forces, is our own 
world seen without the spectacles of subjectivity” (O’Sullivan, 2001, p. 128). 
O’Sullivan is possibly trying to convey a similar idea to that of Rhys: art, because it 
triggers affects (rather than emotions) that are impersonal, allows us to see the world 
not from our own, egoistic viewpoint, but to see a world from some distance, being 
able to question its rules and laws.  
Although art has the potential to take one out of one’s subjectivity in After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie, it still points to a ‘you’ – for example, to Julia or to Mr 
James – because they are the ones who are supposed to give up their subjectivity. 
Occasionally, Rhys’s text has the same effect as it also points to a ‘you’. Simpson 
(2005) distinguishes between the male and female use of ‘you’ in Rhys. In the novel, 
male characters use ‘you’ to eschew their responsibility, but female characters use 
‘you’, because they are unable to make sense of their own feelings, but also, and 
more importantly, to create intimacy between the text and the reader (pp. 41-64). 
Here, I am interested in the female use of ‘you’ that aims to establish intimacy 
between the reader and the text. As Simpson (2005) notes, the reader can join Rhys 
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in creating the meaning (pp. 41-64). Rhys’s modernist, readerly texts are the 
opposite of what Rosi Braidotti identifies as texts that create masculine 
subjectivities. Braidotti (1993) argues that the narrativity of the Oedipal structure 
“organizes the meaning of a text as a process of identification of the practitioner – 
whether male or female – with the achievement of a subjectivity that, qua active and 
empowered, is defined as masculine” (p. 2). A readerly modernist text, like that of 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, on the contrary, constantly questions its own meaning 
and truthfulness, and is therefore better understood as Cixousian affective writing 
which lets the other speak in the text, whether this other is a non-human other, or an 
other with a different viewpoint. 
Letting the other speak in the text, and letting the text speak to the reader, is 
one of the main components of affective art: it opens the world of new possibilities 
and other viewpoints. Critics who read Rhys through psychoanalytical frames note 
the same potential: Simpson (2005) and Sylvie Maurel (1998) acknowledge that 
although After Leaving Mr Mackenzie is deeply suggestive of isolation and 
alienation, the narrative strategy leaves open a possible connection between the I and 
non-I. Rhys’s novel can thus indeed be seen as an example of what Cixous considers 
to be affective writing. Cixousian affective writing is much like Deleuzian 
becoming-animal or becoming-woman as it breaks out of psychoanalytical circles 
and fixed identities. Rhys’s writing does that too; the moments of strange intimacy 
are moments of potential becoming something else. Although there is no visible 
becoming something else in the plot, and the Rhysian protagonist wanders on in 
modern metropolises from men to men and street to street, from hotel room to hotel 
room, we can nevertheless begin to map an alternative route for female desire when 
we look at moments of strange intimacy between female characters, references to the 
non-human world, and the effect artwork has on people. Taking these moments into 
account, Julia’s wandering itself is already an embracing of a different desire to 
become something other than what a woman was allowed to become in early-
twentieth-century Paris and London. The Rhysian text itself is the potential for 
change rather than any specific event or character in the plot. 
This brings us back to Deleuze and Guattari’s arguments about the non-
human, anti-Oedipal desire and becomings. Colebrook (2002) writes that  
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A radical politics, for Deleuze and Guattari, will begin from a desire that is 
not the desire of man, and will not assume the closed human body as a basic 
political unit. Rather, through art and literature we can look at all those 
investments and images that have produced ‘man’ as the transcendent body 
and value that organises the political. Thinking a desire beyond the 
prohibition of woman, thinking a desire that traverses the human body, 
means thinking of the becoming of woman, not as a sex but as the opening to 
‘a thousand tiny sexes’. Becoming-woman is therefore the opening of a 
desire that is pre-personal, anti-oedipal and directly revolutionary. It is not a 
desire explained from within the story of man or human history. It is a desire 
radically other than man and his negation of life […] For this reason Deleuze 
and Guattari also tie becoming-woman to the impulse of literature (p. 143).  
Art at the story level in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, and Rhys’s writing as such, 
give Rhys’s characters and her readers the chance to reflect why society, life, and 
humans are organised in a certain way that sees the white European male as a figure 
of authority. Art in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, and Rhys’s writing, then, opens up 
the possibility to see the world with different eyes; by telling the story of Julia in the 
specific way Rhys does, she challenges what she refers to as the organised society.  
If we read After Leaving Mr Mackenzie as an example of Cixousian affective 
writing that echoes Deleuzian ideas about anti-Oedipal desire, we see the role of the 
mother, female desire, and female intimacy as well as subjectivity and selfhood in a 
new, more positive light in Rhys’s texts. In such a reading, the mother no longer 
represents an infantile desire to find the lost, primary good object that in fact can 
never be found again, so the wandering woman is unfulfilled and wanders on in 
modern metropolises, searching for substitutes in lovers. If we instead take into 
account the moments of strange intimacy between female characters, the moments 
when art takes characters out of their own subjective experience, and pay attention to 
the references of the non-human, then we get a series of moments that disrupt the 
plot that otherwise seems to be a failed desire to settle to Oedipal relations. We 
should see After Leaving Mr Mackenzie as an example of literature that  
is productive, not representative. Literature has the power to mobilise desire, 
to create new pre-personal investments, and enables thought and affects that 
extend beyond the human […] Becoming-woman, or the destruction of 
oedipal man, through literature is the very opening of the political and the 
future. Literature transforms the political space from a relation ‘among men’ 
to the production of inhuman affects and intensities […] Literature is, 
therefore, not a vehicle for veiling and representing unconscious and timeless 
dramas. Literature produces new dramas and intensities. Literature is not 
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reducible to the story and explanation of man; it always possesses the power 
to move beyond man: becoming-woman (Colebrook, 2002, p. 145). 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie too becomes an example of that kind of literature when 
we pay attention to moments of strange intimacy between female characters, 
references to the world of non-human, and to art’s potential for change. After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie is a text in which characters cannot be understood in Oedipal 
terms. Rather, it is a text that opens up new possibilities of seeing life as desiring, 
and portrays it as such in the strange, brief moments of intimacy. It is a text that, as I 
proposed in the introduction, displays “a different mode of modernism – one focused 
less on the limits of language [than] on broadening perception” (Colebrook, 2012, p. 
66). It is a text that writes, no matter how slightly and strangely, a protagonist who, 
even if she is not in love with her individual life, is attached to a life as such. 
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Chapter Four 
The Embodied Aesthetics of Place in Wide Sargasso Sea 
 
Then I turned round and saw the sky. It was red and all my life was in it. I saw the 
grandfather clock and Aunt Cora’s patchwork, all colours, I saw the orchids and the 
stephanotis and the jasmine and the tree of life in flames. I saw the chandelier and 
the red carpet downstairs and the bamboos and the tree ferns, the gold ferns and the 
silver, and the soft green velvet of moss on the garden wall. I saw my doll’s house 
and the books and the picture of the Miller’s Daughter. 
Jean Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea 
 
Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) is the only novel by Jean Rhys which is predominantly set 
in the West Indies, particularly in Jamaica and Dominica.92 In this novel, Rhys 
depicts a love story between Antoinette and the West Indies, not between Antoinette 
and her unnamed husband, as popular media has depicted it in the film adaptations of 
1993 and 2006. In other words, in Wide Sargasso Sea, intimacy emerges most often 
and most radically between Antoinette and the West Indies, not between Antoinette 
and her husband. In her final novel, Rhys explicitly expresses the importance and 
love for place that she already examined in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. In a letter 
to Francis Wyndham on 14 September 1959, Rhys wrote that “when I say I write for 
love I mean that there are two places for me. Paris (or what it is to me) and Dominica 
[…] both these places or the thought of them make me want to write” (1985, p. 171). 
While for Rhys it is places that make her want to write, I suggest that for Antoinette, 
places, or what they are for her, make her want to live. More precisely, the non-
human world of the West Indies creates intimacy between Antoinette and “her place” 
(Rhys, 2001, p. 53). Because Antoinette sees her life in the sky as something that 
includes “the orchids and the stephanotis and the jasmine and the tree of life” (Rhys, 
2001, p. 123), we can consider selfhood and life in a Deleuzian sense – Antoinette, 
like Julia in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, can be seen as an haecceity and her life as 
                                                             
92 I am not only referring to Jamaica here because it is likely that Rhys makes references to both 
Dominica and Jamaica in Wide Sargasso Sea. Elaine Savory writes in Cambridge Introduction to 
Jean Rhys that “Jane Eyre’s plot references are set in Jamaica, so Rhys also sets the beginning of the 
story there but describes Coulibri as if it were her maternal family’s estate of Geneva in Dominica. 
Jamaica is a thousand miles or so from Dominica (and the fictional Granbois) and ‘Rochester’ speaks 
of the “interminable journey from Jamaica” (2009, p. 82).  
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a life.93 Antoinette is herself in relation to the places she inhabits, things she 
encounters, and impressions she has. She is not, like Julia is not, in love with her 
individual life but with a life that includes the human and non-human worlds. Her 
vision that “everything was alive, not only the river or the rain, but chairs, looking-
glasses, cups, saucers, everything” (Rhys, 2001, p. 18) encourages us to read the 
novel with new materialist and affect theories that allow us to notice the embodied 
connection to and love for the non-human world of the West Indies.  
In what follows, I begin by exploring how Antoinette’s lonely childhood 
paves the way to her intimate relationship with the West Indies, how this intimacy is 
well understood with Deleuzian new materialist approaches to the non-human, and 
how this approach is connected to childlike perspective both in Rhys and Deleuze. I 
then suggest that Antoinette’s intimate engagement with her surroundings allows her 
to rethink the relation to land in a way that is critical of colonialism, imperialism, 
and patriarchy. Without undermining the important and insightful work done on race 
and ethnicity studies, I want to shift focus on identity formation in relation to land 
and the non-human. Such a reading offers an understanding of place in Rhys’s final 
novel, as with Between the Acts, that is not dependent on nationalistic ideas about the 
concepts of place and country. Accordingly, I propose that Wide Sargasso Sea offers 
a ground for bridging the gap between new materialist and postcolonial and/or 
Indigenous studies. Finally, I explore those intimacies that are normally not allowed 
to have a plot to demonstrate that these intimacies are precisely that which attaches 
the characters to life and enhances their love for life. I put forward the idea that from 
Rhys’s oeuvre, Wide Sargasso Sea is the most explicitly concerned with that which 
is lost or forgotten – a prevailing love for life, a desire for, and a possibility of, 
happiness. I argue that paying attention to those intimacies and to the world of the 
non-human allows us to notice the love for life that is always present in Wide 
Sargasso Sea. 
  
The Embodied Sense of Belonging to the Non-Human World 
Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips point out in intimacies (2008) that in psychoanalysis, 
all love is seen as self-love (p. 10). Indeed, if we follow psychoanalytic theories, we 
                                                             
93 See Chapter Three for a lengthier discussion of ‘a life’ and ‘haecceity’ in Rhys’s oeuvre.  
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may conclude that Rhys’s characters fail in life in a conventional sense because they 
lack self-respect and self-love, and are therefore unable to love anyone else, or life.94 
Rhys’s interwar fiction predominantly deals with loss (of language, of the mother, of 
the homeland, of economic and sexual power) and the atmosphere in the novels is 
indeed often, as many critics point out, that of indifference and numbness.95 
Accordingly, no attention has been paid to that which paves the way to these losses 
and gloomy atmospheres – the underlying love for life.96 In Wide Sargasso Sea the 
love for life that is lost in Rhys’s other novels is always present. Wide Sargasso Sea 
seriously undermines Erica L Johnson’s (2015) claim that Rhys’s characters “eschew 
or fundamentally alter such mystifying concepts as hope, happiness, or social 
mobility for the more realistic possibilities of temporary escape, numbness, and 
indifference” (p. 213). Of all Rhys’s novels, here we see the love for and attachment 
to life before it is weakened or overshadowed by imperial and patriarchal 
conventions.  
Jane Bennett (2001) writes that “if popular psychological wisdom has it that 
you have to love yourself before you can love another, my story suggests that you 
have to love life before you can care about anything” (p. 4). In the same sense, Wide 
Sargasso Sea demonstrates Antoinette’s love for life in Jamaica and Dominica, 
which is a prerequisite for caring about anything or anyone else. As elsewhere in this 
                                                             
94 See previous chapter for a discussion about Freudian psychoanalysis and anti-Oedipal readings of 
Rhys’s fiction.  
95 See for example Erica L. Johnson’s “‘Upholstered Ghosts’: Jean Rhysʹs Posthuman Imaginary” in 
Jean Rhys: Twenty-First-Century Approaches (2015) and John J. Su’s “The Empire of Affect: 
Reading Rhys after Postcolonial Theory” in Jean Rhys: Twenty-First-Century Approaches (2015).  
96 Many critics read Rhys’s novels, including Wide Sargasso Sea, as examples of disorientation and/ 
or dislocation. John S. Ju ‘“Once I Would Have Gone Back … But Not Any Longer”: Nostalgia and 
Narrative Ethics in Wide Sargasso Sea’ (2010) examines the sense of feeling out of place and out of 
one’s body in Wide Sargasso Sea. According to Ju, disorientation is a major factor influencing and 
defining the ‘fate’ of Rhys’s characters, including Antoinette and her husband in Wide Sargasso Sea. 
Delia Caparaso Konzett in Ethnic Modernisms, and particularly in a chapter ‘White Mythologies: Jean 
Rhys’s Aesthetic of Posthumanism’ (2002) similarly suggests that “[the] sense of homelessness and 
dislocation, so pervasive in Rhys’s works, challenges not only colonial models of master nations and 
narrations, with their unquestioned ontologies of belonging but, more importantly, a concomitant 
mythology of the white race” (p. 128). Elaine Savoury too (2015), focusing on post-colonial aspects 
of Rhys’s fiction, notes that “one vital aspect of post-colonial ecology is to reimagine the 
displacement between people and place through poetics” (p. 87), suggesting that Rhys’s fiction 
expresses this “pained connection often as displacement, between people and place with her 
characteristic originality and awareness” (p. 87).  I agree that in most of Rhys’s interwar novels 
dislocation is indeed a prominent affect. However, as I will demonstrate, Antoinette knows exactly 
where she belongs. Therefore, in Wide Sargasso Sea, the shifting narrative voice and complex 
collision of different worldviews functions, rather, as disorientation for the reader, as Su has pointed 
out. 
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thesis, when I refer to an attachment to life, I refer to ‘a life’ in a Deleuzian sense. In 
Wide Sargasso Sea, it is not Antoinette’s individual life in particular that she is 
attached to, but life as a common life lived in relation to other, particularly non-
human, beings and things.97 Rhys’s final novel is not only a prequel to Jane Eyre 
(1847), but in a way also a prequel to all other Rhys’s novels – it demonstrates the 
love for life before it was debilitated by the many troubles her heroines suffer in her 
earlier fiction: for example, in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. This love for life that is 
always present in Rhys’s fiction, no matter how unconventionally and implicitly, is 
explicit and alive in Wide Sargasso Sea, at least until her husband names Antoinette 
‘Bertha’ and takes her away from the West Indies. When Antoinette thinks that 
“there are more ways than one of being happy” (Rhys, 2001, p. 17), she indicates 
that she never had the chance to be happy in the West Indies, with the West Indies, 
as she would have liked to be happy. Instead, she had to submit to patriarchal and 
imperial conventions.  
Despite that submission, the novel is full of the memory of love and 
happiness place triggered in Antoinette. The novel begins with a section that is 
narrated by Antoinette’s child-self’s perspective. The first section of the novel paints 
the overall tone of the story where the non-human dominates the narrative. We get 
descriptions of places with loving, careful detail. For example, 
our garden was large and beautiful as that garden in the Bible – the tree of 
life grew there. But it had gone wild. The paths were overgrown and a smell 
of dead flowers mixed with the fresh living smell. Underneath the tree ferns, 
tall as forest tree ferns, the light was green, orchids flourished out of reach or 
for some reason not to be touched. One was snaky looking, another like an 
octopus with long thin brown tentacles bare of leaves hanging from a twisted 
root (Rhys, 2001, p. 4).  
The garden here is not described as something made by the Lord for the humans he 
had also created, but as something that is powerful in its own right as it has gone 
                                                             
97 Once this attachment to place is wounded, Antoinette presumably follows the fate of Jane Eyre’s 
(1847) Bertha, i.e. she takes on the story that is attached to the name ‘Bertha’. It is worth pointing out 
that the unnamed husband is often called Rochester because Wide Sargasso Sea is a prequel to Jane 
Eyre. I will not call him Rochester because the link to Jane Eyre is not that relevant in my reading. I 
want to focus on what Wide Sargasso Sea does as a novel in its own right, whether or not Jane Eyre 
exists. Therefore, I will refer to him here as ‘her husband’ or ‘a husband’ because, in a way, not 
naming him can emphasise the fact that there were probably more than one Bertha-like cases 
happening in that time. Elaine Savory (2009) also points out that “in Wide Sargasso Sea the husband 
is not named, an effective retort by Rhys to the renaming or erasure of names performed by 
colonialists and planters” (p. 35). In a sense then, not naming the husband takes power from him, and 
naming Antoinette gives her power.  
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wild not been made wild. The way Rhys describes the garden is full of detailed 
attention to the variety of plants that grow there. This attention encourages the reader 
to see the garden as lively and independent. The description of smell and sight makes 
the garden almost a sensual experience also for the reader. This passage is the first 
detailed description that offers us a setting of the novel and the atmosphere it creates. 
Although Antoinette’s mother, Christophine, and Baptiste are mentioned before the 
garden, Rhys does not offer any detailed information about them. She does so, 
however, when it comes to the non-human.  
The non-human and Antoinette’s detailed attention to it dominate the novel 
from this point. Her friendship with Tia, as well as the end of that friendship, is 
remembered and narrated as embedded in their environment: 
Soon Tia was my friend and I met her nearly every morning at the turn of the 
road to the river […]. [at the bathing pool] Tia would light a fire […] We 
boiled green bananas in an old iron pot and ate them with our fingers of a 
calabash and after we had eaten she slept at once. I could not sleep, but I 
wasn’t quite awake as I lay in the shade looking at the pool – deep and dark 
green under the trees, brown-green if it had rained, but a bright sparkling 
green in the sun. The water was so clear that you could see the pebbles at the 
bottom of the shallow part. Blue and white and striped red. Very pretty. 
(Rhys, 2001, p. 8).  
Nowhere is Tia described with such detailed attention and care as are trees, bananas, 
water, and pebbles. Besides being a sign of love for Antoinette’s surroundings, this 
passage also indicates that their friendship is not just something that exists between 
the two of them, but is like a wire: like intimacy in Between the Acts, or brief 
intimacies between Norah and Julia in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. Antoinette is 
not just happy because she is friends with Tia but because she is friends with her in a 
specific place that she appreciates and finds joy in.  
After her and Tia have a fight, it is also nature that Antoinette finds solace in, 
not other humans:  
I took another road, past the old sugar works and the water wheel that had not 
turned for years. I went to parts of Coulibri that I had not seen, where there 
was no road, no path, no track. And if the razor grass cut my legs and arms I 
would think ‘It’s better than people.’ Black ants or red ones, tall nests 
swarming with white ants, rain that soaked me to the skin – once I saw a 
snake. All better than people. Better. Better, better than people. Watching the 
red and yellow flowers in the sun thinking of nothing, it was as if a door 
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opened and I was somewhere else, something else. Not myself any longer. 
(Rhys, 2001, p. 11). 
Since childhood, Antoinette has trusted nature more than people – even if the razor 
grass cuts her legs and rain soaks her to the bones, it cannot hurt her as much as 
people could. Or, if it does hurt her, she finds this suffering pleasurable as she comes 
into intimate contact with the non-human world. I have explained in the previous 
chapters how art functions as a site that takes people out of their subjectivity, here 
we can see how the non-human takes the child Antoinette out of her own subjectivity 
and absorbs herself in the environment “as if a door opened and [she] was 
somewhere else, something else” (Rhys, 2001, p. 11). Although the friendship was 
no longer a source of happiness, the non-human environment remains, and allows 
Antoinette to imagine herself beyond human relations.  
The happiness she experiences again in the convent with the nuns and girls is 
also always related to the non-human environment. We get the impression of her 
happiness by the sensual, atmospheric descriptions of life in the convent. For 
example, Antoinette describes her friendship with Louise:  
Louise and I walked along a paved path to the classroom. There was grass on 
each side of the path and trees and shadows of trees and sometimes a bright 
bush of flowers. She was very pretty and when she smiled at me I could 
scarcely believe I had ever been miserable (Rhys, 2001, p. 29).  
Although it is Louise’s smile that seemingly makes Antoinette happy, she does not 
simply remember this smile, but the grass on the sides of the path, the shadows of 
the trees, and flower-bushes. Similarly, when describing the life in the convent, she 
remembers the smell of soap, the taste of hot coffee and buns, and how Sister Marie 
Augustine sat “serene and neat, bolt upright in a wooden chair [and how] the long 
brown room was full of gold sunlight and shadows of trees moving quietly” (Rhys, 
2001, p. 31). In these passages, she seems to remember the non-human environment 
and atmosphere and her being embodied in it rather than the doctrines of 
Catholicism.  
Antoinette notices the prevalence of the non-human world around her 
precisely because she is aware of being embodied in this world. An oft-cited 
example of such an awareness is the following:  
Quickly, while I can, I must remember the hot classroom. The hot classroom, 
the pitch pine desks, the heat of the bench striking up though my body, along 
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my arms and hands [...] My needle is sticky, and creaks as it goes in and out 
of the canvas. ‘My needle is swearing,’ I whisper to Louise, who sits next to 
me. We are cross-stitching silk roses on a pale background. We can colour 
the roses as we choose and mine are green, blue, and purple. Underneath, I 
will write my name in fire red, Antoinette Mason, nee Cosway, Mount 
Calvary Convent, Spanish Town, Jamaica, 1839 (Rhys, 2001, p. 29).  
Through remembering the embodied, lived experience, the narrative re-enacts and 
reactivates the sensory experience of the past moment.98 She does not remember, or 
feel that she has to remember, the saints, prayers, or sins that were introduced to her 
in the convent.99 Instead, she chooses to remember (or is made to remember, because 
of being embodied in the surroundings) the hot classroom, the desks that were made 
of pine, and how she sat on the bench, feeling the heat of the wood of which the 
bench is made, in her body. She remembers the feeling of her needle, the noise it 
makes, and how it is in touch with her and the canvas on which she is stitching silk 
roses. She also remembers the freedom to colour the roses as she likes. Many critics 
have examined this quotation for various reasons, and this passage remains striking 
precisely because it holds so much of the general atmosphere of the novel: detailed 
attention to the non-human world and a sensory, tactile perception of it in humans. 
This quotation is the only time when Antoinette claims her identity in the novel. This 
moment is pressed on the readers’ mind in fire red, locating Antoinette with her real 
name in Jamaica, West Indies – a place which, as Antoinette claims, is where she 
belongs and wishes to stay (Rhys, 2001, p. 67).  
All the above examples are parts of Antoinette’s intimate relationship to her 
surroundings – to trees, grass, ants, waterfalls, her garden; this relation is an example 
of her strange intimacy with her environment because she is aware of being 
embodied in a world of animate and inanimate, human and non-human things. 
Within these moments, Rhys seems to slow the narrative pace down by drawing 
attention to silence and heat. This aesthetic is Rhys’s method for enhancing the sense 
of being present in the moment, and focusing on the importance of the non-human – 
both are means by which to create an affective atmosphere of strange intimacy. It is 
                                                             
98 Critics such as John J. Su (2015), Patricia Moran (2007), and Elaine Savoury (2009), to name a 
few, have examined the urgency of remembering expressed in this passage. We cannot be sure where 
she writes this, and why she has to hurry, but we can imagine that she is, for example, trapped in 
England.  
99 For a discussion of religion in Wide Sargasso Sea, see for example Michael Rasbury’s 
‘Protestantism in the Obeah and Rastafarian Doctrines: Afro-Caribbean Religion in Wide Sargasso 
Sea and Brother Man’ (1994), as well as Savoury’s (2009) companion to Jean Rhys.  
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interesting here to think of how in the interwar novels, Rhys emphasises her 
heroines’ being cold in England. It seems that Rhys, like Woolf, associates the 
experience of embodied, pleasant affect with warmth rather than cold. As in Woolf’s 
moments in the boat in To the Lighthouse, and the audience drawn together in the 
summer heat in Between the Acts, heat and silence function as a precondition of 
feeling bodily presence and connection to one’s surroundings, even if these moments 
are not always pleasant. In these moments, the reader is encouraged to be with the 
text, dwell on the moment, and read slowly. This technique seems to help to create 
an intimate atmosphere, to pull the reader into the text, and to then feel perhaps what 
the characters might have felt, sensed, and seen.  
While the above examples involved Antoinette and her being embodied in 
her surroundings, besides Antoinette, even the husband who wants to suppress his 
liking of the West Indies notices the overwhelming presence of the place. He thinks, 
“The silence was disturbing, absolute. I would have welcomed the sound of a dog 
barking, a man sawing wood. Nothing. Silence. Heat. It was five minutes to three” 
(Rhys, 2001, p. 63). Shortly after thinking this, he takes a walk and is touched by the 
beauty of his surroundings (Rhys, 2011, pp. 63-64). He is absorbed in the place and 
the reader gets that impression because silence and heat slow down the narrative and 
dwell on the atmosphere and depict the character’s absorption in the atmosphere. 
Even the husband who fails to feel at home in the Caribbean has moments when he 
enjoys the place and feels absorbed in it. He thinks that the Caribbean is “a beautiful 
place – wild, untouched, above all untouched with an alien, disturbing, secret 
loveliness” (Rhys, 2001, p. 52). In fact, he seems to grow very familiar with his 
surroundings:  
I sat on the veranda with my back to the sea and it was as if I had done it all 
my life. I could not imagine different weather or a different sky. I knew the 
shape of the mountains as well as I knew the shape of the two brown jugs 
filled with white sweet-scented flowers on the wooden table (Rhys, 2001, p. 
75).  
However, his colonial background makes him want to control and own the place. Su 
(2015) points out that the husband’s obsession with the “secret” (Rhys, 2001, p. 52) 
of the place is his unwillingness to accept a different kind of epistemology, one that 
is based on embodied relations to a place. Because he has doubts about who 
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Antoinette is, he perceives the place and his surroundings as a nightmare, and 
towards the end of the novel, he  
hated the mountains and the hills, the rivers and the rain […] hated the 
sunsets of whatever colour, […] hated its beauty and its magic and the secret 
[he] would never know. [He] hated its indifference and the cruelty which was 
part of its loveliness (Rhys, 2001, p. 112).  
Unlike Antoinette, her husband is unable to avow that the non-human world exists 
independently of his will and control, remaining tangled in the colonial Western 
knowledge system.  
The narrative techniques that slow time down, and ‘pull’ the characters as 
well as the reader into the environment and text, have ethical and political 
implications. First, because the strange intimacy between Antoinette and the West 
Indies indicates how the human mind perceiving the non-human world as a radical 
other that can be treated with respect and care offers an alternative to the patriarchal, 
imperial attitudes that subjugate everything non-human to human control, as I 
explained in the previous chapters and introduction with references to Levinas.100 
Antoinette’s awareness of her dependency on her surroundings encourages her to 
pay more attention to the world around her. Here, I would like to read Antoinette’s 
relationship to her surroundings with Bennett’s (2001) concept of the ethics of 
enchanted materialism, which proposes that “its appreciation of non-human, as well 
as human, sites of vitality – of what might be called its hyperecological sense of 
interdependence – proceeds from and toward the principle of treading lightly on the 
earth” (pp. 156-158). Bennett (2001) suggests that a life with enchanted moments 
requires seeing non-human nature not as “inert matter”, but something that is a 
crucial part of calling “attention to magical sites already” present in the world (pp. 7-
8). In Wide Sargasso Sea, more than in any other of the three novels explored in this 
thesis, the non-human, especially nature, functions as the marvellous that “erupt[s] 
amid the everyday” (Bennett, 2001, p. 8). Bennett (2001) explains the proceeding 
from enchantment to ethics:  
Just how does an enchanted sensibility make it more likely that ethical 
principles will be enacted as ethical practices? Any response to this question 
must be somewhat experimental. The one that I am playing out is basically 
this: Enchantment is a feeling of being connected in an affirmative way to 
                                                             
100 See the introduction for Levinasian ethics of radical alterity in relation to keeping the distinction 
between human and non-human.  
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existence; it is to be under the momentary impression that the natural and 
cultural worlds offer gifts and, in so doing, remind us that it is good to be 
alive (p. 156). 
In Wide Sargasso Sea, it is the natural world in particular that offers ‘gifts’, the most 
prominent of which is the enhancing of the attachment to life. The brief friendship 
with Tia, Antoinette’s time in the convent, her intimacy with Jamaica, as well as her 
husband’s sense of becoming embodied in Jamaica all demonstrate how enchanting 
the material, embodied experience of the West Indies is. Regarding Antoinette, her 
relationship to the West Indies is ethical because, unlike her husband, she treats her 
environment with attention and care. Unlike him, she treads lightly in her 
environment; she does not step, like her husband, on frangipani the first day he 
arrives in the honeymoon house, disrespecting his surroundings (Rhys, 2001, p. 42).  
Second, the focus on embodiment, and a worldview that encourages first-
hand, embodied knowledge of and relation to place, complicates the postcolonial 
assumption that voice is the essential indicator of subjectivity and is therefore 
ethical. 101 Carine Mardorossian (1999) suggests that Rhys’s use of silence in 
particular “deconstructs the opposition between silence and voice and, in so doing, 
questions the Western assumption that the speaker is always the one in power’” (p. 
178). Rhys locates subjectivity not merely in language and writing, but in 
embodiment and perhaps what might be called silent resistance to colonialism and 
imperialism. Antoinette’s story and her non-verbal act of setting the house on fire at 
the end of the novel is per se an example of silent resistance. Su (2015) writes that in 
Wide Sargasso Sea, “exploitation is experienced as an affective phenomenon: felt 
but unexpressed, referenced but not articulated” (p. 176). In fact, although Wide 
Sargasso Sea is considered to be giving voice to Bertha, the madwoman in the attic 
in Jane Eyre, Antoinette does not have a first-person voice throughout the majority 
of Wide Sargasso Sea.  
What Rhys’s novel does, however, is to demonstrate that subjectivity is not 
dependent on the speaker’s position only, but it is rather our custom to associate 
power, authority, and knowledge with the ability to speak. Importantly, the fact that 
the husband chooses to narrate the specific sentences by Antoinette that emphasise 
                                                             
101 A similar claim is made by John J. Su (2015) and Molly Hite (1989). See their articles for longer 
discussions on the role of voice in subjectivity in post-colonial scholarship. I will also turn to the 
rethinking of post-colonial scholarship in the light of affect theories at the end of this chapter.  
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her sense of belonging to the West Indies and her embodied relation to it, is a 
confirmation that these sayings have a power over him. We learn that Antoinette 
belongs to the West Indies through the husband’s narration (Rhys, 2001, p. 53). This 
might indicate that the husband struggles to forget and suppress the epistemology 
that takes embodied, lived experience seriously. In other words, she demonstrates 
that there is always more than one side to a story, and the story Rhys gives us is not a 
tale told merely from a position of power, but a tale that has many sides, views, and 
feelings.102 Most importantly, the end of the novel is again narrated from 
Antoinette’s perspective. At the end of the novel, Antoinette describes: 
Then I turned round and saw the sky. It was red and all my life was in it. I 
saw the grandfather clock and Aunt Cora’s patchwork, all colours, I saw the 
orchids and the stephanotis and the jasmine and the tree of life in flames. I 
saw the chandelier and the red carpet downstairs and the bamboos and the 
tree ferns, the gold ferns and the silver, and the soft green velvet of moss on 
the garden wall. I saw my doll’s house and the books and the picture of the 
Miller’s Daughter (Rhys, 2001, p. 123).  
Antoinette’s life is not her marriage or a grand linear narrative of her personal 
growth; it is a collage of non-human as well as human encounters she has 
experienced in her life. It is, in short, a life in Deleuzian sense, lived in relation to 
other beings and non-human forces. Because Rhys shifts the narrative voice back to 
Antoinette at the end of the novel, she establishes Antoinette and her embodied 
relation to the West Indies as the last thing in the reader’s memory. 
 
Place Without Imperial and Nationalistic Sentiments 
The above examples demonstrate how in Wide Sargasso Sea Rhys constructs her 
characters’, particularly Antoinette’s, sense of self, mainly in relation to place, and to 
                                                             
102 In a letter to Diana Athill, written in 1966, Rhys writes the much-quoted line that emphasises the 
need to acknowledge the existence of various lives, ways of being, and knowledge systems. She 
writes, “I came to England between sixteen and seventeen, a very impressionable age and Jane Eyre 
was one of the books I read then. Of course Charlotte Bronte makes her own world, of course she 
convinces you […] I remember being quite shocked, and when I re-read it rather annoyed. ‘That’s 
only one side – the English side’ sort of thing” (1972, pp. 296-7). In Wide Sargasso Sea, many sides 
of a story are remembered, acknowledged, and told. First Antoinette until p. 36 Part II, then her 
husband has the majority of narrative, then at page 66 back to Antoinette for a brief while, when their 
marriage is falling apart; in this part, Antoinette herself confirms again, looking at the dark blue sky 
and dark green mango trees that “‘This is my place and this is where I belong and this is where I wish 
to stay’” (2001, p. 67). Then it switches back to the husband on p. 74. Until the final Part III where we 
get a brief kind of objective description from an outsider, and then have Antoinette’s narrative until 
the end, which is brief, not even 10 pages. But the briefness confirms the point of the novel: voice, 
and the length of the words said does not necessarily give power. 
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the non-human world inhabiting that place.103 Antoinette, like Julia, is the 
impressions of the non-human world of the West Indies she perceives. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, and as Erica L. Johnson (2015) has pointed out 
with the reference to the Deleuzian ‘minoritarian’ identity, Rhys’s characters in her 
interwar novels identify with, for instance, animals, streets, and machines (2015, pp. 
211-212). By doing that, Rhys shifts the focus from what Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari refer to as ‘majoritarian’ identities to ‘minoritarian’ identities – identity 
based on one’s relation to their surroundings and others instead of one’s age, sex, 
skin colour, and social background.104 In Wide Sargasso Sea Antoinette’s relation to 
the West Indies is an explicit example of the Deleuzian sense of self. Antoinette’s 
final statement that her life, which is made of “orchids and the stephanotis and the 
jasmine and the tree of life” (Rhys, 2001, p. 123) as well as her doll’s house, books, 
and various other objects, is visible to her in the sky, indicates that she, and her life, 
is all these non-human things. In the end, it is not her class, race, or gender that 
Antoinette remembers, but all the non-human things and the people she formed odd 
intimacies with in the West Indies: for example, Tia. Johnson (2015) and Delia 
Caparoso Konzett (2002) have argued that Rhys’s characters undermine rational 
Western subjectivity by focusing on the non-human.105 When Johnson and Konzett 
focus on the harshness Rhys’s protagonists face in her interwar novels because they 
cannot conform to those Western ideas of agency and subjectivity, I see Antoinette’s 
identification with the non-human precisely as a site for enchantment and happiness. 
Through Antoinette’s relation to the place, the novel questions, like theories of new 
materialism and affect, the anthropocentric ideas that position humans (most often 
the white human adult male) as higher than other life forms, and instead looks at life 
                                                             
103 The importance of place in identity-construction in Wide Sargasso Sea is also examined by Delia 
Caparoso Konzett in Anzia Yezierska, Zora Neale Hurston, Jean Rhys, and the Aesthetics of 
Dislocation (2002). See the chapter on Jean Rhys.  
104 For a more detailed discussion about Deleuzian concepts such as ‘haecceity’, ‘becoming’, and 
‘minoritarian’ identity, see A Thousand Plateaus, or the introduction to this thesis.  
105 Many critics including Elaine Savoury (2009, 2015), Wilson Harris (2003), Mary Lou Emery 
(2015), and Molly Hite (1989) have examined gardens, outdoor spaces, and flora and fauna in Rhys’s 
fiction. Savoury discusses Antoinette’s love for and association of happiness with Dominican flora 
(hibiscus, orchids, jasmine, ferns): “In some important ways, flowers and trees destabilise 
conventional agency in the service of an alternative possibility” (2015, pp. 95-96). Su also suggests 
that ,“It is good to remember Molly Hite’s judgement (The Other Side, 1989) that Rhys’s 
achievement involved her placement of ‘marginal characters at the centre of her fiction which Hite 
argues destabilises the novel’s traditional privileging of agency” (p. 96). However, only recently have 
people begun to systematically examine the dismantling of Western Enlightenment subjectivity in 
Rhys as related to her privileging of the non-human world. For this reason, new materialist criticism 
is insightful for reading Rhys. 
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as an assemblage of various human and non-human, animate and inanimate 
factors.106  
It is important to pause here for a moment on the criticism of new materialist 
and affect theories that are often influenced by Deleuze and Guattari. Although I do 
not agree that new materialism ignores issues related to class, race, and gender, and 
ignores the work done in the field of Indigenous studies, I do take seriously the idea 
that there is too little dialogue between new materialisms and the earlier theories that 
have addressed the issues new materialism engages with. Criticism from Peta 
Hinton, Tara Mhrabi, and Josef Barla (2014), Nicki Sullivan (2012), Juanita 
Sundberg (2014), and Alison Ravenscroft (2018) opens up a similar dialogue 
between post-colonialism and post-humanism, or new materialism and post-
colonialism, as Sara Ahmed opened up between feminism and new materialism.107 
What these criticisms take issue with is not what new materialists do but how they do 
it – mostly white scholars focusing on Western, often Eurocentric thought.108  
Yet, thinking of Jane Bennett’s work, which is central to this thesis, her 
engagement with white Western philosophers such as Kant, Paracelsus, Lucretius, 
Foucault, and Deleuze demonstrates that the Western thought itself is not that 
different from, say, Australian Indigenous thought. She dismantles the Western 
subjectivities from within it, focusing on the tradition that has seemingly built those 
subjectivities. Wide Sargasso Sea is a particularly interesting novel to read bearing 
these debates in mind, as Rhys’s Antoinette too dismantles the Western subjectivity 
from within that tradition. The latter novel, and Rhys as a writer, as John J. Su 
(2015), and Konzett (2002), for instance, have argued, dismantles the white 
mythologies from within, as Rhys, like most new materialist critics, belongs to and 
comes from the tradition of whiteness. She does so by maintaining the attention to 
race, ethnicity, class, sex, and gender, but in a way that undermines the legitimacy of 
                                                             
106 It is also relevant to emphasise here, as many critics such as Spivak (1985) and Savoury (2009) 
have pointed out, that one of the main achievements of Wide Sargasso Sea is to criticise the feminism 
of Jane Eyre that celebrates the Enlightenment ideas of individual growth and freedom that are in fact 
also the fulcrum of oppression for women and anyone who is other to white middle-class men. See 
Elaine Savoury’s Introduction to Jean Rhys (2009), Gaytari Spivak’s ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ 
(1985) and Carl Plaza’s Jean Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea: A Reader’s Guide to Essential Criticism 
(2001), Chapter 2. 
107 See the introduction and Chapter One for the discussion about femininity and materiality in 
feminist and new materialist theories.  
108 See the introduction for a longer discussion of the critical debates around new materialism, post-
colonialism, and Indigenous studies.  
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any of these categories in identity-formation. Here it is also important to emphasise 
again that in my reading of Rhys, these ‘majoritarian’ categories of identity do not 
offer an explanation for what Rhys is doing with subjectivities throughout her 
oeuvre. Rhys’s engagement with the non-human dismantles coherent Western 
subjectivities from within the Western tradition, especially by making Antoinette not 
cohere to any of the identity categories that she should fit in, but making her, a white 
coloniser’s daughter, both belong and not belong to that tradition.   
As demonstrated in the previous section, the Western subjectivity in Wide 
Sargasso Sea is mostly undermined by focusing on how selves are ‘created’ by being 
embodied in the non-human material environment. When we extend the centrality of 
embodiment and materiality to the concept of national identity more generally, then 
we can also see this identity as located not so much in myths of imperialism but 
rather in the material, non-human aspects of the place in Wide Sargasso Sea. In this 
sense, Rhys engages with similar problems that Woolf tries to dissect in Between the 
Acts. Both writers are interested in writing and remembering history, constructing 
ethnic and national identities, and understanding people’s sense of belonging to a 
place and time they inhabit with fellow beings from a view that undermines imperial 
attitudes. Antoinette’s character in particular demonstrates that there is nothing 
inherent about being white and English, or black and Caribbean, but that 
subjectivities and identities are formed in relation to one’s environment and others. 
Antoinette knows where she belongs not because of the people and their external, 
majoritarian identities, but because she identifies with the non-human – a sense that 
is constantly undermined by imperial discourses.  
Antoinette has been lonely since childhood: her father died, her mother was 
more concerned with Antoinette’s handicapped brother, and Antoinette never felt at 
home with either the white English colonisers or the black slaves/servants. Instead, 
she found comfort in her surroundings – in non-human animate and inanimate life. 
Antoinette’s relation to place, therefore, also requires some consideration of the 
meaning behind the word ‘country’, as it might tell us something of what Antoinette 
means when she refers to the West Indies as “her place” (Rhys, 2001, p. 53). 
Ravenscroft (2018) writes about the word ‘country’, and its meanings in various 
Indigenous Australian languages:  
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Country cannot be confused with the connotations of that word in English: 
this is not merely land or ground or nature if by these things we mean 
something inanimate.  To the extent it can be translated, it seems to be 
something like a living and life-giving nexus of energy-matter in which 
entities, including Ancestors, emerge; it is a sensate intelligence; it includes 
what in English might be thought of as geological and life forms, except that 
rock and mountain ranges are among the living. In includes ‘human’ and 
‘animal’, but these now would be approached as consubstantiating (p. 
361).109 
Thinking of Antoinette’s relationship with the West Indies, her relation to the 
countries of Jamaica and Dominica, and the lands of those countries, it is more 
similar to the Indigenous Australian understandings explained in the above quotation 
than to any ‘country’ in the Western sense of the word. To put it differently, country 
(when she thinks and speaks of the West Indies) for Antoinette is not a word for a 
political entity governing a specific piece of land that is inhabited by people with 
passports issued by this same country, but something that has an intelligence and 
independence of its own.  
In a way, Antoinette’s love for and engagement with the Caribbean should 
not be strange because, conventionally, one is supposed to love one’s birthplace – a 
notion that was especially true at the height of British imperialism. Yet this 
relationship is complicated precisely because of colonial regimes, as Antoinette is 
expected, when marrying an Englishman, to consider England her home, not Jamaica 
or Dominica. I take seriously Carmen Wicramagamage’s (2000) idea that 
“Antoinette is not a woman who is troubled by a lack of cultural identity; she is a 
woman who perceives herself troubled by others on account of her cultural identity” 
(pp. 30-31). In “The Day they Burned the Books” (1972), Rhys gives an account of 
English children who have never been to England and yet talk of England with love 
and admiration, perceiving England as their ‘true’ home. Like the narrator of “The 
Day” – a young girl – Antoinette in Wide Sargasso Sea does not consider England 
her home. On the contrary, Antoinette considers the Caribbean “‘[her] place’, stating 
that this is where she belongs and where she wishes to stay” (Rhys, 2001, p. 67) 
because she “love[s] it more than anywhere in the world. As it if were a person. 
More than a person” (Rhys, 2001, p. 53). It is clear, then, that Antoinette is not 
                                                             
109 Ravenscroft’s essay explores Australian Indigenous materialism’s challenge to the concept of 
human in the Western tradition. She does so by examining the novels by Waanyi writer, critic, and 
activist Alexis Wright. Although Wide Sargasso Sea is not an Indigenous Australian text, there are 
striking similarities between how Rhys and Wright depict the non-human in their novels.  
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disoriented, as the female protagonists of Rhys’s interwar novels tend to be.110 Quite 
the opposite, there is an intimate connection between Antoinette and the West Indies. 
Antoinette notices the liveliness and independence of the place as “everything was 
alive” for her (Rhys, 2001, p. 18) – she is, and has been for a long time, aware of the 
fact that she is not just existing among dead nature and objects, but is in a mutual 
ongoing encounter with her surroundings. Because of this embodied, ongoing 
attachment to the Caribbean, Antoinette, like the narrator in ‘The Day’, resists the 
imperial project of raising white colonisers’ children in the spirit of considering the 
heart of Empire, that is, England, their home. Antoinette is unsure of her identity in 
relation to people – who she is between her husband and Amelie; who she is between 
white English colonisers and black servants, both of whom consider her or parts of 
her as alien and other (Rhys, 2001, p. 63). Instead of identifying with people, 
Antoinette forms a strong sense of belonging in relation to the world of the non-
human.  
Because Antoinette’s relationship to land formed in childhood, because the 
‘protagonist’ of the short story discussed above is a young girl, and because I already 
explored the references to Julia’s childhood in the previous chapter, I now want to 
turn to the concept of children and childhood both in Wide Sargasso Sea and in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s writings. I already drew attention to childhood in the 
previous chapter, and most of the above examples in the first section of this chapter, 
are from Antoinette’s childhood. Similarly, in the short story, ‘The Day’, the 
characters are children, and in another short story about the vividness and liveliness 
of the West Indies, ‘Mixing Cocktails’, the narrator is a small girl. Rhys also 
examines a child-like mind-set in Wide Sargasso Sea. For instance, Antoinette’s 
husband refers to her as “not a stupid child but an obstinate one” (Rhys, 2001, p. 56), 
whom he likes to make feel safe. Interestingly, also the passage that speaks most to 
new materialist criticism, is narrated thinking back to Antoinette’s childhood, when 
she believed in her ‘stick’, or rather amulet of a sort:  
It was not a stick, but a long narrow piece of wood, with two nails sticking 
out at the end, a shingle, perhaps […] I believed that no one could harm me 
when it was near me […] I was still babyish and sure that everything was 
                                                             
110 See John J. Su’s article ‘Empire of Affect: Reading Rhys After Postcolonial Studies’ (2015), Delia 
Konzett’s Anzia Yezierska, Zora Neale Hurston, Jean Rhys, and the Aesthetics of Dislocation (2002). 
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alive, not only the river or the rain, but chairs, looking-glasses, cups, saucers, 
everything (Rhys, 2001, p. 18; emphasis mine). 
Like in Between the Acts, things, such as a narrow piece of wood in this case, are 
more than just what they would be by categorisation – they become something else 
by their ability to affect. I have discussed the ability to affect and be affected as the 
main indicator what a person or a thing is in a Deleuzian sense. Deleuze and Guattari 
speak about ‘becoming-child’ in A Thousand Plateaus, which they associate with the 
ability to affect and be affected with. Firstly, they see children as more easily 
assessing bodies in terms of what they can do, i.e. how they can affect and be 
affected, not in terms of to which species certain bodies belong (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004, p. 257). Second, they stress the importance of an indefinite article in 
children’s language: “Children’s questions are poorly understood if they are not seen 
as question-machines; that is why indefinite articles play so important a role in these 
questions (a belly, a child, a horse, a chair, “how is a person made?”)” (2004, p. 
256).111 Antoinette never refers to her stick as the stick, but always as a stick. What 
can a stick do? She thought it could bring her luck and protect her. In other words, 
children possess a certain ability to see the non-human not as an already-defined 
inert matter to be used for specific functions like chairs and bellies are, but non-
human as sites that affect and can be affected in various ways. Accordingly, they are 
also more able to ethically engage with, and identify themselves with, the world of 
the non-human, as Antoinette does.  
What is important from this childlike perspective in terms of identifying with 
land is the ability to see country not as an abstract political entity, but a very material 
network of human and non-human life, as Ravenscroft explains it. There is a clear 
association of happiness, which depends on seeing the world of the non-human as 
lively as related to the childlike perspective in Wide Sargasso Sea. Rhys’s unfinished 
autobiography Smile Please (1979) relies on childhood memories too; indeed, it 
                                                             
111 Timothy Morton in Ecology without Nature (2007) makes a similar point about children, referring 
to Shelley “who wrote in his essay ‘On Life’ that children ‘less habitually distinguished all that we 
saw and felt, from ourselves.’ Some adults who find themselves still capable of accessing this state 
called reverie feel as if their nature were dissolved into the surrounding universe, or as if the 
surrounding universe were absorbed into their being” (p. 122). However, because, in my reading and 
understanding, Rhys keeps the distinction between human and non-human intact, I do not want to 
bring in a thread of thought that emphasises the dissolution of these boundaries in children’s thinking. 
What is important from both these references to children is their ability to see the non-human not as 
inert and something already defined.  
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posits these memories as sites upon which all else is built upon, and to which Rhys 
returns to, very explicitly, in Wide Sargasso Sea.112 Rhys’s first memories are 
naturally that of colours, of nature, of warmth. In her fiction, we can also trace that it 
is often warmth that makes the world come more alive, friendly, and full of feeling. 
This juxtaposition too is rooted in her childhood in the West Indies. She writes in 
Smile Please,  
[Morgan’s Rest] was hot, only about four hundred feet above sea level. Not a 
beautiful place, just a pretty place. It was shut in behind two low hills which 
sloped down to the sea. It was there, not in wild beautiful Bona Vista, that I 
began to feel I loved the land and to know that I would never forget it. There 
I would go for long walks alone. It’s strange growing up in a very beautiful 
place and seeing that it is beautiful. It was alive, I was sure of it. Behind the 
bright colours the softness, the hills like clouds and the clouds like fantastic 
hills. There was something austere, sad, lost, all these things. I wanted to 
identify myself with it, to lose myself in it. (But it turned its head away, 
indifferent, and that broke my heart). The earth was like a magnet which 
pulled me and sometimes I came near it, this identification or annihilation 
that I longed for. Once, regardless of the ants, I lay down and kissed the earth 
and thought, ‘Mine, mine’. I wanted to defend it from strangers. Why was I 
sure that in the end they would be defeated? They can’t cut down the silent 
mountains or scoop up the eternal sea but they can do a lot. The trees and 
flowers they destroy will grow again and they will be forgotten (1990, pp. 
66-67; emphasis mine).  
Rhys’s own memories of her childhood setting in the West Indies reflect her writing 
in Wide Sargasso Sea and Antoinette’s relation to the land. First, we can see from 
this quotation that it is the natural environment of Dominica that Rhys loves, and the 
land itself that she sees valuable and wants to protect from strangers. We also see 
how she positions land as indifferent and as stronger than human activity as she 
believes that in the end, it will not be defeated. 
Second, Rhys depicts land as independent and alive, free of human-imposed 
concepts. Although she calls the land “mine, mine”, she also acknowledges that it 
“turns its head away, indifferent” (Rhys, 2016, pp. 66-67). Towards the end of the 
novel, Antoinette and her husband have an argument because the latter perceives the 
place as “something unknown and hostile” (Rhys, 2001, p. 82), something that is on 
                                                             
112 Interestingly, although their childhoods were spent in very different countries, looking at Woolf’s 
first memories of St Ives in summertime reveals similarities to Rhys’s childhood environment in 
Dominica. Woolf describes a highly sensual memory of walking down to the beach from Talland 
House, her memory of “stopping and looking at the garden” with ripe, red and gold apples, bees 
humming, and pink flowers blossoming (1972, p. 78). 
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Antoinette’s side, which makes him feel “very much a stranger” (Rhys, 2001, p. 82). 
In response, Antoinette, echoing Rhys’s writing in the above passage, states that 
You are quite mistaken […] It is not for you and not for me. It has nothing to 
do with either of us. That is why you are afraid of it, because it is something 
else. I found that out long ago when I was a child. I loved it because I had 
nothing else to love, but it was indifferent as this God you call on so often 
(Rhys, 2001, p. 82).  
By saying “it is not for you and not for me” (Rhys, 2001, p. 82), Antoinette indicates 
that the non-human world is alive and powerful, but it is also indifferent. This, she 
states, is something that she found out as a child. Regarding Rhys’s writings in Smile 
Please, we also know that she is describing her childhood memories about land 
being indifferent to humans and powerful regardless of what humans to do it. Carine 
M. Mardorossian (2015) takes an interesting approach to the non-human/human 
divide and questions the blurred boundaries between human and non-human, arguing 
instead that these two categories should be kept intact, and there is nothing 
necessarily ethical about this dissolution of boundaries. I have argued throughout the 
thesis, following Levinas, that it is precisely the radical other and its otherness and 
acknowledging that which is ethical, not accommodating the other. In a sense, then, 
it seems that in Wide Sargasso Sea, particularly, and in Rhys’s writings more 
generally, the ethical engagement with the other, especially the non-human other, 
and acknowledging this other in its radical alterity, is associated with children who 
are free of patriarchal and imperial doctrines.  
The ability to see the non-human world as lively, particularly by children, is 
also supported by the fact that while at first Antoinette’s perception of the Caribbean 
is lively and colourful, her attitude alters after her marriage – when she loses her 
childlike perspective, her relation to her surroundings becomes also slightly altered. 
At the turning point in the novel, when Antoinette has a short final voice while she is 
still in the Caribbean and seeks help from Christophine, asking the latter to make her 
a love potion for her husband, Antoinette describes the morning when Christophine 
gave her the drink as follows:  
I can remember every second of that morning, if I shut my eyes I can see the 
deep blue colour of the sky and the mango leaves, the pink and red hibiscus, 
the yellow handkerchief [Christophine] wore round her head […], but now I 
see everything still, fixed for ever like the colours in a stained-glass window 
(Rhys, 2001, p. 74).  
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The West Indies, although still beautiful, have become for Antoinette a fixed image, 
like a stained-glass window – life has gone from it, because her ill-fated marriage to 
her husband has altered the way she perceives her surroundings and her role in it. 
Similarly, her husband remembers that, even as a boy, he was taught not to feel:  
How old was I when I learned to hide what I felt? A very small boy. Six, 
five, even earlier. It was necessary, I was told, and that view I have always 
accepted. If these mountains challenge me, or Baptiste’s face, or Antoinette’s 
eyes, they are mistaken, melodramatic (Rhys, 2001, p. 63).  
Like Mr McKenzie in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, and various male characters in 
Woolf’s writing, including Bart and Giles in Between the Acts and Mr Ramsay and 
Charles Tansley in To the Lighthouse, Antoinette’s husband too is taught from early 
childhood to feel nothing. Rhys highlights that men are not naturally inclined to be 
resilient to feelings but that social expectations force and encourage them to become 
so. He too lost his childlike relation to land. It is this childlike perspective then that 
allows Rhys’s characters to form selves and see others not in terms of majoritarian 
identity categories but in specific human and non-human relations. 
Somewhat problematically, it is also Christophine that is associated with 
what could be termed as a childlike perspective that allows Antoinette, or indeed 
encourages her, to develop a sense of identity in relation to place. While this might 
seem like Christophine’s racial otherness to the white norm here is associated with a 
childish mind-set, the child-like perspective in Wide Sargasso Sea is not something 
less intelligent than the adult perspective. Quite the opposite, it is in children that 
Rhys seems to see an opportunity for living freely. We can see how Christophine 
undermines Western philosophy when we look at how she confronts Antoinette’s 
over romanticised, dreamlike image of England. Christophine questions that image: 
“‘I don’t say I don’t believe, I say I don’t know, I know what I see with my eyes and 
I never see [England]’” (Rhys, 2001, p. 69). For Spivak, Christophine’s line “read 
and write I don’t know, other things I know” (Rhys, 2001, p. 105) “stages what she 
sees as the most significant strength of Rhys’s novel: its refusal to contain 
Christophine within its own narrative framework, thereby allowing her to mark the 
limits of the novel’s discourse” (Spivak, qtd. in Su,2015, p. 175). Christophine’s 
walking away from her conversation with Antoinette’s husband is an example of her 
refusal to submit to the Western epistemologies. Many critics including Ambreen 
Hai (2015), Delia Caparoso Konzett (2002), and Mary Loy Emery (2015) examine 
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Christophine’s importance in the novel. Important for me is Konzett’s (2002) point 
in relation to nationality and belonging that Christophine represents:  
Christophine’s doubt about the existence of England should not be read as a 
representative statement of the provincial and ignorant native. Instead, it 
points, in a manner reminiscent especially of Hurston and Faulkner’s regional 
and folkloric characters with their vernacular grasp of epistemological 
uncertainty, to the entire phantom existence of nationality […] The unreality 
of Eliot’s London is extended in Rhys’s novel to the entire nation of Britain 
and reflects the empire’s claim to a natural territory merely to be the product 
of a cultural imaginary, a “dream.” Unlike Eliot, Rhys challenges not merely 
a modern lifestyle (mass culture) as devoid of substance but questions the 
entire myth of national culture and belonging from within which Eliot still 
attempted to salvage a tradition (pp. 139- 140).  
I agree with Konzett that in Rhys’s work, existence of any kind of nationality or 
straightforward ethnic origin, and through that ethnic or national belonging, is 
portrayed as a dream, a phantom existence, or an illusion growing from imperial 
discourses and values. I would also like to take this further by saying that the 
belonging Rhys portrays is located in place, but in place as non-human or free (as 
much as it could it be) of imperial ideals. In other words, Rhys represents land and 
its ‘use’ for people, nations, and countries as something very different from 
traditional ideas of nationalism. Land in Rhys’s writings is not a site to be occupied, 
controlled and used for human profit and benefit, but something that should be seen 
as lively and independent, something that can provide a site for living for humans. 
Precisely because it provides a place for living for humans, it should be treated with 
respect and care.  
Although Rhys questions the modern myths of national belonging, she seems 
to support a sense of belonging that is rooted in the environment of the place that one 
feels intimate with. Antoinette is rooted in a material place, not to abstract ideas 
about where people belong because of their passports or ethnic origin, but because of 
lived, embodied experience of place. Hélène Cixous’s (1993) writing about the word 
‘root’ is insightful here. She writes: “the word racine (root) has taken on a somewhat 
vulgar tint nowadays, rubbed in ideologies that have racist connotations. We must 
reduce it to ashes and wait for its rebirth” (p. 145). Cixous indicates that we are 
afraid of speaking of roots because we think of nationalism in fascist forms, but 
Rhys is on a different journey in Wide Sargasso Sea. Cixous writes that our roots 
take us to the matter, which  
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is not abstract but intelligent, alive, and powerful. One has to follow a path to 
arrive at matter […] we began as matter before moving away from whence 
we came. The journey is spiritual because it is not enough to put one’s foot 
on the ground to come back to earth. It is an extremely difficult spiritual 
exercise, reintegrating the earthly, the earth, and the earth’s composition in 
one’s body, imagination, thought (Cixous, 1993, p. 150).  
I quoted this passage also in the introduction, to suggest that all the novels explored 
here are on this spiritual journey towards matter, towards the earth. Rhys in Wide 
Sargasso Sea arrives closest to the matter via Antoinette. Although Antoinette is not 
able to put her feet on the ground at the end of the novel, in her act of resistance, in 
remembering her life in the sky and all the objects, she nevertheless (re)roots herself 
to the West Indies. This rooting allows Rhys to notice, remember, and tell stories 
that offer alternative plots of nationalism and belonging to imperialism and 
patriarchy, at least in the imagination.  
   
Intimate Stories 
Wide Sargasso Sea addresses the complex ethical issues around noticing, 
remembering, and telling histories and stories in general not just through 
Antoinette’s relation to place. Throughout the novel the reader gets glimpses of a 
past that has been erased, whether by nature (as in overgrown roads) or by people 
(refusing to tell certain stories). When Antoinette and her husband head to their 
honeymoon house, the husband asks about the name of the place: “‘Massacre.’ ‘And 
who was massacred here? Slaves?’ ‘Oh no.’ She sounded shocked. ‘Not slaves. 
Something must have happened a long time ago. Nobody remembers now.’” (Rhys, 
2001, p. 36). In a similar manner, memory is erased when the husband asks Baptiste 
about the road that was once in the forest: “‘There was a road here once, where did it 
lead to?’ ‘No road,’ he said. ‘But I saw it….’ ‘No road”’ (Rhys, 2001, p. 65). 
Baptiste denies there ever being a road. The past is perhaps denied because it refers 
back to times of slavery and French colonisation, because indeed it seems to be the 
husband who always tries to evoke the past and enquire about it, whether his 
questions are concerned with the road or with Antoinette’s origins. His need to know 
the past can be interpreted as his desire to have the former slaves confirm to him that 
colonialism was a very material presence on the island. Through that, the husband 
perhaps wants to legitimise his own being on the island.  
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Yet, when it might seem that it is the husband, representing the colonisers 
and imperial system who insists on remembering, then it is also Antoinette declaring 
that, “I am not a forgetting person” (Rhys, 2001, p. 85). We see Antoinette trying to 
gain historical knowledge already in her childhood, asking her mother about 
Christophine’s past, to which her mother responds:  
She was your father’s wedding present to me […] I don’t know how old she 
is now. Does it matter? Why do you pester and bother me about all these 
things that happened long ago? Christophine stayed with me because she 
wanted to stay (Rhys, 2001, p. 6).  
Antoinette is denied the truth that she would like to know in order to gain a certain 
historical knowledge about the past. Antoinette’s mother, Anette, denies, or perhaps 
does not know herself, the story about colonialism, slavery, and the Emancipation 
Act – all which are the reasons Christophine was ‘given’ to her in the first place. 
Anette’s denial of the racist past and her affirmation that Christophine stayed 
because she wanted to renders invisible the context of slavery and servitude that are 
the real reasons Christophine was with her in the first place. Because Antoinette does 
not know this past, she also cannot change her future. In the second dream, 
Antoinette yields to knowing that “this must happen” (Rhys, 2001, p. 34) – there is 
nothing to rewrite, because the history has happened already. Konzett (2015) 
suggests that “unlike a developmental novel or a novel of manners [like Jane Eyre], 
Rhys’s text does not advance a progressive or emancipatory model of growth but 
instead foregrounds a history condemned to repeat itself” (Rhys, 2001, p. 138). In a 
way, history repeats itself precisely because historical facts are distorted, deleted, 
and denied to generations who would like to learn about them. In other words, if 
Antoinette and her husband knew exactly what colonial violence had been carried 
out in the West Indies, then perhaps their understanding of the present and their 
futures would be different. As Su (2010) proposes, “the evocation of the past recalls 
and makes present memories that colonial narratives have chosen to forget” (p. 168). 
It is also exactly what Rhys is doing by telling the story of Bertha Mason before she 
became Bertha Mason; a story about Antoinette and her love for her life in the 
Caribbean.  
Not knowing allows imagining history as it never happened. In a sense, then, 
this denial of past colonial regimes is related to imaging a past that never were – that 
is, a past where neither racial prejudices nor gender prejudices exist. It is imagining 
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not the familiar, the possible, but the unfamiliar, the impossible, that yet somehow 
also is possible. Su (2010)argues that Wide Sargasso Sea prioritises “worlds that 
never were” (p. 159) and that it is the past not the future that Wide Sargasso Sea 
looks into. Su (2010) gives an example of Antoinette’s final dream when she is 
reunited with Tia – a unification that was impossible in real life because of the racial 
and class prejudices – “a regret for intimacy felt too late” (p. 161). Indeed, most of 
the intimacy in Rhys’s oeuvre is strange in a way that it is felt at the wrong time. In 
the same way, Sandi and Antoinette’s relationship, with them being from different 
racial backgrounds, was something unthinkable at the time when the novel is set, and 
as Elaine Savoury (2009) points out, even still difficult to speak about at the time 
when Wide Sargasso Sea was written (p. 88). The novel encourages the reader to 
imagine a past that never was, a past where the road never existed, and a past where 
Tia and Antoinette were friends, and Antoinette and Sandi lovers. It is a past where 
intimate stories that otherwise have no life are given an implicit chance to live in 
people’s imagination.113  
In other words, even though Rhys demonstrates that the unwillingness to 
narrate history with all its racist and sexist content is damaging in a way that 
encourages the future generation to live those discriminations, she also says that 
within this history are present already moments of intimacy that deny these 
discriminations. Race too is depicted as something intimate, something that 
Antoinette does not experience or understand through major examples of violence 
and discrimination, but something that is intimately entangled in her life. Maroula 
Jouannou (2015) argues that the materiality and physicality of racism becomes 
apparent when Antoinette “is forced to live the materiality of race subordination and 
to experience through her senses (in the touch of the borrowed clothing on her skin) 
the shock of physical intimacy and proximity to the racial ‘Other’” (p. 132). 
Jouannou refers to the incident when Antoinette is forced to wear Tia’s dress when 
the latter took Antoinette’s, and how this is example of the lived experience of race 
and racism. Noticing stories like this, however, also demonstrates not only the 
existence of racism but inter-racial intimacies. Hai (2015) proposes that we should 
                                                             
113 This imagination can also be seen as positive struggle to overcome what critics, for example, Su 
(2015) refer to as Antoinette’s internalised racism. 
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shift the focus to personal relationships and intimacies, to understand servitude 
better, without presupposing that we already know what it means. She argues that  
rather than presupposing servitude to be an already understood, easily 
dismissed, simple condition, I read it as complex and expansive, as inclusive 
of affective interpersonal relations, paradoxical intimacies, and dependencies, 
as deeply fraught by intersecting axes of power, embedded in multiple 
hierarchies, and as therefore demanding of historically attentive, nuanced 
reading (Hai, 2015, p. 494).  
She is particularly interested in the relationship between female servants and the 
children they raise: for example, in the relationship between Christophine and 
Antoinette. Hai argues that instead of thinking of their relationship as inevitable and 
forced because of Christophine’s servitude, she encourages us to see the real bond 
and true intimacy between these female characters from different racial and social 
backgrounds. Indeed, Christophine is the mother-figure for Antoinette, and their 
attachment seems to be genuine, as Christophine is protective of Antoinette and 
Antoinette remembers Christophine’s songs, meals, voice, and the colours of her 
handkerchief even in England. With Sandi, Antoinette has learned one of the 
pleasures of her life: pebble throwing (Rhys, 2001, p. 52), and with Sandi, 
Antoinette also has “the life and death kiss” (Rhys, 2001, p. 120) – a kiss that seems 
to embody their intimacy that could have never had a real life, to use Berlant’s term. 
It is precisely these affective moments – the sights, sounds, touches, and smell of the 
Caribbean – that ‘roots’ Antoinette there, and creates intimacy between her and 
various characters who she, as a white plantation owner’s daughter, was not 
supposed to be intimate with.  
In this sense, Wide Sargasso Sea is a story of a series of intimacies that have 
no life but provide a ground for exploring within an affective turn in postcolonial 
studies. Phanuel Antwi, Sarah Brophy, Helene Strauss and Y-Dang Troeung (2013) 
suggest that postcolonial studies need to turn attention to tracing and taking seriously 
affects and intimacies (p. 2). These authors follow affect theorists such as Ann 
Cvetkovich and Kathleen Stewart and they shift the focus from what John Ashcroft 
(2012) calls Grand Theory to lived experiences of race, colonialism, and oppression. 
The authors of the edited collection quote Stewart’s Ordinary Affects (2007) to say 
that postcolonial texts “‘pulse’ with what Stewart terms ‘rogue intensities’ – with 
‘everything left unframed’ by the dominant ‘stories of what makes a life’” (qtd. in 
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Antwi et al., 2013, p. 7). In Wide Sargasso Sea, as in the other novels examined in 
this thesis, “everything left unframed” by what both Stewart and Lauren Berlant call 
‘a life’ and conventional intimacies framing that life, is given a story. For example, 
Berlant (1998) writes that “intimacy builds worlds; it creates spaces and usurps 
places meant for other kinds of relations” (p. 282). These intimate stories include 
Antoinette’s relation to the non-human world of the West Indies, and importantly 
also her intimacies with black characters in the novel that build an imaginative yet 
powerful world and depict a place historically associated with colonial violence as a 
place that also resonates with inter-racial intimacies. Wide Sargasso Sea pays 
attention to intimacies that, despite the imperial, racist and sexist attitudes, attach 
Christophine and Antoinette, and Antoinette and her husband, and most importantly, 
Antoinette and the West Indies, together. 
By narrating those intimacies, Wide Sargasso Sea then gives us reasons to 
believe that imagining a past that never was, or was but is suppressed under imperial 
discourses, has ethical potential. Su (2010) refers to Paul Ricœur’s work on narrative 
ethics, arguing that “his notion of ‘telling otherwise’ can be read to suggest the 
ethical aspect of narrative resides not in the events it described but in the implication 
that any event can be narrated again and therefore described otherwise” (p. 165). Su 
(2010), unlike Susan Stewart and Renato Rosaldo, for example, sees nostalgia as 
having ethical potential (p. 166). Su (2010) suggests that history in Wide Sargasso 
Sea “is defined by images of communities never formed, empathy never felt, 
suffering never shared – in other words, history is defined by what never occurred” 
(p. 166). Indeed, Antoinette’s dreams are premonitions, indicating that history cannot 
be changed. The only way to change things is then in imagination, in narrative. Su 
(2010) highlights that  
the key distinction between Rhys’s use of nostalgia and more familiar forms 
of it, such as those employed by Nazism and numerous nationalist and 
fundamentalist movements in the past 150 years: the nostalgic fantasies 
Antoinette creates are never depicted as historical realities (p. 166). 
I agree with Su that Rhys locates intimacy in possibilities, not necessarily in realities. 
This is why storytelling is important as such – what kind of stories do we (choose to) 
notice, pass forward, and write down? Rhys, especially in Wide Sargasso Sea, writes 
down intimacies that otherwise go unnoticed in patriarchal, imperial, and even 
postcolonial narratives.  
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In Wide Sargasso Sea, these minor intimacies often refer to that which never 
really happened or will happen, but that have potential to create spaces where being 
otherwise can be imagined. Storytelling itself, like nostalgia, has an ethical potential 
because it can create the worlds that never were. Ravenscroft (2018) argues that 
“poetics means the practice that, after [Roland] Barthes, can be thought of as 
producing effects most powerfully not through the possible, the familiar – the 
already known, the already believed – but through the improbable or impossible” (p. 
355). Ravenscroft puts forward the idea that we enter and read the text as strangers 
(2018, p. 366). She is interested in the possibilities such an approach holds for 
dismantling the Western colonial subject who enters an Indigenous text as a stranger 
(Ravenscroft, 2018, p. 359), suggesting that these texts have a power to challenge 
Western subjectivity. She writes,  
It may be that for the non-indigenous reader to attempt to take up the position 
of a stranger before Indigenous textuality is such a precarious, decentred, and 
destabilised position that the Western sovereign subject might fall into doubt 
and uncertainty – exactly what new materialism has aimed at, suggesting the 
significance of literary practices for understanding the possibilities of 
changing western ideas about human, inhuman, life and nonlife, energy and 
matter (Ravenscroft, 2018, p. 359). 
Although Wide Sargasso Sea is not an Indigenous text, it clearly poses the same 
challenge for the reader – how to orient within the shifting narrative voice and the 
various worldviews it presents.  
Wide Sargasso Sea demonstrates the complex and intimate co-existence of 
various different lives from different backgrounds in relation to specific places and 
the non-human world. By giving the reader Antoinette’s, Rochester’s, and 
Christophine’s (although the latter is never through first-person narration) views, the 
novel does not present a binary image of the West Indies and England where the 
former represents exotic, less intelligent ways of being in the world. In a letter to 
Diana Athill, written in 1966, Rhys writes the much-quoted line that emphasises the 
need to acknowledge the existence of various lives, ways of being, and knowledge 
systems. She writes,  
I came to England between sixteen and seventeen, a very impressionable age 
and Jane Eyre was one of the books I read then. Of course Charlotte Bronte 
makes her own world, of course she convinces you […] I remember being 
quite shocked, and when I re-read it rather annoyed. ‘That’s only one side – 
the English side’ sort of thing (1985, pp. 296-297).  
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In Wide Sargasso Sea, many sides of a story are remembered, acknowledged, and 
told.   
The attention of various intimate stories and the decision to narrate them 
from the Western perspective itself makes Wide Sargasso Sea a novel that 
undermines the Western tradition from within. It does not look at major identity 
pointers such as race and class to draw on characters’ otherness, but positions every 
other, including the non-human other, as something infinitely other and strange that 
the self tries to understand by forming intimacies with it. Rhys shifts the focus to 
Antoinette’s, and to a lesser extent to her husband’s and Christophine’s lived 
experience and through that offers an alternative to a panoramic, detached, 
omniscient view of the place, as Rhys gives the reader a close-up, a strangely 
intimate, embodied experience of the place. Such embodied aesthetics of place can 
be seen as part of Rhys’s feminist ethics and anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist 
critique that treat the non-human world – the radical other – with care. The intimate 
and careful focus on the non-human allows us to see Antoinette’s sense of identity 
and belonging as not dependent on indicators such as race, class, or sex, but on her 
relation to land and non-human life on that land. Although the encounter between a 
character of a specific sex, class, race, and ethnicity and the non-human world of 
animate and inanimate things is always influenced by the former’s human attributes, 
the material world nevertheless functions as a potential point of common discourse 
between the different characters. And even if the characters in the novel cannot find 
a way toward a peaceful coexistence, Wide Sargasso Sea nevertheless encourages us, 
the readers, to look for a common discourse with those who are different from us. It 
encourages us not to ask what is different or what is the same about Antoinette, her 
husband, and Christophine. Rather, it tells us to ask what is common that they share 
at their present moment and location. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In the course of this thesis, I have explored Virginia Woolf’s novels To the 
Lighthouse and Between the Acts, and Jean Rhys’s novels After Leaving Mr 
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Mackenzie and Wide Sargasso Sea, to think about intimacies, desires, affects, 
embodiment, materiality, and the non-human. I have read these novels in the light of 
contemporary theories of affect and new materialism, which, as I have suggested, 
have some roots in (feminist) post-structuralist theories. I have read Woolf’s and 
Rhys’s novels with a specific focus on works by Hélène Cixous, Jane Bennett, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari to develop a theory of modernism that is anti-Oedipal, 
affective, and life-affirming. I have explored how Cixous’ écriture féminine is not 
simply an aesthetic mode built on biological essentialism but a way of writing that 
pays a specific attention to glances, gestures, and moments that otherwise go 
unnoticed in the patriarchal grand narratives of heteronormative love plots, 
patriotism, and ideas about what a good life should look like. I have looked at 
various strange moments and atmospheres of intimacy in Woolf’s and Rhys’s 
writings – moments and atmospheres which can be seen as examples of affective, 
anti-Oedipal écriture féminine. These strange intimacies are, as Lily thinks in To the 
Lighthouse, “unclassified affections of which there are so many” (Woolf, 2016, p. 
115). Noticing these intimacies and affections is dependent on embracing and 
acknowledging that which Western cultures and societies tend to consider as 
feminine – embodiment, materiality, affect, and the radical other, which is often the 
non-human. I have argued that noticing these intimacies is important precisely 
because it allows us to look at modernism as enchanted and life-affirming, and to 
understand life as a whole, including all the ordinary and daily sites, moments, 
forces, sounds, things, and impressions. It is not just a life of an individual, or a life 
concerned with individuals who are defined in Oedipal, majoritarian categories of 
sex, class, and race, all which go hand in hand with patriarchy, but a common life 
lived in relation to other human and non-human beings, all of which contribute to a 
characters’ sense of self.   
Taking into account Cixous’s écriture féminine, her writings from the 1990s, 
and her more recent novels, I have argued that her oeuvre demonstrates an 
engagement with bodies, materiality, and the non-human, which allows us to see the 
continuity between post-structuralism and affect, new materialist, and post-humanist 
theories. Her writing is not only a link between feminist theories and new materialist 
and affect studies but also a link between post-structuralism and material turns more 
generally. It is important to see that link because theories are not a series of breaks 
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from one another but an intellectual dialogue and continuity, and I believe that it is 
important to appreciate and acknowledge the work that has been done by earlier 
thinkers. Reading Cixous with Jane Bennett, Deleuze and Guattari, in particular has 
not only given us the opportunity to focus on affects, bodies, materiality, and the 
non-human, but to consider how these features create a sense of the common life to 
which Woolf’s and Rhys’s characters are attached. In other words, putting these 
thinkers into dialogue with one another allows us to see a theory about modernism, 
whether post-structural or materialist-oriented, as anti-Oedipal and life-affirming, 
focusing on intimate, positively affective atmospheres and moments. I have 
developed this view on modernism and theory precisely because, although the 
modernist period witnessed traumatic events and changes, which are depicted in 
various modernist writings, there are still moments and atmospheres of strange 
intimacy present in the midst of this chaos. This view does not aim to undermine or 
challenge the readings that examine negative affects such as alienation, shame, and 
disorientation. Rather, my aim is to create a fuller picture of modernism by focusing 
on that which is life-affirming. Such readings are not limited to the modernism of 
Woolf and Rhys, but can be extended to modernism more broadly.  
In this thesis, I have explored how the novels of Woolf and Rhys, despite 
being set in times of war and social change that influence personal lives, maintain 
this attachment to and love for life. They show us how in life, like in writing, a 
certain order nevertheless emerges and remains in the seeming chaos and 
discontinuity. I have argued that Woolf and Rhys ‘locate’ this attachment to life 
precisely in the moments similar to Mrs Manresa’s coffee-sipping from the 
beginning of this thesis – in sensual, affective, and oddly intimate moments where 
characters realise their bodily connection to the world of others, things, and places. I 
opened this thesis with a question from Between the Acts: ‘Why waste sensation?’ A 
possible answer is the following one: sensation breeds affective atmospheres and 
moments of strange intimacy. The intimate moments and atmospheres that I have 
explored have all been dependent on characters’ senses of being embodied in the 
material world which they share with other human and non-human bodies that feel 
and sense, and have the power to be affected and affect. Accordingly, these moments 
and atmospheres allow the characters to form opinions, connections, thoughts, and 
feelings that function as halts in what Woolf calls their daily non-being. It is 
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sensation that creates moments of being; sensation absorbs our attention, it directs it 
to places already in this world, in our everyday, that we might otherwise pass by. It 
creates strange intimacies and directs our attention to these moments: for example, 
between Julia and her sister, between Antoinette and Christophine, between Mrs 
Ramsay and Lily, and many other pairs or groups examined in this thesis. I have 
tried to demonstrate that Woolf and Rhys are experts at creating scenes through 
words that ‘vibrate’ with various intimacies that the characters sense. To do that, 
they sometimes use silence, and increase heat in their texts. By doing so, they slow 
the narrative pace down to a point that both the characters and the readers are 
absorbed in the atmosphere and text; the characters experience (sometimes 
unwillingly) strange intimacy, and the reader too comes closer to the text.  
I have shown how an important factor in strange intimacy, or any kind of 
intimacy, is desire. In the fictions of Woolf and Rhys, desire is, like in the works of 
Cixous and Deleuze and Guattari, and many other critics mentioned in this thesis, 
life-affirming and anti-Oedipal. Cixous writes that “life is to desire the other” (2008, 
p. 34). I have demonstrated that life as such also becomes the other that is desired in 
Woolf and Rhys. For instance, when Antoinette thinks of her life in the red sky and 
all the objects in it, she desires her life and to be one with it. Above all, when the 
figure of Mrs McNab dusts and dances and the narrative voice circling around her 
asks questions about what will remain, we are presented with the idea that life, 
despite Mrs McNab’s weariness, remains, and she is joyful because of this. Life 
here, is ‘a life’ in the Deleuzian sense – not an individual, personal life lived by a 
person who can be defined by or confined into majoritarian categories of sex, 
gender, class, and race, but ‘a life’ that is lived in relation to other human and non-
human beings and influenced by forces, sights, and impressions, which make up the 
‘self’ who experiences life as such. Such an understanding of life and selfhood is 
visible precisely in moments of strange intimacy. 
These moments of strange intimacy draw attention to the spaces already 
available that enchant and induce wonder in the modern world, which, as Jane 
Bennett (2001) points out, is often seen as disenchanted, rational, and void of 
meaning. To summarise this point, I would like to return to one of the texts that has 
‘haunted’ this thesis. In The Hundreds (2019), Lauren Berlant and Kathleen Stewart, 
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writing in the tradition of affect theories, speculate on the shortcomings of social 
constructivist and humanist critiques, and the things these critiques miss: 
all the extensions of ways of being touched, what it feels like to be carried 
along by something on the move, the widespread joking, the voicing, the dark 
wakefulness, the sonorousness, how managing a life vies with an unwitting 
ungluing, how things get started, how people try to bring things to an end, 
like the day, through things that slam or slide down their throats, why thought 
might become an add-on or take the form of a speed list, or why it matters 
that attention sometimes slows to a halt waiting for something to take shape 
(p. 42).  
I too have tried to capture in this thesis how Woolf and Rhys pay attention to certain 
moments when their characters are, in the course of their daily, ordinary lives, 
brought to a halt. I have tried to explore how in these moments the characters 
experience intimacy because in these moments, they realise the strength of their own 
desire, whether it is for a human other, for an idea, or for a life. In these moments, 
characters feel enchanted, wonder-struck, and attached to a material world which 
they inhabit with beings human and non-human, animate and inanimate, precisely 
because they find certain meanings in a life that otherwise seems chaotic and 
disenchanted.  
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